

Da'wah of Global Islamic Resistance

Shaykh

Umar Abd al-akim (Abu Mu'ab as-Suri)

Volume 5: **Conflict with the Romans**

Translated by

Abd ar-Rahmān al-Mansur

﴿فَقَاتِلْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ لَا تُكَلَّفُ إِلَّا نَفْسُكَ وَحَرِّضِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ﴾



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Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm

Volume 5: Conflict with the Romans

Translated by:

‘Abd ar-Raḥmān al-Manṣūr

Annaziat

Dhu’l-Hijjah 1446

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Bismillāhi r-Raḥmāni r-Raḥīm

اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ، وَعَلَى آلِ مُحَمَّدٍ، كَمَا صَلَّيْتَ عَلَى إِبْرَاهِيمَ، وَعَلَى آلِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، إِنَّكَ حَمِيدٌ مَجِيدٌ،
وَبَارِكْ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ، وَعَلَى آلِ مُحَمَّدٍ، كَمَا بَارَكْتَ عَلَى إِبْرَاهِيمَ، وَعَلَى آلِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، فِي الْعَالَمِينَ إِنَّكَ حَمِيدٌ
مَجِيدٌ

Allāhumma ṣalli ‘alā Muḥammadin wa ‘alā āli Muḥammadin, kamā ṣallayta ‘alā
Ibrāhīma wa ‘alā āli Ibrāhīma, innaka ḥamīdun majīd. Allāhumma bārik ‘alā
Muḥammadin wa ‘alā āli Muḥammadin, kamā bārakta ‘alā Ibrāhīma wa ‘alā āli
Ibrāhīma, innaka ḥamīdun majīd

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Conflict with the Rūm and Its Power Dynamics Throughout History

From Thawbān, the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: *“The nations are about to call each other [to attack] you as diners call one another to a dish.”* Someone asked: *“Will that be because of our small number at that time?”* He said: *“Rather, you will be numerous at that time, but you will be like scum, like the scum of the torrent. And Allāh will remove the fear of you from the hearts of your enemies and cast weakness (al-wahn) into your hearts.”* Someone asked: *“O Messenger of Allāh, what is al-wahn?”* He said: *“Love of the world and hatred of death.”*

And from the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) he said: *“Persia will be [defeated in] one or two thrusts, then there will be no Persia after it ever. But the Rūm are the people of horns (generations); whenever one horn perishes, another horn replaces it. People of rock and people of the sea. Alas, until the end of time, they will be your companions if there is good in living.”*

As has become clear to us from the previous chapter, the conflict of the Muslims with the Rūm has continued since the era of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) until our present day, and it continues. The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) informed us in some narrations, which are considered among the miracles of his prophethood (peace and blessings be upon him), that our fighting with them is an eternal conflict, continuing until the establishment of the Hour. Among these narrations are:

It is mentioned in Musnad al-Ḥārith and Zawā'id al-Haythamī, Vol. 2 / p. 713: Chapter on Fighting Persia and the Rūm: Mu'āwiyah ibn 'Amr narrated to us, Abū

Ishāq narrated to us from al-Awzā'ī from Yaḥyā ibn Abī 'Amr from Ibn Muḥayrīz who said: The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "*Persia will be [defeated in] one or two thrusts, then there will be no Persia after it ever. But the Rūm are the people of horns (generations); whenever one horn perishes, another horn replaces it. People of rock and people of the sea. Alas, until the end of time, they will be your companions as long as there is good in living.*" Ibn Ḥammād also cited it in Kitāb al-Fitan, Vol. 2 / p. 479.

It is mentioned in the Musnad of Imām Aḥmad (may Allāh have mercy on him), Ḥadīth No. 17335:

Ḥasan ibn Mūsā narrated to us, Ibn Lahī'ah narrated to us, al-Ḥārith ibn Yazīd narrated to us from 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Jubayr that al-Mustawrid said: While I was with 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, I said to him, I heard the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) say: '*The most severe of people against you are the Rūm, and their destruction will only be with the Hour.*' 'Amr then said to him, "Have I not forbidden you from [saying] such things?"

Indeed, historical events have confirmed what the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) foretold. No sooner had the state of Islām been established during the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) than the clashes between Muslims and the Rūm began, and this has continued, as we summarized earlier, without cessation to this day. I read in a newspaper during the Second Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait) that some historians had counted the wars between Muslims and the Rūm, and they numbered more than 3,600 wars between various Islamic states and Rūm states! Over 1,410 years.

Muslims have fought many nations, such as the Persians, Turks, Sindhis, Indians, Mongols, Chinese, and others. All of these were wars and clashes limited by their history and time. But history has proven that the Rūm are "the people of horns (generations)"; whenever one generation perishes, another replaces it. And

whenever one of their states fades, leadership passes to another. They are the people of the land and sea armies. We are still in conflict with them, and this will remain until the establishment of the Hour. Even the conflict with the Jews will end with their annihilation in the battle of the stone and the tree. And even the conflict with Ya'jūj and Ma'jūj will end when Allāh the Exalted destroys them. But it is the Rūm, their states, and their kingdoms, and the fighting with them will continue until the establishment of the Hour, as mentioned in the Ḥadīth, and they are the most severe of people against the Muslims. Indeed, the Hour will be established while the Rūm are the most numerous of people, as stated in the authentic Ḥadīth, even though it will only be established upon the most wicked of creation, who are the majority of them. This is only because they possess characteristics – by the decree of Allāh – that have enabled them to endure.

It is narrated in the Musnad of Imām Aḥmad: From al-Mustawrid al-Fihri, who said to 'Amr ibn al-ʿĀṣ, 'The Hour will be established while the Rūm are the most numerous of people.' 'Amr ibn al-ʿĀṣ said to him, 'Consider what you are saying!' He replied, 'I am telling you what I heard from the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him).' 'Amr ibn al-ʿĀṣ then said, 'If you have said that, it is because they possess four qualities: they are the quickest of people to return after a retreat, they are the best of people to a poor, needy, and weak person, they are the most forbearing of people during tribulation, and the fourth is a good and beautiful quality: they are the most resistant of people to the oppression of kings.' (Musnad Aḥmad 17334).

It is beneficial, as we endeavor in this research to answer the important question for which this book was written, which is: "How do we confront our enemies in the post-September world under American leadership?" That is, how do we successfully confront the Third Jewish-Crusader campaigns, if Allāh wills. It is beneficial to present the main stages in our clash with the previous Crusader campaigns, to

identify the keys to victory and defeat in them, through a focused analytical study. This is the subject matter of this chapter, if Allāh wills.

How did those first and second campaigns, and this recent third one, proceed? Who were its parties on the side of the Rūm? Who undertook the confrontation, defense, and resistance on the Muslim side? Who was with us and who was against us, from within our ranks and from outside, during these campaigns?

I will not dwell here on the detailed events of history, as it is recorded and well-known in its references, especially the history of the First Crusader Wars, as well as the Second, which represents modern Arab history. A brief overview of this was covered in the previous chapter. However, I will suffice here with analysis, investigation of lessons, and drawing of conclusions.

This chapter is one of the most important foundations of the call to resistance in the field of Fiqh al-Wāqī‘ (understanding contemporary reality) and exploring the causes of victory and defeat.

We will take from history the three main stages of the Rūm's campaigns against the Muslims. And we will adopt a theoretical historical division for them, as we observe they were as follows:

- The First Crusader Campaigns (from approximately the mid-eleventh century to the end of the thirteenth century CE), on the coasts of Bilād al-Shām and Egypt, which included the occupation of Bayt al-Maqdis.
- The Second Crusader Campaigns (approximately 1800 - 1970). Against the components of the Ottoman State and the Islamic world, especially the Arab world, after the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1919) and the Balfour Declaration (1917).

- The Third Crusader Campaigns (1990 - 2004 and still ongoing). Against the Islamic world in general and the Middle East in particular.

There is a clear observation that the center of conflict in all three Crusader campaigns primarily revolved around Bilād al-Shām and its neighboring regions of Iraq, Egypt, and the Arabian Peninsula. And there lay the keys to victory and defeat for both sides.

We should not forget that the arena of modern conflict (from the sixteenth century to the present day) with the contemporary Rūm, in general, has extended across the length and breadth of the Islamic world, targeting all its lands from the farthest islands of the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean in the east to the farthest coasts of Marrakech and Mauritania on the Atlantic shores in the west. And from Central Asia, Crimea, the Balkans, and North Africa in the north, to Central Africa, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia in the south.

Sources of Authority (Marji‘iyyah) among Muslims

Before delving into the study of the three Crusader campaigns and their power equations, it is useful to draw attention to the concept of authority and leadership among Muslims throughout Islamic history, as this will help, as we shall see, in understanding the management of that conflict.

According to the agreed-upon understanding, "Ūlū al-Amr" (those in authority), as a Sharī‘ah-political term among Muslims, refers to the scholars (‘Ulamā’) and the rulers (Umarā’). By virtue of the Sharī‘ah texts and established practice, the leaders of the people, especially the heads of major tribes and clans, and those among them possessing sound judgment and intellect, formed the third pillar of authority among Muslims, alongside the rulers and scholars. Thus, authority among Muslims throughout their history can be identified with three sources, which are, in order of importance, as follows:

1. Political Authority: This consists of the legitimate Caliph (Khalīfah) when one exists, or the Sultans, Kings, and Princes who hold power and authority in the case of multiple kingdoms, which was prevalent throughout most of Islamic history.
2. Religious Authority: This consists of the scholars of the Islamic religion (‘Ulamā’ ad-Dīn), as this authority devolved to the scholars and Imāms of the four schools of thought (Madhāhib) and their major, followed by scholars and jurists (Fuqahā’) throughout Islamic history. Then, the spiritual leadership of the Sufi orders (Ṭuruq Ṣūfiyyah) and their Shaykhs, who had followers and influence, emerged. Often, the Imāms of the Madhāhib were themselves Imāms of the followed Sufi orders in most parts of the Islamic world.
3. Social Authority: This generally consisted of the heads of tribes and clans that form the basic structure of Arab and Islamic societies.

This was the case throughout Islamic history, whether in situations of political unity under a single Caliph or during periods of division under the authority of multiple kings and princes.

Indeed, people always turned to these authorities for leadership and guidance, especially during major calamities.

I am not here to digress into analyzing this and its role in Islamic history or its political and social impacts, except to the extent necessary to understand the structure of resistance in Islamic societies against the Crusader campaigns and the role of these authorities in it.

It is also necessary to clarify that this academic assessment, based on observation and conclusions, is not an evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of the methodologies of those groups, neither from an intellectual nor from a Sharī‘ah perspective. The research may indicate that a certain segment or a particular school

of thought played a role in resistance, which we mention according to its importance, without this being, as it should be understood, an endorsement of the detailed beliefs, methodology, or way of thinking of the proponents of that phenomenon. It is an academic assessment and classification, not an evaluation for preference or correction of methodologies and beliefs to determine right from wrong according to the standards of Sharī'ah-based policy (al-Siyāsah al-Shar'īyyah).

I believe that while most Muslims today are ignorant of the role of these authorities, their cohesion, and their impact on the Ummah's coherence and ability to resist, the enemy has realized this and has worked to destroy these three authorities as much as possible. And it has invented alternatives for them or corrupted them and made them serve its purposes, as we will see by following those campaigns in the subsequent analytical study.

The First Crusader Campaigns (1050 - 1291 CE)

The summary, by way of a brief overview from historical references, is that when the Abbasid Caliphate (Khilāfah Banī al-'Abbās) weakened, and influence around the Abbasid Caliph fell to commanders and soldiers – most of whom, during the second half of its history, were Turks who appointed a Sultan from among themselves who became the de facto ruler of the Caliphate's center and its surroundings. The Caliph's influence was mostly confined to his palace or to Baghdad and its environs. Over time, the princes who theoretically followed the Caliph in the peripheries of the Caliphate state established independent states and kingdoms, which often fought among themselves, or their leaders vied for kingship and authority within them. These kingdoms often fragmented to include mere small cities or even castles and fortresses. Thus, there was a kingdom in Mosul, another in Beirut, a third in Tripoli, a fourth in Aleppo, another in Damascus, and so on. The Shī'ah gained control over the Caliph's court in Baghdad, the Qaramitah spread in the Arabian

Gulf, and the Ismā'īliyyah and Nuṣayriyyah – extremist Shī'ah groups – controlled the coasts of al-Shām. The Ubaydid state, which attributed itself to the Fatimids, arose and established an independent caliphate for itself in Egypt that lasted for nearly two centuries.

During that time, at the beginning of the eleventh century CE, the Pope of the Vatican issued his call to the kings of Europe for the necessity of liberating Bayt al-Maqdis and the "True Cross" – which they falsely claim Christ was crucified on – from the hands of the "infidels" (Kuffār) – meaning the Muslims. Kings from various parts of Europe, especially England, France, and Germany, quickly responded to the call for political and economic interests, as many historians suggest, though the Crusader spirit was not absent from their motives either. The Caesar of Constantinople cooperated with these campaigns by supplying them with provisions as they passed through his lands in Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, as well as by placing the Roman fleet at their service.

Thus, the Crusader campaigns, which historians date as seven major campaigns, followed one another against the coasts of al-Shām, southwestern Anatolia (in the region of Edessa, which is between Adana and the Sanjak of Alexandretta in present-day Turkey), and finally Egypt, over two hundred years. During these campaigns, the Crusaders managed to occupy Bayt al-Maqdis and establish a central principality there. They also succeeded in establishing numerous Crusader principalities, independent of each other, depending on their links to the European kings who collaborated against the Muslims, who were often fighting amongst themselves.

The Islamic principalities bordering the Crusader principalities were weak, fragmented, and fighting among themselves, such as the principalities of Aleppo, Hama, Damascus, Homs, and Mosul. They witnessed many coups and internal conflicts. The princes and sultans therein made their people taste the woes of unjust taxes (mukūs) and various forms of oppression. Thus, the Crusaders occupied the

regions that, according to contemporary geographical terms, comprise the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the Syrian coast west of al-Shām from the mountains to the Mediterranean Sea, and the entire region of Lebanon and Palestine. The weak Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad could do nothing. The Fatimid Caliph in Cairo did not lift a finger; rather, Fatimid history witnessed cooperation with the Crusaders. History also recorded the cooperation of the Nuṣayriyyah, who inhabit the western mountains adjacent to the coast in Syria, with the Crusaders, as they fought alongside them. The Islamic world, especially the Arab Mashriq, generally witnessed a state of severe turmoil and weakness during that period.

However, the historical documents that confirm this deteriorating situation at the level of political authority also prove that this period witnessed a scholarly flourishing, in which many great scholars (‘Ulamā’), Imāms, and orators (Khuṭabā’) emerged. The mosques (Masājid) bore the responsibility of religious authority and the guidance of the people, alongside social authority, far from the corruption of palaces and the conflicts of princes. The tribal social structure was cohesive and soundly built, so the people turned to their leaders among the scholars and tribal chiefs and acted upon their opinions.

With the arrival of the Crusaders, the scholars and orators rose up, urging the people to Jihād and knocking on the doors of the princes, inciting them to fight, starting from the Caliph's gate in Baghdad to the gates of the princes of al-Shām. However, historical references narrate unfortunate stories of the state of fragmentation and corruption among various types of princes and rulers of cities and fortresses. Some historians have recounted stories from that era, such that scholars toured the mosques, urged the people, and collected funds to build an army for Jihād. They knocked on the doors of princes searching for someone suitable for this task. None of the princes welcomed them until they heard of one who was thought to possess goodness and chivalry. They went to him and gave him the

money after he promised them good. Then they returned to him but could not find him. They searched for him for a month in the Syrian desert (Bādiyat al-Shām) and found that he had gone hunting and, with the money they had collected for Jihād against the Crusaders, had built a palace in the desert for himself, his companions, and his retinue for nights of hunting and sport!!

Historians have narrated that the state of most of the Ummah at that time was one of preoccupation with the world and its adornments. They recounted how orators and preachers would ignite the enthusiasm of the people in the masājid, which resounded with weeping and wailing, yet as soon as the men left the masjid, each would return to his worldly affairs, paying no heed to anything else... As if history is repeating itself today!!

Soon, the Ummah awakened from the shock, and the religious authority played its role within the Ummah. Books chronicling that era describe how this religious authority sharpened the resolve of the men of the Ummah, and how the social authority, along with the heads of tribes and clans in al-Shām and its surroundings, responded to the calls for Jihād. The elites of the Ummah at that time began clashing with the Crusaders from the very first day, until the resistance escalated.

The Ummah quickly regained its political authority with the rise of one of the amīrs of northern al-Shām, the Atabeg, the Mujāhid Amīr ‘Imād al-Dīn Zangī, who confronted the Crusaders in northwestern al-Shām and succeeded in toppling the Crusader state of Edessa. His star shone, and the Mujāhidūn and some amīrs rallied around him. The nucleus of the Zangid state began to form, with its capital initially in Mosul (northwestern Iraq, on the border of al-Shām), then moving to Aleppo (northwestern al-Shām) during the reign of his son, King Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd Zangī (may Allāh have mercy on him). He took power after the Bāṭinī Assassins from the Nuṣayriyyah of al-Shām assassinated his father. He assumed the emirate, and his authority extended to include northern Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The Zangid state was

established, and Nūr al-Dīn shouldered the task of building the foundational base for Jihād against the Crusaders in the East. Indeed, the credit goes to him (may Allāh have mercy on him) for all the glories later achieved by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. The history of this period is very well-known, covered by books, media, films, and television series, making repetition and digression unnecessary.

The ascetic King Nūr al-Dīn spent his life engaged in Jihād against the Crusaders in al-Shām, achieving one victory after another. The Zangid authority extended to Damascus, which became their capital after Aleppo in the Jihād.

The Crusaders were keen on capturing Egypt due to its significant impact in supporting whoever controlled it in the conflict over al-Shām. They were enticed by the weakness of the Fatimids and the correspondence of some of their senior viziers with the Crusaders in Bayt al-Maqdis, inviting them to Egypt and promising to hand it over. Nūr al-Dīn recognized the importance of the race to Egypt and sent his army there under the command of the Kurdish commander Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh to support the Fatimid Caliph's army against the anticipated Crusader campaign against Egypt. Asad al-Dīn was accompanied by his nephew, the emerging commander Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī, despite the latter's reluctance to leave al-Shām. However, the destinies of glory awaited him in Egypt.

Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh, upon whom the Fatimid Caliph relied to strengthen his position against his viziers, who were vying for power and conspiring with the Crusaders, passed away. The Fatimid Caliph chose Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn for the position of Ḥājib (chief minister), thinking he could control him due to his youth and his being a foreigner in Egypt, and to use his army to strengthen himself against the Fatimid amīrs. The Crusader campaign against Egypt took place, and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and the army of al-Shām and Egypt fought valiantly. Nūr al-Dīn sent them reinforcements, enabling them to repel the Crusader campaign that attacked them by land and sea, with the help of the Roman (Byzantine) fleet from Constantinople. Shortly after the victory,

the last of the Fatimid Caliphs died. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn then declared the end of the Fatimid Caliphate, delivered the Friday khuṭbah in the name of the Abbasid Caliph, reinstated the Sunni Shāfi'ī madhhab in Egypt, and consolidated his rule there. This reached a point where Nūr al-Dīn and his aides in Damascus feared Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's independent rule over Egypt. Nūr al-Dīn summoned him multiple times, but Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn delayed, until Nūr al-Dīn considered marching to Egypt with his army to ensure its annexation to his kingdom, aiming to unite Egypt and al-Shām in the Jihād against the Crusaders.

It was by Allāh's decree and His kindness that Nūr al-Dīn, the ascetic, Mujāhid king, passed away. His family declared his son Ismā'īl as his crown prince, who was an eleven-year-old child. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn went to Damascus, acknowledging Ismā'īl, and to discuss confronting the Crusaders. The people of authority and decision-making (ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd) from the 'ulamā' and leaders of Egypt and al-Shām gathered and gave their bay'ah (pledge of allegiance) to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī as Sultan over the lands of Egypt and al-Shām. They were convinced that it was not appropriate for affairs to be entrusted to a child under circumstances of confronting the Crusaders, and of the necessity for a strong sultan to assume guardianship over the affairs of the Muslims and lead the Jihād. Thus, the Ayyūbid state was established.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn proceeded to correspond with the amīrs in the Ḥijāz, Yemen, and North Africa, as well as the Seljuk kings in Rayy, northern Iraq. His relationship with the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad also strengthened, as he sought to unite the ranks of the Ummah for the upcoming confrontation. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn had concluded a temporary hudnah (truce) with the Crusaders to free himself to eliminate the fitan (seditions) of minor Fatimid amīrs in Egypt and those fighting over fiefdoms and fortresses in al-Shām. Then, the Crusaders violated the hudnah when their commander, Arnaṭ (Reynald de Châtillon), raided a caravan of ḥujjāj (pilgrims) south of Jordan. The hudnah was thus broken, fighting erupted, and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's victories followed one

after another, culminating in the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn and then the conquest of Bayt al-Maqdis. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn then installed the magnificent Friday minbar that Nūr al-Dīn Zangī (may Allāh have mercy on him) had ordered to be made, to be placed in al-Masjid al-Aqṣā for the first Friday khuṭbah after the conquest. It was destined to be installed during Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's reign, and the imām of the Friday masjid in Aleppo, who had prophesied the conquest that occurred in 583 AH, delivered the khuṭbah from it, at the very same time the Shaykh had prophesied!!

When death approached Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, he divided the kingdom among his sons, who soon fell into disagreement among themselves. The kingship eventually passed to his brother, al-Malik al-ʿĀdil, who took over the rule of Egypt and al-Shām. During his reign, the last of the Crusader campaigns against Egypt occurred, led by King Louis IX of France, whom al-Malik al-ʿĀdil captured and imprisoned in Manṣūrah. He was later released. There, after reflection and contemplation on the history of two centuries of military Crusader campaigns, Louis IX wrote his observations on the failure of the military invasion of the Islamic East and the necessity of working towards an intellectual invasion. His observations formed the initial groundwork for the contemporary Crusader campaigns, which were based on missionary work, Westernization, and then, five centuries later, colonialism.

Then al-Malik al-ʿĀdil died after having shouldered the mission of Jihād against the Crusaders. Later, when power passed to al-Malik al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl, who became Sultan over al-Shām, and to his uncle al-Malik Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb, who became king over Egypt, Ismāʿīl colluded with the Crusaders and sought their help against Najm al-Dīn in Egypt. He gave them a number of castles and fortresses and allowed them to buy weapons from the markets of Damascus. Confronting him resolutely was the Sultan of the ʿUlamā of his time, ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, the scholar of Damascus. Ismāʿīl imprisoned him, then released him. ʿIzz al-Dīn then traveled to Egypt to

continue his practice of ḥisbah (enjoining good and forbidding evil) towards the Sultan of Egypt, who sheltered and honored him.

The Ayyūbids in Egypt increased their number of slaves and Mamlūks, gathering hundreds and thousands of them, and appointing them as soldiers and commanders. The strength of each Ayyūbid amīr in Egypt and al-Shām came to be measured by the number of his slaves and Mamlūks, many of whom were from Central Asia and the lands of Turkistan. The Mamlūk commanders were enticed by their own strength and the state of decay and weakness of their Ayyūbid kings and amīrs. So, they revolted against them and took over the rule in Egypt, and consequently al-Shām, after the death of Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb during the Battle of Manṣūrah (1250 CE). His wife, Shajar al-Durr, married the chief of his Mamlūk commanders and then abdicated the throne to him. Thus, the Mamlūk state was established. The Sultan of the ‘Ulamā’, ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (may Allāh have mercy on him), has a famous historical account in this regard: he did not issue a fatwā affirming the validity of their rule because they were slaves and not free men. They were compelled to comply with his fatwā, which necessitated their sale and the return of their price to the Bayt al-Māl (treasury) of the Muslims, until they became free, and only then did their rule become valid!!

The Mamlūk state carried the banner of Jihād against the Tatars (Mongols), who had invaded the East, toppled Baghdad, and violated the cities of al-Shām, and were knocking on the doors of Egypt. It's Mamlūk Sultan, the Mujāhid Quṭuz, who rose to meet them. The Sultan of the ‘Ulamā’ did not issue a fatwā for him to take money from the public to buy weapons until after Quṭuz had contributed his own wealth and taken the wealth of the Mamlūk amīrs for that purpose. Then, the scholar issued the fatwā for him and incited the Muslims in Egypt and al-Shām to Jihād. The Battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt was the first strategic defeat for the Tatars, leading to the beginning of their retreat.

Al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars succeeded Quṭuz as Sultan after assassinating him as they were returning from ‘Ayn Jālūt, in order to seize the kingship and the joy of victory! Nevertheless, Baybars shouldered the responsibility of Jihād against the Crusaders in al-Shām for approximately 27 years, until he expelled them from their last fortresses. The complete expulsion was achieved during the reign of Sultan Khalīl ibn Qalāwūn, thus ending the First Crusades (1291 CE).

The lessons and morals to be drawn from the course of these campaigns are many. What concerns us for this research is to understand the authorities that managed the confrontation on the Islamic side:

1. The Political Authority: It was initially absent. Then it was formed through the Zangids, then the Ayyūbids, then the Mamlūks.
2. The Religious Authority: It managed the confrontation until the political authority was established. Then it stood as a support for it until the end of the confrontation.
3. The Social Authority: It stood alongside the other two authorities. The necessary components were complete, and so the Islamic Ummah confronted the nation of the Crusaders.

The equation of the confrontation in the First Crusades was, in short:

The Ummah of Islām vs. The Nation of the Cross = The Ummah of Islām was victorious.

The Islamic Ummah did not confront them with small segments, nor with small gangs, nor with limited organizations, neither secret nor public. The entire Ummah stood up to the Crusades and defeated them. Neither the conflict among amīrs and sultans for kingship, nor the weakness of the common people of the Ummah and their dereliction of Jihād, hindered this.

The Second Crusades (1798 - 1970)

The First Crusades lasted in the Arab East for about two hundred years. This enabled them to have close contact with Islamic civilization, not just militarily. There were many periods of hudnah (truce), and many commercial relations were established between the Crusader and Islamic emirates around them. Many European travelers and clergymen were able to visit Muslim lands and witness the vast difference in thinking, development, political and economic systems, and social and cultural life. They were also able to transfer many manuscripts and books, to the extent that European historians consider the Crusades one of the causes of the Renaissance in Europe and the end of the Middle Ages.

In the final days of the campaigns, the Christian kings realized they had no way to remain. They began to rethink their methods of invading and dealing with Muslims.

In the last campaigns against Egypt (1249 CE), Louis IX, King of France, was captured along with thousands of his Crusader soldiers by the Mamlūks and imprisoned. There, he had ample time for reflection to lay down important foundations for Crusader thinking on how to invade the Muslims. He wrote those important directives, the gist of which was:

"Indeed, Muslims cannot be defeated as long as their creed is established. The war against Muslims must begin with a war of words."

Then, it was not long before the First Crusades ended completely with the fall of Acre in the year 640 AH - 1291 CE.

Thus, the Crusading West realized that Muslims could not be overcome by subjugation and military force because, due to their religious sentiments and the nature of their creed, they are provoked within them all reasons for resistance and fighting. The way to do so was to invade them intellectually, changing their way of

belief and thinking to dry up the roots of their strength and ability to resist, thereby making it easy to overcome them militarily.

The Intellectual Invasion of Muslims and Its Practical Results in the Political Arena:

The First Crusades ended at the close of the thirteenth century, and the Second began at the dawn of the eighteenth century. So, how did the Crusaders benefit from a period of 500 years to prepare and plan for a return based on experience and knowledge?!

Ever since the remnants of the defeated Crusader campaigns returned to Europe, European scholars and thinkers have immersed themselves in studying the essence of our Arab and Islamic civilization. The translation movement flourished, and centers and universities of Orientalism—the specialization in Eastern studies—were established. With the collapse of Islamic rule in al-Andalus in 1492 CE, something similar occurred. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the activities of travelers, scouts, and Orientalists increased. Then, missionary movements arose under the patronage of the Pope, with European kings competing to support the sacred missions of sailors and explorers. Over these long centuries, these researchers and Orientalist and exploratory missions penetrated all parts of the Arab and Islamic world. They produced studies and research, and transferred books and manuscripts that accumulated in colossal Orientalist study centers specialized in studying us.

As an example, I once entered the library of the School of Oriental Studies in London to search for books on the contemporary political history of Algeria. When we accessed the library's computer catalog, I learned that the library contained what amounted to 114 km of shelves packed with books from various studies and languages, including Arabic and others! When I requested books about Algeria, I found out there were 30,000 books on Algeria in various languages. When we

specified the Arabic language, I recall there were over 5,000 books. When we specified the requirement for books in Arabic on the contemporary political history of Algeria, I found 263 books. And I found what I was looking for regarding documents from the independence era in dozens of them!! So, reflect. I also learned by chance that the library holds 6,000 Pashto language manuscripts dating back to various periods. You may well ask: How many Pashtuns know how to read their written language?! Meanwhile, European scholars have studied it and read its manuscripts!

I have seen similar things at the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, which is a library of read, audio, and visual materials containing hundreds of thousands of books, research papers, and studies. I learned of similar situations in universities in Holland, Germany, and elsewhere. In Spain, I saw the El Escorial library near Madrid, which contains about fifty thousand Arabic manuscripts, not to mention what is held in the Vatican Library and other centers for missionary work and Christianization.

In short, modern colonialism penetrated our lands after acquiring information in all aspects, and they read us and understood us as one reads the lines on their palm. They moved scientifically and systematically. These are the Romans and their characteristics. Most of us only know the superficial veneer of their current civilization, characterized by decadence, immorality, and licentiousness. But the civilizational foundation of these Roman nations is far more complex than that. We must know them as they knew us, and resist them with insight, just as they invaded us with insight and knowledge.

Some Arab and Muslim historians and researchers have written a number of books on Orientalism and its relationship with colonialism, and on missionary movements and their relationship with colonialism, leading one to marvel at the interconnectedness of these three subjects. Thus, the intellectual invasion of our

lands began with the arrival of Napoleon's campaign (1789 CE). The Freemasons began to infiltrate Arab countries and the Ottoman Khilāfah. The winds of Westernization and intellectual colonialism began to blow upon our lands before the physical colonialism that arrived with full force in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though it had already started nibbling at the edges of the Islamic world since the sixteenth century.

Parallel to the intellectual invasion, the vanguards of colonialism persistently worked on cultivating colonial proxies and establishing relations with various segments of society, especially its emirs and its 'ulamā'. Thus, they infiltrated the nervous system of the Islamic body, which lay ailing and moribund with the Ottoman Khilāfah. When the grand colonial concoction was ripe, colonialism was aided in its invasions by Europe's achievements, as we mentioned earlier, in the scientific renaissance, the Industrial Revolution, and advancements in weaponry and rapid transportation. Thus, colonialism descended upon us, fully equipped, and the Muslim lands fell more easily than a storm fells the yellowed leaves of a diseased tree whose trunk is worm-eaten, its roots decayed, and corruption has crept into every aspect of its civilization – religiously, intellectually, politically, and on every level.

The Sunan (Divine laws) brought it to the point where what Ibn Khaldūn had foretold about the rise, fall, and demise of kingdoms came to pass for us. Thus, civilization witnessed its fourth shift, according to Toynbee, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, from the Islamic East to Crusader Western Europe and its heir, America.

The Beginning of the Second Crusader Campaigns:

The Second Crusader campaigns and their main thrust can be dated to the beginning of the nineteenth century, with Napoleon's campaign to Egypt in 1789 CE. However,

their advance towards the peripheries of the Islamic world, their establishment of bridgeheads and naval bases on the coasts of Muslim lands, and their occupation of distant islands on the fringes of the Islamic world date back to the mid-sixteenth century. Their audacity reached the point of establishing colonies on the shores of the Arabian Peninsula and even contemplating the invasion of Al-Ḥaramayn (the Two Holy Sanctuaries), as the Portuguese fleet attempted. However, the Ottomans and their dominant naval power thwarted this attempt. Soon after, the Ottomans controlled the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea. After the English seized Portugal's colonies on the coasts of Africa, India, and the islands extending to the Philippines, and after their occupation of the Indian subcontinent, they managed to occupy the southern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula and the coasts of the Arab-Persian Gulf. In cooperation with the Gulf sheikhdoms, they established protectorates that were practically subservient to the British Crown. They did not dare – due to their civilizational understanding and comprehension – to think of occupying the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, especially Al-Ḥijāz, due to the presence of the holy sites and fearing the existence of the central (Ottoman) Khilāfah, even if only nominally, and fearing to provoke a declaration of general Jihād by it in defense of the Muslim Holy Sanctuaries against Britain in regions where they had no desire for conflict.

Then, the Franco-British rivalry openly began for the heart of the Islamic world south of the Mediterranean, in Bilād al-Shām, Egypt, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. Napoleon occupied Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth century and advanced to southern Palestine. France occupied Tunisia, Algeria, and parts of northern Morocco between 1830 and 1844 CE. Spain also entered the Moroccan Sahara and the Rif region in 1860 CE.

The Second Crusader campaigns reached their peak shortly after World War I and the Ottoman State's loss of the war alongside Germany, after Freemasons gained

control of its administration and the deposition of its last Caliph, Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, or rather conspiracy, was concluded in 1917. In the same year, the Balfour Declaration was issued by the British Colonial Office, promising Palestine as a national homeland for the Jews after Britain would take control of it according to the agreement, which allocated Palestine to its share.

Thus, the entire Arab Mashriq fell under the occupation of the armies of the Second Crusader campaigns, under the guise of modern colonialism. The French General (Gouraud) entered Damascus in 1920, and France occupied Syria, which included Lebanon. The English General (Allenby) entered al-Quds (Jerusalem) in 1921. The British army occupied Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq after Britain betrayed Sharīf Ḥusayn and reneged on the promises made to him by its minister (McMahon) to gain his assistance and incite the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Turks. Sharīf Ḥusayn was deceived, believing Britain would help him establish an Arab Khilāfah on the ruins of the Ottoman one, encompassing the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Bilād al-Shām. He led what became known as the Great Arab Revolt, where Arabs in Al-Ḥijāz and Bilād al-Shām fought their Turkish brothers, soldiers of the Khilāfah, with British support and cooperation. Britain had occupied Egypt and Sudan before that, while Libya fell to Italy (1904 CE).

This was regarding the Arab world. As for the wider Islamic world, colonial Europe divided it as well. India, the lands of Sindh (Pakistan), and Iran fell under British occupation. Turkey, under the name of independence and republic, was placed under the rule of Dönme Jews supervised by the Jew (Mustafa Kemāl Atatürk), who established the Turkish Republic and announced the abolition of the Khilāfah. Turkey thereby relinquished its legacy in the Arab and Islamic countries to the Crusader world, while France and Britain divided the Islamic countries in Central Africa.

As for Russia, its Tsars launched a colonial movement in the mid-sixteenth century that devoured Islamic kingdoms one after another. Russia occupied Crimea, Bashkiria, Tatarstan, and the Caucasian lands: Chechnya, Dagestan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. It pushed eastward to swallow Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. It had already seized all of Siberia, and the Tsarist armies encamped on the banks of the Jayhūn River (Oxus) on the borders of Afghanistan in 1904, after having toppled major Islamic capitals such as Merv, Bukhārā, Tirmidh, Samarqand, and Tashken. Then, Communist Russia, after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, inherited these colonies after eliminating the Tsarist family. Russian Jews played a major role in the Communist Revolution, both in thought and execution.

As for the lands of Najd and Al-Ḥijāz, Britain seized them in a clever way, befitting the sanctity of the Ḥaram. Britain sponsored a young prince from the Āl Sa‘ūd family, who had sought refuge in Kuwait after the fall of the Second Sa‘ūdī State. The Colonial Office became acquainted with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Āl Sa‘ūd through their chief agent in Kuwait, (Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ), whom the leaders of Christianization in the Arabian Peninsula called (Mubārak the Great) for the services and facilities he provided them for Christianization in the Arabian Peninsula. [1] Britain thus offered ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Āl Sa‘ūd its assistance to reclaim his ancestral kingdom in Najd. Due to his old age, he presented his son ‘Abd al-‘Azīz in 1898. Britain financed its first campaign in Najd in 1901. Then, as a result of the difficulties he faced, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz adopted the idea of reviving the Wahhābī da‘wah and tried again the following year.

(1) See the lecture (Ṣāni‘ū al-Khiyām - The Tentmakers) by Shaykh Salmān al-‘Awdah – may Allāh sustain him.

With British assistance, which provided him with money, experts, and English officers, and because of his claim to carry the banner of the Wahhābī da‘wah, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz received help from the groups of Al-Ikhwān, the proponents of the Wahhābī

da‘wah, who aided him in entering and seizing Najd. After deep consideration, Britain abandoned Al-Ashrāfin Al-Ḥijāz in his favor, placing all the lands of Najd, Al-Ḥijāz, and most of the Arabian Peninsula under the authority of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Āl Sa‘ūd, whom Britain declared Sultan of Najd and Al-Ḥijāz in 1935, leading to the establishment of the (Third Sa‘ūdī State). The British Crown concluded a treaty of subordination with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, in which he committed not to deviate from their counsel and orders, and not to conclude any treaty or agreement without their permission, in exchange for the British Crown guaranteeing his throne for his lifetime and for his sons hereditarily after him. Britain then supplied ‘Abd al-‘Azīz to fight Al-Ikhwān and assisted him with aircraft, enabling him to eliminate their remnants in the famous Battle of al-Sabīlah, clearing the way for him and bringing the remaining proponents of the Wahhābī da‘wah under the cloak of his sultanate and kingdom.

After Britain gained control of Palestine, it cooperated extensively with the Jewish Agency for Immigration, established by the Zionist movement. It poured hundreds of thousands of Jews into Palestine, shipped from various European countries; the number of original Jews in Palestine did not exceed 15,000 when Britain occupied it. Muslims sensed the imminent danger, and the revolution led by Shaykh ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām (raḥimahu Allāh), who came from the Syrian coast to revive Jihād in Palestine in 1936, erupted. Battles flared between Muslims and Jews, so Britain sought help from ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl Sa‘ūd to quell the revolution. He sent his son and foreign minister, Fayṣal, to persuade the Palestinians to stop the revolution and declare a truce. Fayṣal convinced their leaders to trust the promises of "our friend Britain," as he claimed. Thus, the main revolution that stood against the campaigns of displacement and Judaization in Palestine was aborted. Subsequently, various European countries continued their efforts to support the Jewish Agency for Immigration and supply the Jews with money and weapons, until their numbers reached 650,000 in 1947. The farce of the Arab armies' entry and defeat in Palestine

took place in 1947, and the Jews declared the birth of the state of Israel, with the United Nations General Assembly, blessed by European countries, America, and Russia, rushing to recognize it.

Thus, the Second Crusader campaigns planted the Jewish cancerous entity in the holiest of Muslim sanctities, and the Jews occupied half of the city of al-Quds after Crusader Britain had indirectly seized the lands of Najd and Al-Ḥijāz through the deed of hereditary kingship for ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and his sons.

So...

The entire Arab and Islamic world fell under Western occupation, which did not hide its Crusader identity. General Allenby, while planting Britain's flag with its two crosses on the summit of the Mount of Olives in Bayt al-Maqdis, exclaimed: "Now the Crusades have ended!" Similarly, French General Gouraud went to the tomb of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, struck his grave with his sword, broke off a piece of it, and said to him: "We have returned, O Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn!" Mussolini, the ruler of colonial Italy, declared that he was bringing the glories of the Romans to the southern Mediterranean. Such was the behavior of the other European countries wherever they went.

These campaigns continued their direct, overt occupation throughout what was called the era of Old Colonialism, until Jihādī revolutions and liberation movements forced the colonizing states to change their methods to the stage of New Colonialism. The campaigns continued their devastation throughout the Islamic world in a more cunning and astute manner. The declaration of independence for Arab and Islamic countries began in the early 1940s, the last being the United Arab Emirates, whose "(independence!!)" was declared in 1973. As for the Islamic kingdoms occupied by the Russians, only some of them were freed from direct occupation upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990.

As I mentioned earlier, the independence of these countries was nominal. The rise of Russia and America as two superpowers led each to inherit the tasks of New Colonialism in most of these countries, leaving France and Britain with only some colonial crumbs here and there.

Modern history has recorded that Jihādī revolutions, which combated colonialism and confronted the Second Crusader campaigns, ignited in all parts of the Islamic world and did not let colonialism enjoy peace. Revolutions would barely subside before flaring up anew. The revolutions of the ‘Ulamā’ forced Britain to withdraw early from Afghanistan. Then it departed from India and Pakistan after nearly two centuries of occupation. Similarly, revolutions in Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, and Aden forced it to leave after significant losses. Likewise, France exited Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Syria after devastating losses. In the same way, Italy left Libya, and Spain left Morocco, and so on and so forth.

A student of the course of the Second Crusader campaigns will find some important points of difference and development in the Crusaders' methods between the First and Second campaigns. Among the most important are:

The First Crusader campaigns were primarily religious, mixed with a secondary economic dimension. In contrast, the Second campaigns had a Crusader religious dimension, an economic colonial dimension, and a political dimension for the struggle for influence, as well as a civilizational dimension aimed at spreading the colonizer's culture and secular systems in the colonized countries.

The First Crusader campaigns focused only on the coasts of the Mashriq and Bilād al-Shām, in Bayt al-Maqdis and its environs, and the coasts of Syria and Lebanon. In contrast, the Second Crusader campaigns targeted the entire Arab and Islamic world, concentrating on the Middle East and supporting Israel in Bayt al-Maqdis.

The First Crusader campaigns aimed at occupying the land. In contrast, the Second campaigns aimed at occupying both the land and the Muslim individual, whom they intended to distort and alter in all aspects of his civilizational components.

And this is the most important observation: the First campaigns were carried out in a state of complete ignorance on the part of the Crusader colonizers regarding the Islamic land, its inhabitants, and all their civilizational, religious, and cultural components. In contrast, the Second campaigns were based on detailed knowledge and in-depth studies that enabled them to enter with clear insight, penetrating according to well-defined maps of the land and peoples, their psychological, ethnic, and religious composition, and their complete characteristics. This point requires the following consideration:

So, what was the state of the three authorities in leading Arab and Islamic societies?

The State of Islamic Authorities During the Second Crusader Campaigns:

On the Political Level:

It had completely fallen with the practical fall of the Ottoman Khilāfah (since the end of the eighteenth century) and then officially (1924 CE). The state of political leadership was often no better, if not worse, than the conditions of the warring emirs of the Mashriq during the Crusader and Tatar invasions. It can be said that Muslims were practically without political authority.

On the Religious Authority Level:

The religious authority was still alive. It was represented in that phase by the Imāms of the fiqhī madhāhib (schools of jurisprudence) and centers of religious enlightenment, such as major masjids in all Muslim countries. During this stage, the Ṣūfī ṭuruq (orders) emerged as a religious authority in most Muslim lands, as Ṣūfism

had flourished during the Ottoman era and before. Thus, the ‘Ulamā’ and Ṣūfī Imāms called the common people to Jihād and resistance and personally led these Jihādī uprisings.

On the Social Authority Level:

The tribal and clan-based system was still cohesive in most of the Arab and Islamic world and was very much intertwined with the religious authority, which provided the popular base that fueled the revolution.

Thus, revolutions against colonialism swept through the entire Islamic world.

Examples include the revolution of Imām Shāmil in the Caucasus against the Russians, which lasted for nearly forty years, as well as the revolts of the Uzbeks and others in Central Asia, which the Russians brutally suppressed. Consequently, Muslims shifted their Jihād towards secretly preserving their religion and national identities. Revolts against the Russians have continued to erupt throughout their history. Similarly, revolutions against the British were led by the ‘Ulamā’ of Deoband, the Imāms of the Ḥanafī madhhab, and Ṣūfī orders in the Indian subcontinent, the lands of Sindh, and Afghanistan, which ultimately led to their withdrawal. The British also faced revolts in Iraq, the Mahdist Revolution in Sudan, and uprisings led by the ‘Ulamā’ of Azhar in Egypt, as well as the revolution of the ‘Ulamā’ of Yemen against the British. France, too, faced a fierce revolution in Algeria, as well as numerous acts of resistance in Morocco, Syria, and some African countries. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī led the Jihād against the Spanish and a coalition of European armies in the Moroccan Rif, famously defeating the combined armies of five European nations at the Battle of Anwal, where thousands of soldiers and more than a hundred generals were captured. Likewise, ‘Umar al-Mukhtār and the Senussis led the Jihād against Italy in Libya for over forty years. Such was the case in various countries of the Islamic world.

Thus, despite the absence of a political authority, the religious and social authorities managed to unite the Ummah and launch resistance through Jihādī guerrilla warfare, various forms of civil resistance, disobedience, demonstrations, and political struggle. This ultimately forced the colonizers to depart and grant those countries their independence. However, this was only after colonialism had managed to lay the foundations for the next phase of the Second Crusader campaign in a cunning and malicious manner, which came to be known as modern colonialism.

The power equation in the Muslims' struggle against the Second Crusader campaigns, during the phase from military colonialism to independence, after the Jews had become fundamentally involved since World War I, became as follows: The Nation of the Cross + the Nation of the Jews versus the Nation of Islām — the Nation of Islām was victorious.

Once again, we can say here that the resistance and confrontation were not solely the actions of limited gangs, secret organizations, or ideological elites. Rather, they encompassed the Ummah of Islām in every region, as people rallied around the leaders of Jihād and revolution. When the cause of the struggle became the cause of an Ummah confronting other nations, the Ummah was qualified for victory, and colonialism departed.

Here, the discussion shifts to the stage of modern colonialism, between the Second and Third Crusader campaigns. I addressed this in previous lectures covering this research under the title "The Second Stage of the Crusader Campaigns." However, I now find it to be an independent stage that paved the way for the Third Crusader campaigns. Therefore, I will address it here under a separate title, as follows:

The Stage of Political (Nominal) Independence and the Rise of Modern Colonialism

This stage extends from the attainment of independence in Arab and Islamic countries to the establishment of the New World Order (1990)—that is, from the 1940s to the 1970s, depending on when each country gained independence, until the fall of the Soviet Union and America's unilateral dominance in managing the world and leading the contemporary "Romans." European countries, Russia, and America, which had entered the colonial scene, transitioned into a phase known as modern colonialism. The Arab and Muslim lands have not been free from it to this day. America and its Zionist administration inherited the task of leading the Third Crusader campaigns, as we will clarify later, Inshā'Allāh.

As for this stage, in continuation of what the European colonizers had decided regarding the intellectual invasion of Muslims to consolidate their control, the colonizers wasted no time. They benefited from their previous experiences and the missionary, Orientalist, and colonial projects they had established. Means of intellectual and cultural invasion were introduced alongside the first occupying forces. Missionary schools and Western universities were opened, printing presses, social and cultural clubs, newspapers, and publishing houses were established. Colonialism spread ideas of Westernization and secularism and founded nationalist parties based on them to prepare these countries for the stage of independence. Through literary, intellectual, and cultural activities, colonialism encouraged Westernization processes. It also opened the doors wide for educated youth to travel to the colonizing countries to complete their university and postgraduate studies. They returned laden with its ideas and culture, dazzled by its civilization, their hearts and minds filled, with nothing left of their connection to their Ummah except their skin color and language! These efforts, undertaken during the colonial era, which lasted for decades in some countries and over a century in others like

Algeria and the Indian subcontinent, and even longer in other regions such as Central and peripheral Asia and some African countries, yielded highly significant results. These extremely clever colonial efforts formed the components of modern colonialism and paved the way for the Third Crusader campaigns. Among those results were:

1. The colonizer cultivated, under his own supervision, political elites in our countries, preparing them to replace him, protect his interests, and carry out his burdens using our own people. Thus, he reaped the benefits without bearing the losses of confrontation with the resistance, because these "national" elites appeared to their peoples as the guardians of independence.
2. Colonialism chose the form of government according to the conditions of each country: either ruling families inheriting kingship, as in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, and Morocco, under its sponsorship and supervision; or political parties that rotated power through a theatrical parliamentary life, as in India, Pakistan, and some Arab countries. For other countries, it chose the method of military coups and dictatorships, as in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. It also created a type of civil dictatorship in a third category. These authorities were to take over governance after their departure in what was known as the stage of independence.
3. The colonizer, through media spotlight and sometimes political and military theatrics, oversaw the creation of these elites upon whom he decided to rely, making them appear to their peoples as the architects of independence. The Jihādī efforts undertaken by the ‘Ulamā’, religious authorities, and the people who fought under the banner of Islām to achieve independence were stolen. Thus, applauding demonstrations of human herds, deformed by colonialism over time, marched carrying ideas of nationalism and patriotism, belonging to Western political ideologies such as socialism, democracy, communism,

liberal capitalism, and others. Nominal independence was declared in our countries, and the people cheered and celebrated the artificial idols that took upon themselves the task of continuing the second phase of the Second Crusader campaigns. Modern colonialism thus took complete control of our lands.

4. The colonizer tied these systems—whose borders he had drawn and whose structures he had designed—to himself through various methods. Among the most important was the establishment of military bases for his armies in most of these countries, enabling him to deploy them and reassert control whenever he wished, and to use them in his international conflicts. He also bound these (independent!) regimes and countries with political, economic, military, cultural, and security treaties in a way that ensured their subservience even more than during the period of military colonialism.
5. Through its major monopolistic companies, the economic agreements that bound us, and by placing us under the compulsory supervision of international monetary institutions, the colonizer established what was practically an octopus that gripped all the resources of our countries. This ensured the plunder of our wealth, especially oil, gas, and mineral resources. He established this with his agents and partners from among our countrymen, who consisted of government officials and prominent merchants. Thus, economic colonialism sucked the blood of our peoples and the sustenance of our children, obtaining what it had come for with its massive armies, but without losses or soldiers in this phase.
6. The colonizer spread and protected Christianizing institutions. The countries of the Islamic world were subjected to intense Christianization campaigns. In the heart of the Arab and Islamic world, these campaigns only succeeded in making some Muslims doubt their religion and weakening their connection to

it. However, they were successful in the peripheries of the Islamic world, such as Central Africa and Southeast Asia (like the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Burma), where tens of millions of Muslims were converted to Christianity!

7. Modern colonialism, through these "valiant" deputies of his, worked to exclude the Islamic Sharī'ah and ruling by what Allāh has revealed in Muslim lands. Our sons, graduates of law faculties in Western universities, drafted constitutions, legislations, and laws based on the principles of Western law, Roman civilization, and its pagan constitutions. These "legislators," who usurped the "right of divinity and legislation," enacted laws and formulated constitutions derived from French and British law, which became the foundational structure of authorities and the political framework in Muslim countries.
8. As a result of a thorough study of our people and their religious, social, and general civilizational components, the colonizer worked to demolish the three authorities we discussed, which had been responsible for his defeat in the First and Second Crusader campaigns:

As for the political authority:

The Khilāfah was overthrown, and then the colonizer himself assumed political authority. Subsequently, he handed it over to the kings, presidents, emirs, and sultans he had installed, so they would follow him in everything. They would govern by his laws, establish their political systems on his principles, build their ideas and parties on his imported ideologies, and bind themselves to him with all ties of loyalty and affection. Thus, the political authority of Muslims was destroyed and disappeared completely since the fall of the Khilāfah, even in its symbolic form, in 1924 CE.

As for the religious authority:

The colonizer focused his war on mosques, ‘Ulamā’, and religious bodies independent of governments, such as al-Azhar in Egypt, and various associations of Muslim scholars and their institutions. Through coercion and bribery (literally, "the sword of al-Mu‘izz and his gold"), his deputies swayed many prominent figures, personalities, and scholars within the religious establishment. After colonialism, the governments of "independence" took over religious institutions and merged them into ministries called the Ministry of Awqāf, Religious Affairs, or similar names.

Most governments established hypocritical religious authorities that operated under the command of the Sultān, issuing Fatāwā tailored to royal and presidential wills. This happened to the administration of al-Azhar in Egypt, Zaytūna in Tunisia, the Council of Senior Scholars, the Commission for Commanding Good (al-Amr bil-Ma‘rūf), the Supreme Judiciary, and Da‘wah and Guidance in Saudi Arabia—and one can draw analogies for what occurred elsewhere.

State media and policies deliberately distorted the image of any sincere ‘Ulamā’, independent Imāms of mosques, scholars, and students of Sharī‘ah sciences who resisted. Their livelihoods were cut off, and they were besieged materially and morally. Over time, in the eyes of the "civilized" society, as they call it and promote it in the media, these figures were transformed into ridiculous models of backwardness, opportunism, and detachment from reality. Thus, governments monitored mosques, imposed Friday sermons (Jumu‘ah Khuṭbahs), and, in one way or another, co-opted this religious authority, which had been the Ummah's last refuge. This colonial plan

succeeded to varying degrees across Muslim countries. Its success was striking in the Arab world, especially in Shām, Egypt, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. It was total and complete in places like Turkey. In contrast, it was less successful in some countries and limited in others, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and places with similar circumstances. However, overall, the classical religious authority, which had historically preserved the emotional driving force of resistance for Muslims, was destroyed or paralyzed.

It is only fair to say and acknowledge that despite the prominent role played by religious authorities in confronting the occupation, they had been, since the Ottoman era, declining and suffering from diseases and ailments, such as the spread of Bida' (reprehensible innovations) and extremist, lax, and submissive Ṣūfī orders. The religious authority, in general, also suffered from a departure from the Sharī'ah-based scholarly methodology and a lack of creativity and Ijtihād. This made it easier for the colonizer and governments to isolate and dismantle them over time. Indeed, during the colonial era, the colonizer managed to win many of them over to his side, forming a class of "'Ulamā' of colonialism" that rivaled the "'Ulamā' of the Sultān" and surpassed them in their detrimental impact on the Ummah. It became apparent that this religious authority itself was in need of a renewal revolution to restore it to its correct origins, vitality, and historical merit.

As for the social authority:

It was dismantled with the rise of modern states and large cities, and the migration of workers, students, and employees from rural to urban areas due to the nature of contemporary civil society. This led to the disintegration of tribes, the weakening and fraying of clan ties, rendering them incapable of forming a cohesive bond (ʿaṣabiyyah) that would enable their leaders and

heads to play a pivotal role in political events and changes. This disintegration varied from one country to another. While tribalism remains strong and dominant in some countries like Afghanistan, Yemen, and parts of the Arabian Peninsula and Africa, these ties have almost completely unraveled, and the influence of this authority has entirely vanished in most other countries due to contemporary social and economic transformations.

Thus, apostate (Riddah) regimes arose in the Arab and Islamic world to rule their peoples with iron and fire, carrying out all the tasks of colonialism for its benefit in order to preserve their thrones.

So, who confronted the calamities of this cunning stage of the Second Crusader campaigns, managed by its deputies from among the apostate rulers? Especially after the fundamental structures of the Ummah's authorities had been shattered and its elements of steadfastness and resistance had collapsed?!

Some opposition parties to these ruling regimes did resist colonialism in its political and economic objectives. However, most of these parties were also based on the same imported Western ideas. Most of them in the Arab and Islamic world adopted leftist nationalist or liberal democratic ideologies. Because these oppositions were also colonial constructs in terms of ideology, the colonizer could use them, employ them, eliminate them, or give them the opportunity to seize power by overthrowing the existing regime and replacing it with a new one from these secular parties and political oppositions. This occurred in a series of military coups in Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, and in many African or Southeast Asian countries. Colonialism also allowed for some democratic exchange of power in certain countries. Opposition parties replaced ruling parties through rotation, but the general situation and the fundamentals of ties to colonialism did not change in any significant way. Meanwhile, modern colonialism maintained its grip through economic exploitation, resource depletion, and control over the center of Crusader

and Western intellectual influence via dilapidated governments whose external form it preserved while controlling everything through them. It did not permit any form of genuine democratic rotation of power like that practiced in its own country.

During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Arab and Islamic world witnessed the nationalist and leftist tide surge to its peak. It reached power in many countries, plunging them into a state of dependency on the Soviet Union, albeit with some balancing of interests and ties with the West, as happened in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. The Cold War era and the conflict between the two poles created a situation that reflected upon our countries as political turmoil, resulting from the dependency of nationalist, patriotic, leftist, and liberal parties on either the East or the West. This was driven by the struggle of these pawns for power, influence, and collaboration with foreign entities that provided them with material, moral, or political support to attain power.

Thus, the Islamic peoples suffered from all those options that the East or the Crusading West allowed them to compete over. Meanwhile, all of them were commanded by their masters to exclude Islamic orientations, preventing them from forming a religious authority (*marji'iyah diniyyah*) that could elevate the Ummah to confront the collapse that had become comprehensive in all aspects of life.

During this period, Israel expanded to devour the rest of Palestine and the remaining part of Jerusalem, and even to occupy parts of neighboring Arab countries whose area exceeded six times the area of Palestine, through theatrical wars, the most significant of which was the setback (*Naksa*) of June 5, 1967.

Thereafter, Israel became a bitter reality, draining the Ummah's resources, trampling its pride, exhausting its political situation, and providing its Pharaohs with material for one-upmanship over their peoples.

And because Allāh the Exalted decreed the preservation of His Dīn and His Book, and the persistence of a group manifest upon the truth (*ṭā'ifah zāhirah 'alā al-ḥaqq*)

within this Ummah, fighting for this Dīn, unharmed by those who forsake them or oppose them, and they remain so—the seeds of the Islamic Awakening (Şahwah) and the blessed revival (Nahdah) emerged in this Ummah from the very first days after the fall of the Khilāfah. These took the form of schools with diverse methodologies and inclinations, yet all striving for a single goal: to restore the Ummah to its Dīn, its Sharī‘ah, and the rule of its Lord. I will leave the detailed discussion of the Şahwah phenomenon for the next two chapters. Here, I will suffice with mentioning the equation of the confrontation and the parties to the conflict during that period between the Crusaders and the resistance forces in this Ummah.

The phenomenon of the Islamic Şahwah spread in various forms. The most prominent were those that took the shape of political parties entering the political arena, seeking power to implement the Sharī‘ah. Some took the form of intellectual schools of creed (madāris fikriyyah ‘aqadiyyah), or reformist associations or groups aiming to reform the individual and society to qualify them for Sharī‘ah rule. In other places, it manifested as popular Imāms and Khaṭībs, public scholars (‘ulamā’ ‘āmmah), and callers to reform (du‘āt iṣlāh). At times, it even reached the point of armed confrontations with apostate governments (ḥukūmāt murtaddah). This phenomenon had its literary output, its writers, thinkers, and symbols. The civilizational struggle was reflected in many segments of society through a desire for religiosity; manifestations of ḥijāb and beards spread, the Islamic book became popular, and some religious customs and traditions began to permeate all Arab and Islamic societies.

The Crusading West and the atheist East, which supported the various ruling regimes, sensed the danger. They sounded their alarm bells and instructed the governments to begin campaigns of confrontation and liquidation against this nascent, living seed, to cut its roots before its trunk could grow tall, its branches leaf out, and it bear its fruit. Thus, the clash within the Ummah transformed from being

directly with colonialism to a clash between individuals and groups of the Şahwah and the apostate governments, the creations of colonialism. This clash took many forms, including oppression, imprisonment, dissolving parties, closing newspapers and associations, and at times, it escalated to violent armed confrontations.

During the period from the beginnings of independence until the establishment of the New World Order and the launch of the Third Crusades led by America, almost all lands of the Islamic world were an arena of varying degrees of heat and turmoil for this conflict. After a new party entered the fray, its equation became as follows:

The Nation of the Cross + The Nation of the Jews + The Sect of Apostate (Rulers) versus The Islamic Şahwah → Result: The Şahwah was defeated.

Several extremely important matters are observable in this equation, which changed the nature of the conflicting forces and the outcome compared to what happened in the First and Second Crusades, including:

First: The disappearance of the overt role of the Crusaders and Jews in the confrontation, which became one of management and support from behind the scenes. The apostate sect, led by the rulers who are their allies, took the lead in the confrontation.

Second: The Ummah and its people withdrew from the confrontation due to the non-appearance of the real enemy. The conflict took the form of fitnah and infighting between the ruler and some classes of the ruled.

Third: The task of confronting these formidable powers fell upon the shoulders of the Islamic Şahwah, which constituted only partial forces, numbering in the tens, hundreds, or at best, thousands, depending on the country. This led to its crushing, derailment from its path, and failure to achieve its objectives.

Fourth: The important role of the official religious establishment and the battalion of the Sultān's scholars (‘ulamā’ al-Sultān) emerged in this stage of the conflict. They affirmed and assisted in the Ummah's withdrawal from the battle, confining it to the few groups steadfast on the truth. This establishment bestowed legitimacy and testimonies of Islām and Īmān upon the apostate rulers, granting them the title of "legitimate guardians" (Ūlī al-amr shar‘iyyīn). Consequently, they reinforced the conviction among the general populace that rebelling against them (khurūj ‘alayhim) is ḥarām, that confronting them is fitnah, and that their relations with the West and the colonial treaties they conclude fall within their صلاحيات (powers/authorities) as legitimate Imāms. This was blessed by the West, which sought to achieve it.

Thus, the pace of the clash between those governments and the Islamic Ṣaḥwah, in its various schools, particularly the armed Jihādī school, escalated since the mid-sixties. However, what happened at the end of this conflict was that by 1990, the deputies of colonialism and the vanguards of the Crusaders among our apostate rulers had defeated the forces of the Ṣaḥwah. This was achieved with the help of their colonial masters and strategic support from their hypocritical religious apparatuses and their formidable media machines. They managed to defeat the various schools of the Islamic Ṣaḥwah, practically leading them to failure, preventing them from achieving their goals, and cornering them into the bottleneck of crisis. Meanwhile, segments of the Ummah adopted the position of a spectator in this fateful battle, with utter apathy, swallowing oppression, enduring various forms of persecution, and living a miserable life.

It is very beneficial to present a summary of the colonial program of intellectual invasion from the beginning of the Second Crusades, led by Europe, up to the establishment of the recent Third Crusades, led by America.

The Course of the Tragedy and Its Causes Between the Second and Third Crusades (1798 - 1990)

The Course of the Tragedy and Its Causes Between the Second and Third Crusades (1798 - 1990 M):

In constructing this section, I will rely on some extremely important books in which our Shaykh, the martyr ‘Abdullāh ‘Azzām (may Allāh have mercy on him), summarized the essence of the causes and nature of the comprehensive upheaval that occurred in the conditions of Arabs and Muslims during this period. These are the books: "Khaṭṭ al-Taḥawwul al-Tārīkhī" (The Line of Historical Transformation), "Aḍwā’ alā al-Qawmiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah" (Lights on Arab Nationalism), and "al-Saraṭān al-Aḥmar" (The Red Cancer). The material in these books forms a basis for understanding the reasons for our current situation and for understanding the programs of the current American campaigns. By reading these books, one quickly discovers:

That the American program today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, concerning the Greater Middle East, the programs for changing educational and religious curricula, and Rumsfeld's programs for the "war of ideas," are nothing but a repeated application—albeit foolishly—of the European colonial program during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

I will quote extensive passages from them, with conciseness and slight adaptation, placing these quotations in quotation marks "...", indicating their source, which is: "Mawsū‘at al-Dakhā’ir al-‘Izām fīmā Uthira ‘an ‘Abdillāh ‘Azzām" (Encyclopedia of the Great Treasures of what was narrated from ‘Abdullāh ‘Azzām). I will place my comments and additions within them in parentheses (Author's comment: ...). These three books of his—may Allāh have vast mercy on him—have spared me the necessary return to dozens of references covering the history and events of that

period, something not feasible for me now as we live in a stage of hideouts and American pursuits—may Allāh disgrace them. I re-emphasize that the heritage of Shaykh ‘Abdullāh contains political, intellectual, and Shar‘ī treasures that make it a fundamental pillar for the intellectual and methodological upbringing of the Mujāhidīn in this age. May Allāh reward him with what he deserves.

Shaykh ‘Abdullāh ‘Azzām (may Allāh have mercy on him) said:

"The Islamic region has witnessed, during the past three centuries, a change that began slowly, then gradually intensified until, by the beginning of the first half of the twentieth century, the change reached its peak, and the path of imitating the West became overwhelming. It reached a point where an observer would initially think that this sweeping torrent could not be resisted, and that any attempt to confront it was a kind of futile absurdity or clear suicide. The battle of change occurred in three phases:

The First Phase: The encounter between the West and the East on the battlefield.

The Second Phase: The battle between the West and the East in the fields of thought, culture, and religion.

The Third Phase: The battle among the sons of the East themselves in the fields of thought, religion, and politics.

I. As for the First Phase:

The West had its advances and retreats during the Crusades, which then ended with its definitive defeat and its routed withdrawal.

II. As for the Second Phase:

The West employed numerous methods and used many means to cause the Muslims a slow death. Its goal in this phase was to brainwash Muslims of their Islām and to

quietly remove them from the Dīn of Allāh to the dīn of the ṭāghūt, without causing a commotion or uproar.

Western agencies undertook the cultivation of a replacement class for them in all fields, handed over the reins of power to them, and removed the sincere ones from the institutions of guidance and construction. The departments of education and media—press, radio, and then television—fell into the hands of the class that had shed its (Muslim) Eastern identity and declared its loyalty to the (Crusading, atheist) West.

The mission of this period can be summarized in the words of Gibb, the English Orientalist:

'This—education—is the only way to Francize the Islamic lands and Westernize them. The focus was strong on creating a class that definitely adopts a viewpoint over which religion has no authority. Then, it would be possible to evacuate their land and hand over to them the reins of power therein because they are an extension of the occupier's thought.'

It is also represented by the words of Lord Macaulay, chairman of the educational committee in India:

'We must create a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.'

And it is the same as the words of Lord Lloyd, the British High Commissioner, regarding Victoria College in 1936, M:

'And when the public gets to know this college, fathers will realize that educating their sons in it develops in them enough English sentiment to make them a link for understanding between the Easterner and the Westerner.'

III. As for the Third Phase:

The phase of 'national independence', as they like to call it, and the advent of local regimes, particularly military ones—this phase was the most impactful. Western civilization was imposed by military force, which was labeled national, progressive, and popular. These regimes, which arrived with the fanfare of 'national celebration' and were presented to the Ummah with enthusiastic popular chants, under this noise and clamor, the Westernized sons of the homeland—the rulers—erected gallows, crushed principles, uprooted values, and exterminated scholars and sincere individuals.

Indeed, the sincere ones suffered at the hands of their ruling kinsmen, in terms of torment and persecution, many times more than what they had seen during the days of the English and French. It is sufficient to give examples of this:

What the Pashtuns faced at the hands of Amānullāh Khān in Afghanistan.

What the Kurds faced at the hands of Muṣṭafā Kemāl Atatürk in Turkey.

What the Muslim Brotherhood endured at the hands of ‘Abd al-Nāṣir and his henchmen in Egypt.

And what a sincere face at the hands of the military regimes spread throughout the Arab and Islamic world. They are a single pattern and a single model in combating the truth and its people, weaving on the same loom as their predecessors and following their path.

The image of cruelty and brutality with which the West treated the sons of Muslims appears meager and small next to the image of how the local rulers (the 'dark-skinned English') treated them.

Lines of Change:

This change in the Islamic world proceeded along three parallel lines:

1 - The First Line: The line of moral corruption.

2 - The Second Line: The line of combating the sources of Islamic legislation and

diluting the texts.

3 - The Third Line: The line of tearing apart the Islamic Ummah.

The First Line: Moral Corruption:

This is summarized in the words of Zwemer, head of the missionaries, at the Jerusalem Conference in 1934:

'...We want to produce a generation that has no connection to Allāh, and no connection to the morals upon which nations are built.'

So, the focus was on women and bringing them out (of their traditional roles/homes), establishing women's unions, theater, singing, acting, institutes of fine arts, sports institutes for girls, spreading nudity, swimming pools, fashion houses, the naked image, and beauty shops. Until women became, as Morroe Berger said in his book 'The Arab World Today': 'The educated Muslim woman is the furthest member of society from religious teachings and the most capable member of society to pull the entire society away from religion.'

The women's revolution against Islām clearly began in Egypt, starting with Munīra Thābit (the first Egyptian female journalist), whom they called 'The Rebel Girl.' She was a friend of Sa'd Zaghlūl and could intervene in steering the helm of governance.

Then came Hudā Sha'rāwī, who, during the 1919 revolution, led a women's demonstration where they burned the ḥijāb in public streets. Şafiyyah Zaghlūl, Sa'd Zaghlūl's wife, was the first wife of a leader to appear unveiled in public gatherings. She named herself in the English manner after her husband and gave herself the title 'Mother of the Egyptians.'

Her husband, Sa'd Zaghlūl, was a leader of the women's movement and said: 'I shared with my friend Qāsim Amīn his ideas, which he included in his book "The New Woman".'

Newspapers were published defending women's rights, including 'Fatāt al-Sharq' (Girl of the East), and magazines like 'Al-Hilāl,' 'Al-Muqtaṭaf,' and 'Al-Muṣawwar.'

Luṭfī al-Sayyid called for co-education and imposed it on the Egyptian University. Therefore, Hudā Shaʿrāwī praised this act, and it was later supported by Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Samīr al-Qalamāwī, and others.

In Turkey, in 1929, a decree was issued prohibiting polygyny, eliminating the ḥijāb, the ḥarīm system, and the law of divorce. Women in Turkish cities appeared in revealing attire.

In 1965, Ḥabīb Bourguiba issued similar decrees in Tunisia, and so on in other countries.

The Second Line: Casting Doubt on the Sources of Islamic Legislation and Diluting its Texts

This was represented by attacking:

The Qurʾān itself: Distinguishing the Meccan Qurʾān and casting doubt on the Medinan, stripping the Qurʾān from revelation, and considering revelation as a psychological outburst or neurotic states.

The first among the progeny of Muslims to openly deny the divine origin (Rabbāniyyah) of the Qurʾān and loudly proclaim his rejection of its divine source was Ṭāhā Ḥusayn in his book 'Fī al-Shiʿr al-Jāhili' (On Pre-Islamic Poetry), in which he followed the method of doubt he inherited from Descartes.

The Noble Sunnah: The focus of hostility towards it was to destroy it as a primary source for explaining the Qurʾān, clarifying its generalities, restricting its absolutes, and specifying its general rulings.

The attack on the Sunnah came from many angles, the most important of which were:

Attacking the personality of the Messenger (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) and disparaging him."

Focusing on Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī as the most authentic book after the Book of Allāh and casting doubt upon it: Abū Rayyah wrote "Aḍwā’ ‘alā al-Sunnah al-Muḥammadiyyah", Ṣāliḥ Abū Bakr wrote "Al-Isrā’īliyyāt fī al-Bukhārī", and Al-‘Arabī magazine wrote, "Re-examine al-Bukhārī, for not everything in it is authentic."

Focusing on undermining the personality of Abū Hurayrah as the most prolific narrator of Ḥadīth from the Messenger of Allāh (ṣallā Allāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam), and defaming the personality of Lady ‘Ā’ishah as a rich source for the transmission of this Dīn.

And now there is a broad call adopted by some regimes, such as (al-Qadhdhāfī) in Libya, to abandon the Sunnah entirely.

The Arabic Language: Considering it the language of the Qur’ān, they called for: Abandoning the rules of the language (grammar and morphology). This was advocated by Salāmah Mūsā, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, and Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, proponents of the rule "use a sukūn and you'll be safe."

Colloquial Arabic instead of classical: Starting with Wilhelm Spitta (the German director of the Egyptian National Library), then Willmore (the English judge), and Nallino Cox (the English agricultural engineer). Finally, Salāmah Mūsā and Qāsim Amīn came, and then Yūsuf al-Sibā’ī and Iḥsān ‘Abd al-Quddūs wrote in colloquial Egyptian.

Adopting Latin script instead of Arabic: This was called for by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Fahmī from Egypt and Sa‘īd ‘Aql from Lebanon.

As for Muṣṭafā Kamāl Atatürk, he implemented this matter with iron and fire.

Propaganda for prose poetry instead of metered poetry, because classical poetry is one of the most important vessels of the Arabic language.

Islamic History: Focusing on the doubts within it and exaggerating the extent of disagreement among the Companions (raḍiya Allāhu ‘anhum). Focusing on the Abbasid Caliphate as a state of slave girls, wine, and pageboys, especially during the era of al-Rashīd, as promoted by "Kitāb al-Aghānī" by al-Aṣḥānī. Then, distorting the history of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate and considering it a form of colonialism.

Replacing Islamic Culture with Western Culture:

In Egypt – the leader of the Arab world – the missionary conference held in 1906 recommended establishing a secular university to oppose al-Azhar, which "threatens the Church with danger," and for this university to be modeled on French universities. Thus, the Egyptian University was established (1908 CE), and after a period, Luṭfī al-Sayyid became its president.

Writings appeared calling for assimilation into the West, such as the writings of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn in his book "Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfah fī Miṣr" (The Future of Culture in Egypt), where he says: "We must follow the path of the Europeans and tread their way to be their equals and partners in civilization, its good and its evil, its sweet and its bitter, what is loved of it and what is hated, what is praised of it and what is blamed."

This trend began during the days of Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha through the writings of Rifā‘ah al-Ṭaḥṭāwī in "Takhliṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz" (The Extraction of Gold in the Summary of Paris). The call intensified during the days of Khedive Ismā‘īl, and Ismā‘īl's line appeared in the writings of Muḥammad ‘Uthmān Jalāl, al-Ṭaḥṭāwī's successor. Ismā‘īl established a system for al-Azhar in 1872 CE. Then Dunlop came and took over guidance in the Ministry of Education, completely removing Islam from schools, disparaging al-Azhar, and attempting to diminish its status. A holder of an English language certificate would receive (12) pounds monthly, a holder of an

Arabic language certificate would receive (4) pounds, while an al-Azhar graduate would receive (112) Egyptian qirsh.

Then, many schools emerged in this regard:

The first school (the school of complete assimilation into the West) and severing ties with Islam. Prominent names in this regard include: Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Salāmah Mūsā, Luṭfī al-Sayyid and his brother-in-law Ismā'īl Maẓhar, and 'Abd al-'Azīz Fahmī.

The school of mixing and patching (between Islam and Western culture) was led by Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh.

In this field, calls rose and voices were raised with grand slogans, including:

Development: Meaning the dilution of Islamic texts and the introduction of atheism and Western secularism in a deceptive, glittering guise. An example of this is the law for the development of al-Azhar issued during 'Abd al-Nāṣir's time, which was a devastating blow to it.

Development also means building a bridge over the chasm created by Islam between the East and the West to achieve understanding and communication, which consequently leads to the tearing apart of the Islamic world, as Gibb says: "Perhaps new opinions and the necessities of life will finally succeed in scattering Islamic society and tearing apart its unity."

Connection with Greek culture as a basis for development.

Raising the slogan of freedom: Secular governments in the Islamic world provided intellectual freedom if people used it against religion.

The call for a universal religion: As advocated by (Kālgharlī). The meaning of a universal religion is the complete elimination of Islam and its dissolution into the crucible of global Judaism.

Rapprochement between religions: As advocated by (Āṣif 'Alī Qubṭī al-Ismā'īlī).

Conferences began to be held for this purpose.

The call for types of Islam: Such as Classical Islam and Modern Islam, as stated by Faḍl al-Raḥmān al-Hindī, and also by Aḥmad Khān, founder of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (propagating Modern Islam influenced by Western doctrines). Also, the repetition of names like Indian Islam, Pakistani Islam, and Turkish Islam.

Secularism (secularism) (lā-dīniyyah – non-religiousness): So that Islam becomes exactly like Christianity, with no connection to life, as stated in the book "Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm" (Islam and the Foundations of Governance) by ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq.

Religious reform: As they call it, similar to what happened in the program of the "Kemalist destruction of Islam" under the name of religious reform, as called by Smith, Brockelmann, and other Orientalists. The meaning of religious reform is changing the texts of Islam with new texts while retaining the name of Islam.

Colonialism, Orientalism, and missionary work—these three tentacles of the octopus hostile to Islam—proceeded side by side.

American universities, in particular, held several conferences to combat Islam, foremost among them the conferences held at Princeton University in America. Princeton University Conference in 1947 CE, titled "The Near East: Its Society and Culture."

Princeton University Conference in 1953 CE), titled "Islamic Culture and Contemporary Life."

The Lahore Conference, held in 1955 CE, was arranged by Western Orientalists and failed completely.

The Third Line: The line of tearing apart the Muslim Ummah:

Its meaning includes:

Nationalism: Arab, Kurdish, and Indian.

Global movements, Such as Communism.

Masonic-Jewish humanitarian calls and their branches, such as Lions Clubs, Rotary,

Jehovah's Witnesses, and B'nai B'rith (Sons of the Covenant).

Kāfir (disbelieving) sects attributed to Islam: Such as: Qādiyāniyyah - Bābism - Bahā'ism - Nuṣayriyyah - Druze.

(End of quote.)

The Line of Historical Transformation

"Indeed, the most dangerous thing the Islamic Ummah has been exposed to is the process of internal transformation, i.e., spiritual, psychological, and intellectual defeat before its enemies. It thus submitted before idols, knelt at the feet of the ṭawāghīt (tyrants), and was afflicted by al-wahn (weakness), which the Messenger of Allāh (ṣallā Allāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) defined as 'love of the world and hatred of death.' In the authentic Ḥadīth narrated by Aḥmad: 'The nations are about to call each other to attack you as diners call one another to a dish.' A questionnaire asked: 'Will it be because of our small number on that day?' He said: 'Rather, on that day you will be many, but you will be like the scum carried by a torrent. Allāh will remove the fear of you from the hearts of your enemy, and He will cast al-wahn into your hearts.' Someone asked: 'O Messenger of Allāh, what is al-wahn?' He said: 'Love of the world and hatred of death.'"

So how did the "best Ummah brought forth for mankind" become scum?

And how did beneficial goodness turn into foam and flotsam?

And how did lions beget monkeys?

And how did the lions of the jungle give birth to pigs?

Indeed, the most dangerous thing that can afflict nations is defeat in their depths. This is a fatal disease. The most severe blow that struck the Ummah in its vital core was the loss of self-confidence. People are victorious only when they interact with their principles, live by their beliefs, and find elevation in their Dīn. An Ummah that rallies around a sound ‘aqīdah, lives for it, and strives to revive it will never be

defeated, no matter who its enemies are and no matter how many forces gather against it. This principle is what the Lord of Glory has inscribed as the cause of victory and defeat, as He, the Exalted, says:

{Or when a disaster struck you [on the day of Uḥud] after you had struck [the enemy] with one twice as great, you said, "From where is this?" Say, "It is from yourselves." Indeed, Allāh is over all things competent.} (Āl ‘Imrān: 165).

Defeat begins internally, and then it is reflected on the battlefield. The defect starts in the depths of the soul, then we see its effects as a rout in the fields of life—in behavior, morals, and dealings. So, how did the process of transformation take place?!

Europe and the War of Words instead of the War of the Sword

In the recent campaigns against Egypt (1249 CE), during the last days of the Ayyubids and the early days of the Mamluks, Louis IX, King of France, was taken captive and imprisoned in the Citadel prison. There, he had ample time for reflection to lay down important foundations for Crusader thinking on how to invade the Muslims. He wrote those important directives, the essence of which was: "Muslims cannot be defeated as long as their ‘aqīdah is intact. The war against Muslims must begin with a war of words."

Thus, the Christian kings realized they had no way to remain. They began to rethink their method of invading Muslims and dealing with them.

Napoleon's campaign in Egypt (1798 CE) was a prominent point in the transformation of the battle and its methods. Napoleon invaded Egypt armed with the latest French weapons, cannons, and machine guns. Horses entered al-Azhar, and their hooves trampled the mats that had produced tens of thousands of the Ummah's scholars. Al-Azhar rose up and defended the dignity of this Dīn, disturbing

Napoleon's rest and keeping him sleepless. He could not achieve stability despite the collaborators who stood by him, like Ya'qūb the Copt and those who sided with him from the Byzantines (Rūm), Christians of Shām, and others. Finally, Sulaymān al-Ḥalabī attacked Kléber, Napoleon's deputy, whom he left behind in Egypt, and killed him.

The French withdrawal from Egypt was one of the most prominent landmarks in modern Europe, as it led Europe to resolve to wage a battle of the tongue instead of a battle of the spear. It moved towards uprooting this Dīn from the depths of this Ummah to plant in its place nationalism, 'aṣabiyyah (partisanship), and other slogans in an attempt to fill the void.

It was stated in the conference "The Near East and Its Culture," held by a group of Orientalists at an American university:

"In every Muslim country we entered, we dug up the earth to unearth pre-Islamic آثار (artifacts/remains). We do not aspire for the Muslim to revert from the Islamic 'aqīdah to a pre-Islamic belief, but it is sufficient to scatter his loyalty."

And in a report from one of the missionary institutes, penned by Nabīh Amīn Fāris: "While the Near East was an ambition for empire-building ideas, it was also an ambition for another group of people seeking to achieve through the word what their Crusader ancestors failed to achieve through the sword."

"Let us give an example of this with the corruption that began in the heartland of Islam, in Egypt and Shām."

Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha (Napoleon's Heir) (1904 - 1949)

Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha came to do what Napoleon failed to do. He wanted to turn Egypt into a piece of France and began by sending missions to France to brainwash

the dispatched individuals. Among those who went there was Rifā'ah al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, who returned as an advocate for Western culture and wrote "Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz" (The Extraction of Gold in the Summary of Paris) and translated French law. Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha took a Frenchman-a – physician – as his advisor, whose name was Clot Bey. This Frenchman had a great influence on the Westernization of Egypt. During Muḥammad 'Alī's reign, French laws were introduced to gradually replace the Islamic Sharī'ah. His private companions were tourists, consuls, and missionaries. One of the deepest negative impacts during Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha's time was that he opened the doors of Egypt and Shām, when it came under his control, to Christian missionaries. These doors had been closed to them due to the Ottoman Caliphate's strictness and firmness on this issue and its prohibition of missionaries.

The result of missionaries entering Shām was the establishment of two universities in Lebanon:

First: The Syrian Protestant College, established by the Protestants, which later became known as the American University of Beirut.

Second: The 'Azīr College, established by the Catholics, which later became known as the Jesuit University.

The American University was a launching point for many deviant opinions and trends that left deep impacts on the process of transforming the Arab world. Among these trends was the nationalist trend, which was intended to replace the 'aqīdah of Islam in hearts to fill the void left by Islam after it receded from all aspects of life.

It is stated in the book "The Arab Society" / Beirut University / Faculty of Arts: "The first association that began to call for Arab nationalism was a Christian association, the idea for which was inspired by a man named Ilyās Ḥabbālīn from the town of Dhūq Mikāyil. He was a French language teacher at the American

University, teaching a class that included Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī, Ya‘qūb Şarrūf, and Shāhīn Makāriyūs. The professor was an admirer of the French Revolution."

Arab nationalism, thanks to its leaders and advocates, most of whom were Christians, became a new religion that replaced Islam, as ‘Alī Nāṣir al-Dīn said in the introduction to his book "Qiṣṣat al-‘Arab" (The Story of the Arabs), footnote p. 38: "Arabism itself is a religion for us, the devout, long-standing Arab nationalists, both Muslims and Christians. For if every era has its sacred prophethood, then Arab nationalism is the prophethood of this era."

The American University and its schools in the region provided us with the leaders of nationalist parties in the region: Anṭūn Sa‘ādah founded the Syrian Nationalist Party, followed by Asad Ashqar, then George ‘Abd al-Masīḥ.

The Ba‘ath Party was founded by Michel ‘Aflaq, a Christian, and Zakī al-Arsūzī, a Nuṣayrī. The Arab Nationalist Movement was headed by George Ḥabash, under the guidance of his professor Constantine Zurayk, a professor at the American University.

It is stated in the Fifth Protocol of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion: "We have sown discord between each and every one in all the personal and national objectives of the Gentiles over twenty centuries."

Western countries succeeded in directing Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha to perform the greatest service to the West, including:

1. Shaking the authority of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate over the East and fighting Turkey in many places.
2. Activating the Christian missionary movement in the region.
3. Transforming Egypt and Syria into countries that are Westernized in their thinking and life.

4. Striking the Islamic movement that appeared in the Arabian Peninsula (the Wahhābī movement).
5. Introducing Western laws to be applied to Muslims.

All five of these actions were dangerous and had a great impact on the lives of Muslims, especially regarding the introduction of the new religion (Napoleon's religion), i.e., French laws, and mixing them with divine law, thus creating a new, mixed religion from (the French religion and the Islamic religion). His right-hand man in altering the Dīn of Allāh was Rifā'ah al-Ṭaḥṭāwī. As for his main mentor, it was Dr. Clot, who directed Egyptian life in most of its aspects. As for striking the Wahhābī movement (the call to Tawḥīd) in the Arabian Peninsula, Muḥammad 'Alī sent his son Ibrāhīm Pasha in the year (1231 AH) (1815 CE) to the peninsula, and in the year (233 AH) (1817 CE), Ibrāhīm Pasha entered al-Dir'īyyah, the capital of the Da'wah, and crushed the Wahhābī movement.

Before we conclude the chapter on Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha, we must pause to consider Rifā'ah al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, who had the greatest impact on the process of transformation.

Al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (one of the members of Muḥammad 'Alī's missions to Paris) resided in Paris from 1826 to 1831. He returned and wrote his book, *Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz* (The Extraction of Gold in the Summary of Paris), which he wrote during his stay in France and presented to his teacher, Jomard. He expressed his profound admiration for France. In *Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz*, he translated the French Constitution and glorified the French Revolution, which had shattered the Church and reduced it to a pile of historical remnants.

During the time of Khedive Ismā'īl, al-Ṭaḥṭāwī was his right-hand man in corruption and Westernization. During this period, he wrote his two books: *Manhaj al-Albāb al-Miṣriyyah fī Manāhij al-Ādāb al-'Aṣriyyah* (The Curriculum of Egyptian Intellectuals in

the Methods of Modern Etiquette) and Al-Murshid al-Amīn lil-Banāt wa al-Banīn (The Trustworthy Guide for Girls and Boys). He showed a clear interest in Pharaonic history and called Ramses II (the Pharaoh of our master Mūsā): "the pride of the Egyptian state in the pre-Islamic ages and the lamp of its history." A Muslim's astonishment does not cease when seeing al-Ṭaḥṭāwī presenting the system of companies and interest-based (ribā-based) banks without comment. He considered French dance a type of shalbanah (elegance, youthfulness, and sport). He admired amusement, and al-Ṭaḥṭāwī encouraged the mixing of genders, the education of girls without restrictions or adherence to Sharī'ah limits, the prohibition of polygyny, and the restriction of divorce. He began to repeat a new slogan: "Brotherhood of the Homeland." This slogan later became a creed for advocates of nationalism and racism.

Al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, like his contemporary Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī, who authored the book Aqṣam al-Masālik fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-Mamālik (The Surest Path to Knowing the Conditions of Kingdoms), were the first messengers of Western civilization in our lands, who acted as vanguards to demolish the great edifice of Islām in the souls of its people.

The Salon of Princess Nāzli Fāḍil

Nāzli was the daughter of Muṣṭafā Fāḍil, the brother of Ismā'īl Pasha. Muṣṭafā was the crown prince, but Ismā'īl removed him, so he traveled to Turkey and then to Europe. There, his daughter Nāzli was raised, mastered several languages, married a Tunisian minister, and then returned to Egypt to carry out acts of sabotage that Western circles had failed to achieve. She opened her salon, which became a meeting place for power enthusiasts and a focal point for those who dreamed of prominence in the land, because the salon came under the patronage of Cromer, the British Agent in Egypt. The regular attendees of this salon were those who sought to benefit from the princess's prestige and wealth.

Among those considered the elite of her council:

- Sa'd Zaghlul: He came from the streets, without prestige, knowledge, or wealth – and headed her office, remaining unmarried until the age of thirty-six. Then he married Şafiyyah, the daughter of Muşţafā Fahmī, who was the Prime Minister under the British occupation for some ten years. The strange thing is this marriage to the Prime Minister's daughter, who was not yet fifteen years old. Şafiyyah later became known as Şafiyyah Zaghlul and was nicknamed "Umm al-Mişriyyīn" (Mother of the Egyptians).

Also among the salon's attendees were Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and his student Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh. I have come across a letter between the two Shaykhs concerning the princess, which is heartbreaking regarding the state of the leaders of Islamic thought at that time!!

Also among the salon's attendees:

Luţfī al-Khulī. Then Qāsim Amīn was brought, who had once responded to a Frenchman, D'Harcourt. This Frenchman had disparaged the status of women in Islām. So Amīn responded to him, explaining that Islām gave women their due status, preserved their fundamental role, and their modesty through their attire. Because of this article, Sa'd Zaghlul and Muḥammad 'Abduh incited Princess Nāzli against Qāsim Amīn, because his words detracted from the princess's standing as she advocated nudity and licentiousness. Then they suggested a solution for the princess to be pleased with him: that he write a book about women. So, in 1900 CE, he produced the book Taḥrīr al-Mar'ah (The Liberation of Women), which Qāsim Amīn and Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh co-authored. Years ago, this secret was discovered when Muḥammad 'Abduh's grandson announced that his grandfather was the author of Taḥrīr al-Mar'ah. The meaning of "liberation of women" was: liberating them from values, principles, modesty, and morals.

Britain continued to patronize this salon and its attendees until they brought them to positions of power:

Muḥammad ‘Abduh became the Muftī of Egypt. Sa‘d Zaghlūl became Minister of Education, then Prime Minister. And Luṭfī al-Sayyid (dubbed "Ustādh al-Jīl" - Professor of the Generation) became the president of the Egyptian University and imposed gender mixing in the university.

Luṭfī al-Sayyid: This is the one who used his newspaper, called Al-Jarīdah, to promote Cromer's views and defend them, and to call for Pharaonism and the shaping of a distinctive Egyptian personality.

The protégés of Nāzī Fāḍil's salon adopted this by separating Egypt from the Arab Islamic world.

For example, Sa‘d Zaghlūl, when asked about Arab unity, replied: "It is a unity of zeros."

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn followed this line, saying: "Religion and language are not suitable as a basis for political unity, and the Egyptian is Pharaonic before being Arab." Salāmah Mūsā published this statement in his newspaper, Al-Majallah al-Jadīdah, in 1928 CE because he was following the same line.

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn also said: "If Islām stood between me and my Pharaonism, I would renounce my Islām."

In 1927 CE, Zaghlūl died, and al-Naḥḥās became the leader of the Wafd party. British tanks imposed him as Prime Minister on February 4, 1942, against the will of King Fu‘ād.

- Ṣafiyyah Zaghlūl (Umm al-Miṣriyyīn) and Hudā Sha‘rāwī. Ṣafiyyah and Hudā had a great impact in corrupting the good fiṭrah (natural disposition) of Egyptian women. As for Ṣafiyyah, she managed the wheel of corruption from

her position of power because her husband was Prime Minister, and she, as we mentioned, was the daughter of Muṣṭafā Fahmī, a former Prime Minister.

As for Hudā Sha‘rāwī, she was the daughter of Sulṭān Pasha, who sided with the English against the ‘Urābī Revolution. He received a large sum of money from the English for his collaboration, then contracted cancer. Before he died, he married his daughter to a wealthy man in his fifties named ‘Alī Sha‘rāwī, so she became Hudā Sha‘rāwī. ‘Alī Sha‘rāwī was an agent of the English, and Hudā was taken to Europe. Upon her return from her trip, on the ship's gangway, she removed her khimār (headscarf) and placed it under her feet, saying: "The age of darkness has ended forever." And she formed the "Egyptian Women's Association."

Cromer, the British Ruler of Egypt, and Reverend Dunlop

As for Cromer, he was the British Agent who administered Egypt from the occupation in 1882 until 1906. Dr. al-Nashshār said: "Cromer announced upon his arrival in Egypt that he would demolish the Qur’ān, the Ka‘bah, the Islamic family, and al-Azhar." [1]

Cromer focused his attack on the Ottoman State and assailed Islām through Turkey, which represented it. He spread English, fought Arabic, and advocated the idea of "Egypt for the Egyptians." He devalued al-Azhar and its men, promoted the Westernized class, and used to say:

"Patriots will find their best hope in the advancement of Muḥammad ‘Abduh's followers to gradually achieve an independent Egypt." [2]

Cromer authored the book Modern Egypt. He claimed that Islām is contrary to civilization and teaches its followers to hate those who differ from them!! And that it opposes progress, permits divorce, and prohibits ribā (usury/interest) and alcohol.

Luṭfī al-Sayyid was one of those who championed the defense of Cromer and his policies in his newspaper Al-Jarīdah, and in the newspaper Al-Muqaṭṭam.

As for Douglas Dunlop:

(1) Note his statement and the details of what will come regarding the Europeans' programs in what they called the "war of words" since the nineteenth century. Compare the program of Cromer, the British ruler of Egypt since 1882, with the program of Bremer, the American ruler of Iraq since 2003. And the strategy of Rumsfeld and Rice for the "war of ideas" and the "development of societies" – Arab and Islamic – religiously, culturally, politically, and socially! You will discover that what is happening now is merely a subsequent chapter to a previous one... The only difference is the stupidity in the American application, which is based on foolishness, ignorance, brutality, and the barbarism of the cowboy who was deprived of European culture and cunning!

(2) Now, an "independent" Iraq, gradually!!

He was one of Cromer's major misdeeds. Cromer had encouraged missionaries in Egypt and Sudan, but when he saw their naive way of approaching people in the streets, he feared that their work would lead to an awakening of the people and then ignite a national revolution with Islamic fervor. So, he limited their activity. The missionaries submitted a report to the British government, and Britain sent a reprimand to Cromer. He responded to the missionaries, "I will achieve, through one monk, many times what you do." He brought Dunlop in 1889, a monk who had graduated from a British theological college. Cromer appointed him Secretary of Education in 1897. Then, in 1906, he was appointed advisor to the Ministry of Education, and Dunlop was the de facto minister.

He implemented Cromer's policy: "A British mind and Egyptian hands." [1] And he raised his master's slogan:

"When the Qur'ān and Makkah disappear from the Arab lands, then we can see the Arabs progressing on the path of civilization." [2]

Dunlop fought the Arabic language and al-Azhar, and encouraged English. The teaching of science, mathematics, chemistry, and geography came to be in English. He fought higher education under the pretext that Egyptians were not fit for it. And he fought Islamic books or those with Islamic sentiment, such as the books of 'Alī Mubārak and 'Abd al-'Azīz Jāwīsh.

The most dangerous thing Dunlop did was that he designed the curricula that became a model for Arab countries, and he divided education into two sections:

- Religious: He made this exclusive to al-Azhar and its institutes.

(1) - Now, it's an (American-Jewish-British mind)... and Iraqi, Jordanian, Saudi, Pakistani, Egyptian hands... and so on to the end of the caravan of livestock!!

- And secular (Madanī): In this, he fought every religious word and prevented the employment of al-Azhar graduates, the people of true knowledge. If he needed some of them, he would pay one 112 Egyptian piasters per month. Such was the situation in Egypt – the pioneer of the Arab world – in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

(2) - Now America demands the removal of what it calls verses and sūrahs of Jihād and incitement to hatred from educational curricula. It promotes an abridged muṣḥaf (Qur'ānic text) they want to publish, calling it Furqān al-Ḥaqq!! It incites tolerance between wolves and sheep! And governments enroll Imāms in rehabilitation courses to avoid extremism!

In politics: Matters were in the hands of the English, as their Agent was the de facto ruler of the country, while the Khedive had no control over his affairs.

In the economy: Egypt's wealth flowed into English pockets.

Al-Azhar: Excluded from guiding the course of life.

Media: The radio was directed by Luṭfī al-Sayyid and his ilk, who was also the university president, as were the daily and periodical newspapers. Most magazines were in the hands of Christians, such as Al-Ahrām, Al-Muqaṭṭam, Al-Muqtaṭaf, Al-Hilāl – more than twenty of them were in Christian hands. And the Ministry of Education and curricula: in Dunlop's hands.

The University: In the hands of Luṭfī al-Sayyid. Then came Ṭāhā Ḥusayn to continue the role through his books Al-Shi'r al-Jāhilī (Pre-Islamic Poetry) and Al-Adab al-Jāhilī (Pre-Islamic Literature), to deny the divine origin of the Qur'ān, and he uttered his statement:

"The Torah can tell us about Ibrāhīm and Ismā'īl, and the Qur'ān can tell us about Ibrāhīm and Ismā'īl, but we do not consider these two as reliable historical sources." Then he took over the university, then the Ministry of Education. Some said, "The era of Dunlop ended, and the era of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn began."

In the late nineteenth century, the most dangerous event of the modern era occurred: the Basel Congress (1897 CE), convened by Herzl in Switzerland.

The Basel Congress in Switzerland (189)

Many historical commentators almost unanimously agree that the Basel Congress is considered the most dangerous event of the modern era. It was a turning point for the Islamic world, as after it, international Jewry diligently organized plans and perfected schemes and snares to trap Muslims in order to reach the Promised Land.

As for Herzl, he was an Austrian Jewish journalist born in 1860. In 1894, he attended the trial of the Jewish officer Dreyfus, who held French citizenship. This officer was accused of collaborating with Germany and was sentenced for treason to ten years and stripped of his military ranks. The trial deeply affected Herzl. He believed

Dreyfus was unjustly convicted because of his Jewish religion and said – whoever wishes to be treated fairly in this society must triumph – and he resolved to work towards establishing a homeland for the Jews. A year after this event, in 1895 CE, he published his book *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State), which is similar to the book published by Moses Hess, Rome and Jerusalem.

In 1897, he managed to gather Zionist organizations at a World Zionist Congress in Basel. At the end of the congress, Herzl declared that the Jewish state had been established and set a timeframe for it

Most of the major events that took place in the Islamic region – particularly the Arab region – were aimed at the grand objective that Herzl, and the Jews behind him, set their sights on: reaching the Promised Land. The Jews faced a formidable obstacle that could not be overcome: the Ottoman State, headed by Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II, who ruled between 1876 and 1909.

The Jews first attempted to entice the righteous Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd had ascended to the Khilāfah at a time when Freemasonry (al-Māsūniyyah) was on the verge of strangling the state.

Let us return to Herzl, who, after the conclusion of the Basel Congress in 1897, went to meet Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. He took with him the Rabbi of Constantinople, Moses Levi, and they presented the Sultan with several offers, including:

- 1 - The establishment of an Ottoman fleet.
- 2 - Supporting Ottoman policy in the external world.
- 3 - Jewish assistance to the Sultan in improving his financial situation.
- 4 - The establishment of an Ottoman university in Jerusalem (Al-Quds).

Herzl said, "For example, if His Majesty (Mawlānā) agrees and sells us the ownerless lands in Palestine for the price he determines." The Sultan became angry and said:

"The lands of the homeland are not for sale. Lands acquired by blood are only sold for the same price."

Herzl did not give up and met the Sultan a second time in 1901. This time, they offered the Sultan himself 150 million English gold pounds. He said: "Even if you were to pay the earth full of gold, I would never accept this commission of yours. I have served the Islamic Millah and the Muḥammadan Ummah for more than thirty years, and I will not blacken the records of my Muslim forefathers and ancestors, the Ottoman Sultans and Caliphs."

This meeting was with Qaraṣū, the Jewish Freemason lawyer who supervised the Salonica lodge.

Some sources reported that the Sultan shouted in Herzl's face, "Get out of my sight, you scoundrel!" and shouted at the chamberlain who had brought him in, saying, "Did you not know what this pig wanted from me?"

So Herzl flew with Qaraṣū to Italy, and Qaraṣū sent a telegram to the Sultan: "You will pay the price for this meeting with your person and your throne."

Herzl says in his memoirs: "Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd advised me not to take any further steps in this matter because he could not give up a single inch of Palestinian land, as it did not belong to him, but to his Islamic Ummah, which fought for it and watered its soil with the blood of its sons. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd said: 'The surgeon's knife in my body would be easier for me than to see Palestine severed from my empire.' Then he said: 'Save your money, Herzl. When ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd is gone, you will take Palestine for free.'"

After this, the Jews resolved to overthrow ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. In 1904, they detonated a carriage in front of the mosque where the Sultan performed the Friday prayer (Ṣalāt al-Jumu‘ah). Allāh saved him from death, but many people were killed.

The Freemasons clamored for his removal, and Freemasonry pushed its agents into high positions in the state, such as Talat Pasha; Anwar Pasha – Minister of War; Aristidi Pasha – a Greek who became Minister of Public Works; Jamal Pasha – Governor of Shām (Syria); Mustafa Kemal Pasha – commander of the Arab Eastern Front in World War I; and Jawid Pasha (David Pasha) – Minister of Finance.

Hussein Jahid Yalçın was one of the three members (American, French, and Turkish) of the conciliation committee between Arabs and Jews. The Sultan found himself increasingly surrounded by men bought by Freemasonry through the Committee of Union and Progress (Jam‘iyyat al-Ittiḥād wa-l-Taraqqī). His grip gradually weakened until they were able to force him to declare the constitution. He established the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Mab‘ūthān), which included Jews, Christians, and Muslims, and Qaraşū joined the Chamber of Deputies.

The declaration of the constitution was a victory for Christians and Jews everywhere, to the extent that Georgi Zaydan, the Christian owner of Dār al-Hilāl, dedicated his book "The Ottoman Coup" to the "heroes"! They declared the constitution in 1908. Then the Freemasons managed to mobilize the army under the leadership of Maḥmūd Shawkat – an Arab – and the Chamber of Deputies convened to pass a resolution overthrowing the Sultan. The hand of Nāḥūm Ḥāyīm, the Rabbi of Constantinople, was prominent in this affair. The letter of deposition was presented to Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd by three individuals: 1 - Qaraşū. 2 - Aristidi Pasha. 3 - ‘Ārif Ḥikmat, whose mother had been a servant in the Sultan's palace; the Sultan had taken her son, ‘Ārif, and enrolled him in the navy until he became a naval aide-de-camp.

The removal of Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd from the Khilāfah occurred in April 1909. This was the greatest stab directed at Islam. On that night when Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd was deposed from the seat of power, we can say that: Actual Islam was removed

from existence and witness, and Palestine – in reality – fell into the hands of the Jews.

Anwar Pasha – one of the prominent figures of Freemasonry and the coup against Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd – said, addressing Jamal Pasha: "Do you know, Jamal, what our sin is? We did not know Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, so we became a tool in the hands of Zionism, and global Freemasonry bought us. We exerted our efforts for Zionism; this is our real sin."

Bernard Lewis says: "The Freemason brothers and the Jews secretly cooperated to remove Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd because he was a strong opponent of the Jews, as he vehemently refused to give any inch of land in Palestine to the Jews."

Turkey after Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd:

The righteous Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd fell due to Jewish Freemasonry, and Turkey came to be run by the Young Turks Association (Jam‘iyyat Turkīyah al-Fatāh) and the Committee of Union and Progress (Jam‘iyyat al-Ittiḥād wa-l-Taraqqī), which became a plaything in the hands of Freemasonry. The Turkish nationalism advocated by the Committee of Union and Progress was in Jewish hands.

Thus, calamities befell Turkey one after another. The Khilāfah was weak, manipulated by the Committee of Union and Progress – the nationalist advocates; these were secularists, not religious people. Masonic lodges spread like wildfire. Debts accumulated. And behind all this were the Jewish hands that engineered the overthrow of Turkey to reach the Promised Land.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Destroys Turkey and Abolishes the Khilāfah:

Turkey emerged shattered from World War I, and the major powers divided the inheritance of the "Sick Man!" – as they used to call Turkey. Europe was relieved of this terrifying ghoul that had disturbed its sleep for many centuries.

Mustafa Kemal emerged after his defeat on the Arab Eastern Front, and his personality came to prominence as a military leader through some military clashes with Greece. Plans were set in motion to highlight Mustafa Kemal. Some historical and political analysts believe that the silence of the three Allied powers, whose forces were stationed near the battlefield, was part of a plan to elevate Mustafa Kemal for the role awaiting him: fighting Islam and abolishing the Khilāfah.

The Allied powers withdrew from Turkey. When the British House of Commons confronted Curzon, who had agreed to withdraw Allied armies from Turkey, saying that Turkey would return to occupy Europe once more, he said: "Rest assured. Turkey will not rise again after we have stripped it of Islam and the Khilāfah."

The State of the Islamic World from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Islamic world was in a deep slumber, surrendering to humiliation, having grown accustomed to the whips of its executioners lashing its back.

The West, which held the Islamic world by the throat, had agreed on two matters: That Islam should not rise again.

That a Jewish state should be established in Palestine.

The Islamic world was divided into two parts: The Arab Islamic world. And the non-Arab Islamic world.

Conditions in the Arab Islamic World:

As for the Arab Islamic world: its beating heart was Egypt, which was in Britain's grip. We have seen how they wrought corruption there through the Muḥammad ʿAlī dynasty and their protégés. Jordan, Iraq, and Palestine were likewise under the yoke of British occupation, and their condition was no better than that of Egypt.

As for France, it controlled Syria, Lebanon, and North Africa, where it was determined to turn North Africa, from Tunis to Tangier, into a grand brothel reminiscent of Paris. It imposed the French language and issued the Berber Dahir (Berber Law) on May 16, 1930, which mandated the implementation of Berber customary laws and Berber personal status law instead of the Islamic Shariʿah. This was to differentiate between Arabs and Berbers, turn the country into an arena of ethnic conflict, and strip Muslims of their religion.

At the same time, Saʿīd ʿAql, Yūsuf al-Sawdā, and Victor Khallāṭ evoked the specter of Phoenicianism, revived names like Hannibal, created the Syrian Nationalist Party, and declared that Lebanon did not belong to the Arabs but was part of Mediterranean civilization. In Egypt, Salāmah Mūsā and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn promoted Pharaonism. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn declared in "The Future of Culture in Egypt" that Egypt is part of Mediterranean (European) civilization, not Arab, and is closer to the civilizations of Italy, France, and Greece than to the Arabian Peninsula. He stated that Europeans should be imitated in their food, drink, dress, and lifestyle.

As for Palestine: it was under the administration of the British High Commissioner – the Jew Herbert Samuel – who was paving the way for the establishment of a Jewish state there. Therefore, he inundated the major cities with theaters, cinemas, and nightclubs, in addition to controlling the curricula of secular schools and excluding Islamic education and Islamic history from school life. The radio was in their hands.

As for the Nuṣayrīs in Syria: France, in addition to the aforementioned British methods of change, sponsored the Nuṣayrī sect, whom they called 'Alawites' to confuse their matter among Muslims. This sect had taken from among themselves a god, Sulaymān al-Murshid, who had been a cowherd, and he took a messenger named Sulaymān al-Maydah, who worked as a camel herder. This Sulaymān al-Murshid was from the village of Jūbā Burghāl, east of Latakia. The French advisor would prostrate to him along with the other prostrators to increase the deviation of his followers. A robe was made for him with electric lights that would illuminate, and his followers would prostrate to him!

Conditions of the Rest of the Muslims in the Islamic World:

As for the Muslims in the rest of the Islamic world, one can speak extensively about their plight. In addition to the pervasive ignorance afflicting the majority of Muslims, colonial powers, led by Britain, encouraged deviant Sufi orders (al-Ṭuruq al-Ṣūfiyyah al-Munḥarifah) that understood nothing of Islam except negative isolation and patience with colonialism, considering it a trial from Allāh. They promoted wiping oneself on graves, erecting shrines, raising banners over them for blessings, preoccupying the people with the birthdays and coronations of shaykhs, then making supplications around their graves, swearing by their names, and offering flowers at their monuments.

Furthermore, new prophethoods were invented whose function was to abolish Jihād and entrench loyalty to Britain.

In India

Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad al-Qādiyānī was brought to prominence. This self-proclaimed prophet was born in 1840 in Qādiyān. He suffered from hysteria in his youth. In 1884, he declared the prohibition of Jihād against the English in his book "Barāhīn-i-

Aḥmadiyyah."

In the second phase: he announced his resemblance to Christ in 1891 and published three books: "Fath al-Islām," "Tawḍīḥ Marām," and "Izālat Awhām."

He said: he was the Promised Messiah.

In the third phase, he declared himself a prophet in 1900, and he claimed that Allāh had combined all prophets in his person.

Bashīr Maḥmūd, one of the Qādiyānī propagandists, said: "Ghulām Aḥmad is superior to some of the Messengers of Strong Will (Ūlū al-ʿAzm min al-Rusul)!!"

Many followed him to pledge allegiance (bayʿah) to Britain. Maḥmūd Aḥmad, the khalīfah of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad, says in his letter "A Gift to His Highness the Prince of Wales, son of George V, in 1931":

"I welcome you and assure you that the Aḥmadiyyah community is loyal to Britain and will remain loyal – In shāʾ Allāh. The methodology of this community since its foundation has been to obey the existing British government, and this is a condition of the bayʿah within it."

It is stated in Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad's book "Tiryāq al-Qulūb": "I have spent my life supporting and aiding the English government. I have authored books and pamphlets on prohibiting Jihād and the obligation to obey the English rulers, which, if collected, would fill fifty chests. I have published all these books in Arab countries, Egypt, Shām, and Kabul."

Bābism and Bahāʾism in Iran

This is another religion sponsored by Britain and eagerly spread by Russia to dilute the Islamic ʿaqīdah. The founder of Bābism was a Shiite named Mīrzā ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, who called himself the Bāb, deriving his name from the fabricated ḥadīth: "I am the city of knowledge, and ʿAlī is its gate." He first claimed prophethood, then claimed to be the manifestation of Allāh. Then his disciple, Bahāʾ, founded the Bahāʾī religion.

In 1848, the Bahā'īs held a conference in Badasht, and Bābism announced the abrogation of Islamic Sharī'ah by Bābism. Bahā' was later executed, and his community fragmented into sects in various parts of Iran.

We should not fail to note that the initial nucleus of the Bāb's followers included a large number of Jews. A part of the Russian embassy's work in Tehran was confined to preparing the 'tablets' and organizing Bābī activities.

The call of Bahā' went through three phases: first, he claimed to be 'Īsā (Jesus), peace be upon him, then he claimed prophethood, and then he claimed divinity.

The School of Building Bridges to the West:

We have pointed out more than once that the West preferred not to use force except in cases of extreme necessity because it realized that, through its protégés from among the locals, it could achieve many times more than what its soldiers and air and naval fleets could accomplish.

The English, in particular, saw that one of the best ways to strike roots in Muslim lands was to establish schools that would bridge the gap between the polytheistic (mushrik) West and the Muslim East by diluting barriers, removing distinctions, and narrowing the distance between pure faith (īmān) and explicit disbelief (kufr) by confusing matters, mixing symbols, and demolishing the differences between Muslims and kāfirīn.[1] Among these schools were:

The school of Muḥammad 'Abduh in Egypt.

The school of Aḥmad Khān, and in his manner, Waḥīd al-Dīn Khān (in India).

The School of Muḥammad 'Abduh in Egypt:

Interpreters of historical events differ regarding the personality of Muḥammad 'Abduh, in analyzing his political stances, and his connection to the British occupation.[1]:

[1] America is now implementing the same program by opening cultural centers and advanced scientific and research institutions. It does so by taking academically outstanding students, and the children of the wealthy and political and social figures, on study missions to America to brainwash them and return them with American minds, culture, and spiritual allegiance. America declares in its propaganda for these mission programs that these graduates will take over the task of managing their countries in all fields and will be the future leaders of their countries!

Some say he is an extremist figure, seeing him as the reformer who awakened Egypt from its deep slumber, that he did his utmost to reform al-Azhar, and that he was unable to confront Britain and was thus forced to appease them in order to protect Islamic awqāf and undertake a radical reform of al-Azhar and its scholars. Among these are his student Muḥammad Riḍā, and Muḥammad al-Bahī.

Others believe he played a significant role in serving Britain, more so than outspoken secularists, because he built bridges between the Egyptian Islamic psyche and the hateful English psyche, and managed to convince many that cooperation with Britain was necessary.

Among those holding this opinion was Shaykh ‘Alīsh, the Shaykh of al-Azhar, who declared Muḥammad ‘Abduh a kāfir.

Whatever the case may be, there are major issues in the life of Muḥammad ‘Abduh that we cannot overlook:

1. His entry into Freemasonry, a fact confirmed even by his student, who also confirmed his receiving medals in Freemasonry from the American cultural attaché at the Lebanese Masonic lodge.

2. His siding with Cromer against Khedive Abbas... his high standing with the English and their intervention to support him in every predicament he faced. They also designated him for the position of Muftī in Egypt and confined him to it.
3. Muḥammad ‘Abduh was a frequenter of Princess Nazli's salon, as we mentioned before. Photographs of Muḥammad ‘Abduh have been preserved showing him mingling with some European women and other dissolute women of Egypt at that time.
4. Cromer used to say to Khedive Abbas: "Allow me to say that as long as Great Britain has influence in Egypt, Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduh will be the Muftī until he dies."

It is stated in Cromer's book "Modern Egypt":

"As for us, we do not differ, and we have no doubt that Muḥammad ‘Abduh was a Freemason, an agent of Britain, an apostate, an atheist regarding the dīn of Allāh. We agree with the Shaykh of al-Azhar of his time, Shaykh ‘Alīsh (may Allāh have mercy on him), who openly declared him a kāfir and explained the aspects of his apostasy—may Allāh fight him—and may He forgive the good, sincere, but gullible people who were deceived by him."

"Indeed, Muḥammad ‘Abduh was the founder of a modern school very similar to the one founded by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān in India, the founder of Aligarh University."

The English Orientalist Hamilton Gibb says in his book "Whither Islam":

"On the other hand, we find that Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduh built a bridge over the chasm separating dry traditional education from Egyptian education, which was subject to the rationalist school of thought that had invaded the East and West."

I have no doubt that Muḥammad ‘Abduh's tafsīr of the Qur’ān, conveyed by his student Muḥammad Riḍā, indicates a spiritual defeat in the face of the crushing

pressure of the West upon the chests of Muslims and a deference towards Orientalists. He interpreted angels as natural forces, explained their prostration to Ādam as the subjugation of earthly forces to him, interpreted jinn as microbes, the Abābīl birds as creatures like mosquitoes and flies, and the stones of Sijjīl as germs!

So where did Muḥammad ‘Abduh stand in relation to the words of Allāh the Exalted: *{And do not incline toward those who do wrong, lest you be touched by the Fire, and you have no protectors besides Allāh, nor will you be helped.}* (Hūd: 113).

The School of Aḥmad Khān Bahādur in India:

The presence of sincere, mujāhid scholars in the Indian subcontinent, such as Shaykh Aḥmad ibn ‘Irfān ash-Shahīd (1842), who ignited the flame of enthusiasm and Jihād in the hearts of believers in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, alarmed Britain. Therefore, it resorted to cultivating religious protégés to erase the idea of Jihād from minds, inventing several schools such as:

The Qādiyāniyyah, presenting Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad as a prophet who abrogates Jihād.

Aḥmad Khān, the secularist who also called for the abolition of Jihād.

This Aḥmad Khān was born in 1817 in Delhi, then worked in the service of Britain as a secretary in the criminal justice system in 1837. When Muslims undertook Jihād in 1857, Aḥmad Khān stood against the Islamic revolution, saved many Britons from being killed, paid a huge sum of his money to rescue them, and wrote a book on the causes of the revolution in which he blamed the ignorant Muslims.

Britain awarded him the Star of India medal. In 1875, he established the "English Oriental College" in Aligarh, now known as the "Islamic University." He perished in 1898.

Among Aḥmad Khān's most significant attempts:

Establishing a new religion in which the three religions (Islām, Christianity, Judaism) would meld.

Attempting to prove the authenticity of the Gospels, about which he wrote a book in 1862 called "Tabyān al-Kalām."

He advocated the naturalist, materialist doctrine, and said that all prophets were naturalists who did not believe in God—and refuge is sought in Allāh—and he called himself "the Naturalist."

He claimed that prophethoods are acquired through spiritual exercises.

Abolition of the obligation of Jihād.

The School of Waḥīduddīn Khān in Delhi, India:

Waḥīduddīn Khān praised his predecessor Aḥmad Khān. Among his ideas found in his books were:

1. The call to establish a modern international center, on the condition that it completely avoids politics.
2. Leaving the world to its people and reminding people only of death.
3. Abolishing Jihād, calling for abandoning confrontation with the West, and advocating submission, humiliation, and patience.
4. That prophets were sent to corrupt believers.

The English Orientalist (Gibb) Writes About the Islamic World in 1932:

During the first third of the twentieth century, the Jews and their Western allies succeeded in various fields in the Islamic world...

They overthrew the Ottoman Khilāfah, dragged Turkey into World War I, shattered it, and divided its possessions. Arab leaders, in their naivety, sided with the Allies,

especially the English, against their Muslim Ottoman Turkish brothers, thinking they would help them establish an independent Arab kingdom! But the realities previously indicated by the Qur'ān were otherwise! Lawrence (the British intelligence agent), who orchestrated the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans to aid Britain, which had lavished false promises on Sharīf Ḥusayn, the then governor of Makkah and the Ḥijāz, says: "I knew that if we won the war, our promises to the Arabs would become dead letters. Had I been an honorable advisor to the Arabs, I would have advised them to return to their homes. The leaders of the Arab movement understood foreign policy with a tribal, Bedouin understanding. The British and French were carrying out bold maneuvers relying on the Arabs' naivety, weakness, and simplicity of heart and mind, and they had trust in the enemy. I am most proud that English blood was not shed in the thirty battles we fought, because all the countries under our control were not worth, in my view, the death of a single Englishman..."

Weizmann later said: "Lawrence rendered great services to the Jews!"

Then the West, through education, began to inject venom into the veins of this Ummah. It corrupted the youth, corrupted women, destroyed family structures, introduced Masonic and Rotary clubs into the elite of societies, and spread fusūq through theater, cinema, and the media...

The English Orientalist Gibb says in his book "The Whither of the Islamic World": "Regarding 'Education': Pay attention to European colonialism's interest in education, and to their open declaration of their aims behind it. Remember the insistence and coercion practiced by America today to re-distort what has already been distorted of educational curricula, and the convening by Arab and Islamic governments, under American pressure, of dozens of conferences under the deceptive slogan: 'Developing Educational Curricula.' This is the only way to Europeanize and Westernize Muslim countries. The focus was strong on creating a

class that definitively adopts a viewpoint over which religion has no authority. Then, it would be possible to evacuate their lands and hand over to them the reins of power, because they are an extension of the occupier's thought."!

He also says:

"Schools and institutes are not enough; they are but the first step. Attention must be turned to creating public opinion by relying on the press, for it is the most powerful and influential of European tools in the Islamic world. The editors of national newspapers are mostly progressives, and the newspapers are characterized by a predominantly secular tendency, as he sees it."!

He adds that education and the press have left Muslims largely non-religious:

"The Islamic world will, within a short period, become non-religious in all aspects of its life."

Gibb expresses his fears on two fronts:

1. Religious institutes.
2. Islamic movements: which he sees as developing with astonishing, amazing speed, and erupting suddenly before observers can discern from their indications anything that would cause them to be suspicious of them.

And he says: "Islamic movements lack nothing but leadership and the emergence of a Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn."!

The Leader of Missionaries (Zwemer) Describes the Muslims Desired by the West in 1933:

Zwemer, addressing missionaries at the Jerusalem Conference in 1933, says:

"Your mission is to take the Muslim out of Islām, so that he becomes a creature with no connection to Allāh, and consequently, no connection to the morals upon which

nations depend in their lives. By doing so, you will be the vanguard of colonial conquest in the Islamic kingdoms. This you have done excellently over the past hundred years.

Read and reflect, and you will understand: that nothing has changed in the program of colonialism between the European Crusader Romans and the new American Zionist Romans. Except, perhaps, for what we have pointed out regarding the characteristics of the American cowboy, and his triad: foolishness, ignorance, and brutality... because he rushes the outcome, and because they are a dwarf people without history or civilization.

We have, in this era from the last third of the nineteenth century to the present day, eliminated all educational programs in the Islamic kingdoms, and we have spread in those regions centers of missionary activity, churches, societies, and Christian schools, those dominated by European and American states.

You have, by your means, prepared all minds in the Islamic kingdoms to accept treading the path that you have thoroughly paved.

You have prepared youth in the lands of Islām who do not know the connection to Allāh, nor do they want to know it. You have taken the Muslim out of Islām but have not brought him into Christianity. Consequently, the Muslim generation emerged according to what colonialism desired for it: not caring for great matters, loving comfort and laziness, and directing his concerns in the world only towards desires. If he accumulates wealth, it is for desires; and if he attains the highest positions, it is for the sake of desires that he generously spends the most precious of what he possesses."!

Zwemer also says:

"When colonial policy, since 1882 CE, eliminated educational programs in primary schools, it removed the Qur'ān from them, then Islamic history. Thus, it produced a

generation that is neither Muslim, nor Christian, nor Jewish; a troubled generation, materialistic in its aims, not believing in a creed nor knowing truth, so that neither religion, nor dignity, nor the homeland has sanctity"!

Zwemer accurately described the generation during the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth century. But his prediction later failed, and Gibb's assumption, who believed the Muslim East would soon become secular, did not prove true.

Allāh – the Mighty and Majestic – was lying in wait for them. (For the Islamic Ṣaḥwah with its various schools arose, then it produced the Jihādī Ṣaḥwah, and the Ummah returned to seek salvation in the path of the Qur'ān).

{Indeed, those who disbelieve spend their wealth to avert [people] from the way of Allāh. So they will spend it; then it will be for them a [source of] regret; then they will be overcome. And those who have disbelieved - unto Jahannam they will be gathered.}
(Al-Anfāl: 36) (1)

The Nationalist Call and the Real Reasons Behind It:

The main reason: The West's attempt to take back the primary societal role from Islām as the sole bond and to substitute a new bond in its place, after the West's failure in the Crusades. So, it wanted to use the method of thought and tongue instead of the spear, to make it easier for the West to establish its foothold in our lands, especially after Napoleon's campaign in Egypt.

Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha and Ibrāhīm Pasha's ambition to create an Arab nationalist empire.

Getting rid of Muslim Turkey and eliminating it so that the West could inherit its possessions.

The Christians' attempt to get rid of Turkey because it applied the Jizyah to them and some exceptional duties, corresponding to Muslims paying Zakāh and performing military service to protect the Islamic state.

And out of a desire from the Christians to lead the societies in which they lived, direct their course, and become their masters and the elite of their people.

Historical Development of the Nationalist Idea:

Napoleon's campaign is considered the first point in the beginning of shifting the Arabs from Islām to nationalism. This idea fermented in Napoleon's mind following the resistance stirred by al-Azhar with the call of "Allāhu Akbar," and the West became convinced of this idea.

The French left Egypt in (1904) and Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha came. Muḥammad ‘Alī was an Albanian officer – who did not know Arabic – who came with the campaign sent by the Caliph to Egypt to resist Napoleon. Muḥammad ‘Alī was an ambitious and intelligent orphan, but he was illiterate, so he suffered from an inferiority complex due to his illiteracy. He wanted to civilize and develop Egypt, so he eliminated the Mamālīk and was proclaimed ruler of Egypt.

Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha and the French:

Muḥammad ‘Alī admired the French. Since his youth, he had a connection with a Frenchman named Leon (Lion). Then he brought Dr. Clot, the French physician, to Egypt to be his advisor. Clot suggested the idea of nationalism to him (Clot took care to instill in the students of the higher schools he managed the correct sense of Arab nationalism). Muḥammad ‘Alī began sending missions to France, and these missions returned carrying the seeds of the nationalist idea. Among them was Rifā‘ah al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, who stayed in Paris (1826 - 1831) and brought back the idea of the French nationalist revolution.

Ibrāhīm Pasha in Bilād ash-Shām:

Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha aspired to an Arab empire separate from Ottoman rule, and the West (the French in particular) made this appealing to him. So he sent his son

Ibrāhīm Pasha, who occupied all of ash-Shām. Ibrāhīm's rule in Bilād ash-Shām lasted for seven years (1833 - 1840). These years had a profound impact on changing the course of events in ash-Shām for over a century.

So what did Ibrāhīm Pasha do in ash-Shām?

He abolished the Islamic rulings applied to Christians in ash-Shām and called for their equality with Muslims, as did his father in Egypt.

He encouraged missionary societies and their schools. As for his father in Egypt, his companions were always ambassadors, tourists, and missionaries. This encouragement of missionaries in ash-Shām resulted in:

The arrival of Protestant (American) missions, and among its prominent figures were [1]:

(Eli Smith), who worked tirelessly for Christianity from (1834-1857), moved the mission's printing press from Malta to Beirut. It began printing in Arabic and was the first press of its kind in Bilād al-Shām. Smith and his wife also established a girls' school in Beirut, the first of its kind in Bilād al-Shām.

(1) Note the early American attempts to infiltrate the region. They were unable to do so due to the strength of Britain, France, and other colonial powers at the time, until the opportunity arose and the time came for them to reap what their Protestant missionary ancestors, the Judaizing Christians, had sown.

Dr. Cornelius Van Dyck came as a doctor with the American mission and worked for 55 years in Bilād al-Shām. His efforts were perhaps the most valuable and influential individual foreign contributions to the cultural development of the country.

Nāṣīf al-Yāzījī (1800-1871) was a Lebanese Christian who worked with the American mission and in its printing press with Smith and Van Dyck. He and his son Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī translated the Torah. His son Ibrāhīm was the first to establish the

"Secret Society of Beirut" (Jam'īyyat Bayrūt al-Sirriyya), which had a nationalist character.

This Ibrāhīm was a Christian Freemason who lived between (1847-1906). He died in Egypt and was mourned by the Masonic lodges there. He was the author of the poem calling for revolution against the Turks:

Awaken and arise, O Arabs... The flood has surged until the knees are submerged.
Your destinies are lowly in the eyes of the Turks... Your rights are plundered at the hands of the Turks.

We shall seek our goal with the edge of the sword... Our purpose in its side shall not be frustrated.

Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883) was a Lebanese who worked as a translator at the American consulate in Beirut. He changed his religion from Maronite to Protestant due to his friendship with Smith and Van Dyck. The missionaries employed him as a teacher at the 'Abayh school. He translated the Torah with Smith, a task that took ten years. He published the dictionary "Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ" and its abridged version "Quṭr al-Muḥīṭ," and "Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif lil-Bustānī" (Al-Bustānī's Encyclopedia).

During the strife of 1860 (between Christians and Druze in Lebanon), he published a magazine called "Nafīr Sūriya" (Syria's Clarion Call), advocating for national unity. In 1863, he founded "al-Madrasah al-Waṭaniyyah" (the National School), where he and Nāṣīf al-Yāzījī taught. In 1870, he launched a magazine called "al-Jinān" (The Gardens), a bi-monthly political and literary journal, with the slogan "Love of the homeland is part of faith." He also published the two newspapers "al-Jannah" (Paradise) and "al-Junaynah" (The Little Garden).

Al-Yāzījī and al-Bustānī are considered among the early pioneers of the idea of Arab nationalism. Their students established nationalist organizations that later bore fruit, resulting in this exclusion of Allāh's religion from life and the nurturing of

pioneers who consider nationalism their supreme ideal, for which laws are made and sacrifices offered.

Among the fruits of the American mission, besides highlighting al-Yāzījī and al-Bustānī, was the establishment of the largest institute for nurturing nationalist thought, which is:

The American University of Beirut (1866):

Its name was initially the "Syrian Protestant College." Its first president was Daniel Bliss, an American clergyman with a doctorate in theology, who remained president of the university until 1902 and was succeeded by his son, Howard Bliss. The influence of the American University in the region is unparalleled in terms of nationalist thought. The university graduated generations of leaders of Bilād al-Shām for over a century. Among its professors known for fostering nationalist thought was Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq, under whom George Ḥabash studied.

The Catholic-Jesuit Mission: It established a lithographic press (1847) and founded the Yūsuf School, later known as the Université Saint-Joseph.

C - The Lazarists: They opened the ‘Ayn Ṭūrah College in Lebanon.

Nationalist Societies:

Among the activities undertaken by the missionary missions was the establishment of societies advocating nationalist thought, the most important of which were:

1. The Society of Arts and Sciences (1847):

Founded by the American missionary mission, headed by Smith, Van Dyck, al-Bustānī, and Nāṣīf al-Yāzījī. Within two years, its membership reached fifty, most of whom were Syrian Christians in Beirut. There was not a single Muslim or Druze among them. The society lasted for five years.

2. The Oriental Society (1850):

Founded by the Jesuits and supervised by Father Debrunner.

3. The Syrian Scientific Society (1857):

Its membership reached one hundred and fifty. In addition to its founders from the American mission's followers, some Muslims and Druze joined. It gained government recognition in 1868.

"The first voice to emerge for the Arab nationalist movement was that of Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī, a member of the society, who recited a poem that took the form of a national anthem."

4. The Beirut Syrian Society (1875):

George Antonius says: "The first organized effort in the Arab nationalist movement dates back to the year 1875, i.e., two years before 'Abd al-Ḥamīd ascended to the throne, when five young men who had studied at the Syrian Protestant College – the American University – in Beirut formed a secret society. They were all Christians, but they realized the value of Muslims and Druze joining them. They managed to attract about twenty-two individuals from various religious sects, representing the chosen and enlightened elite of the country. Freemasonry had already entered Bilād al-Shām in the form known in Europe, and the founders of the secret society, through one of their colleagues, were able to win over the recently established Masonic lodge and involve it in their activities."

From this, we realize:

- That the beginning of organized nationalist work in Bilād al-Shām was through Christians.
- That these Christians were students or admirers of al-Bustānī and al-Yāzījī and were the fruit of the American mission's efforts.

- That among the founders was Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī, author of the society's slogan: "We shall seek our goal with the edge of the sword... Our purpose in its side shall not be frustrated."
- Likewise, Fāris Nimr Pasha (a Lebanese Christian) and his brother-in-law Shāhīn Makāriyūs were among its founders. These three were well-known senior Freemasons.

So, the Masonic-Jewish hands were the ones that adopted the idea of Arab nationalism. These are the same hands that were simultaneously stirring Turanian nationalism, adopted by the Dönme Jews in Salonica, who held their meetings in the homes of Italian Jews.

And the one who inspired the idea of establishing the Secret Society of Beirut was a man named Ilyās Ḥabbālīn from the town of Dhūq Mikāyil. He was a French language teacher at the American University, teaching a class that included al-Yāzījī, Ya‘qūb Ṣarrūf, and Shāhīn Makāriyūs. The teacher was an admirer of the French Revolution.

It was suspected that Miḍḥat Pasha – a leader of Freemasonry, also known as Abū al-Aḥrār (Father of the Free) – was behind the formation of the society. A telegram sent by the British consul in June 1880 stated:

"Pamphlets inciting revolution have appeared in Beirut, and it is suspected that Miḍḥat is their originator." Miḍḥat was then the Wālī (governor) of Syria.

However, Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd's firmness and his monitoring of the society and its publications froze its activities. The most important of the society's publications was the third pamphlet, issued on December 31, 1880, which outlined their demands in four points:

- Granting Syria, including Lebanon, independence.
- Recognizing Arabic as an official language.

- Lifting censorship on freedom of education.
- Not sending Arab sons to fight with the Turks outside their countries.

Migration of Nationalist Advocates to Cairo:

As a result of Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd's campaign against secret nationalist societies, those early advocates of nationalism moved to Cairo, where the British Agent, Cromer, was entrenched. Christian families migrated to Cairo to disseminate secular ideas and the nationalist call from there, and to launch their fight against Turkey from there. Among the most prominent names that settled in Cairo were:

- Fāris Nimr and his brother-in-law Shāhīn Makāriyūs, owners of the daily newspaper al-Muqaṭṭam and the monthly magazine al-Muqtaṭaf, both of whom were Freemasons.
- Salīm Taqlā, who founded the daily newspaper al-Ahrām, which still exists today.
- Jurjī Zaydān: owner of Dār al-Hilāl publishing house and author of many works.
- Adīb Ishāq (director of the newspaper Miṣr) and Salīm Naqqāsh (director of the newspaper al-Tijārah). These two Christians worked under the direction of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, who founded these two newspapers.
- Rōz al-Yūsuf, who came from Bilād al-Shām and was a Christian. She feigned conversion to Islām and named herself Fāṭimah Yūsuf, but she named her newspaper after her old name, Rōz al-Yūsuf.
- Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq – a Maronite who converted to Protestantism at the hands of the American mission, then came to Egypt and published the

newspaper al-Jawā'ib, then converted to Islām at the hands of the Bey of Tunis. End quote. [1].

(1) (Al-Dhakhā'ir al-'Izām: Vol. 1, pp. 879-882).

Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad 'Abduh, and 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī:

Here, I must refer to three preachers who dressed as scholars and are renowned worldwide as advocates of Islamic unity, yet at the same time, they attacked Turkey and sought to demolish the edifice of the Khilāfah. They are:

Al-Afghānī: He embraced many Christians and Jews. His personal physician was a Jew named Hārūn. His death was attended by Hārūn and another Christian named Jurjī Kanjī. He stayed in London as a guest of Mr. Blunt, the British author of "The Future of Islam." When the Caliph tried to prevent al-Afghānī from leaving Turkey, the British ambassador intervened on his behalf, and he left. Al-Afghānī was the head of the Eastern Masonic Lodge.

As for Muḥammad 'Abduh: He was a close friend of Cromer, who stated that Shaykh 'Abduh would remain Muftī of Egypt as long as Britain was there. He was a Freemason and a regular at Princess Nāzli Fāḍil's salon. Among his students were: Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, the secularist who openly declared his kufr (disbelief) in his newspaper al-Jarīdah; Sa'd Zaghlūl; and Qāsim Amīn (author of the book "The Liberation of Women"). These individuals had a profound impact on the course of events in Egypt.

And 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1849-1903): Most of his friends and students were Muslims, Jews, and Christians. His lessons were held at the Splendid Bar café. He called for pledging allegiance to an Arab Caliph in his book "Umm al-Qurā." He authored another book titled "Ṭabā'ī' al-Istibdād" (The Natures of Despotism). He

advocated for equality between religions to achieve national cohesion:

"Let us manage our worldly life and let religions govern only the afterlife. Let us unite on a common word, which is: Long live the nation, long live the homeland, let us live free and cherished." "These nations of Europe and America have been guided by science to methods of national unity without religious [unity], racial harmony without sectarian [harmony], and political connection without administrative [connection]."

These three [1], their ideas were a prelude to secularism. Their views, as Albert Hourani says, were a bridge over which secularism crossed into Islām.

They shattered the psychological barrier between kāfirīn (disbelievers) and Muslims, and Muslim souls became receptive to imported ideas, foremost among them nationalism. Albert Hourani says:

"It is true that whoever reads Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s debates with Renan and Farah Anṭūn senses that he wanted to erect a dam against the secular trend to protect Islamic society from its flood. But what happened was that this dam became a bridge for secularism, which crossed over it into the Islamic world to occupy one position after another."

Then came Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s students to deepen this current and to lead with their secularism.

For example, Luṭfī al-Sayyid: deepened regional patriotism and championed the call for Pharaonic history.

And Sa’d Zaghlūl came: Cromer handed him the Ministry of Education so that he would advocate the Pharaonic regional national trend on both political and social levels. Cromer says he handed him the Ministry of Education because he was one of Shaykh ‘Abduh’s students.

And Qāsim Amīn came: to clarify the generalities and elaborate on the essence of what Shaykh ‘Abduh advocated, calling for the removal of the ḥijāb and the stripping

of modesty from women's lives. Even the book "The Liberation of Women" earned Shaykh 'Abduh's admiration. He and his student Luṭfī reviewed its draft in Geneva in 1897, as mentioned by Luṭfī al-Sayyid and Qāsim Amīn.

[1] The three are: 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (the Syrian), and the two Shaykhs Jamāl al-Dīn (al-Afghānī) and his student Muḥammad 'Abduh (the Egyptian). It is regrettable that we were taught at all stages of education in our countries, as children and youth, that they were pioneers of reform, enlightenment, and liberation... Indeed, I remember that 'Abduh and al-Afghānī were considered part of the reformist school in the curricula of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Movement, and they were mentioned with praise and adornment... There is no power nor strength except in Allāh!

Therefore, the fiqhī (jurisprudential) chapters in the book are attributed to Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh – as is thought – because Qāsim Amīn had no knowledge of these issues.

In this context, Ismā'īl Maẓhar, owner of Majallat al-'Uṣūr (Al-'Uṣūr Magazine) and Luṭfī al-Sayyid's brother-in-law, is mentioned. Likewise, one must point to a finger of sabotage, which is 'Abd al-'Azīz Fahmī – Luṭfī al-Sayyid's close friend. Their third friend was Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, who was expelled from the university due to his explicit kufr (disbelief) in his book "On Pre-Islamic Poetry." Consequently, Luṭfī al-Sayyid resigned from the ministry (he was Minister of Education) in protest of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's expulsion from the Egyptian University.

This group is the one that emptied the Egyptian people of Islām, replacing it with new ideas of Pharaonism, secularism, and irreligious nationalism. The friendship between these individuals and Shaykh 'Abduh might have been an attempt to bring this group closer to Islām. However, he was unable to do so after he became lenient – in order to attract them – regarding many Shari'ah rules that define al-walā' (loyalty), al-'adāwah (enmity), friendship, and boycott. He issued many fatāwā (legal

edicts) to remove barriers between himself and Cromer on one hand, and between himself and this group on the other, such as the Transvaal fatwá, and his fatwá on mirrors and divorce, in addition to interpreting many Ghaib (unseen) verses in the Qur'ān in a way that almost removes them from the Arabic language and completely negates their content.

Cromer's 1906 report to the British government regarding Muḥammad 'Abduh's party stated:

"...These individuals are desirous of promoting the interests of their compatriots and co-religionists, but they are not influenced by the call of Pan-Islamism. Their program – if I have understood it correctly – includes cooperation with Europeans, not opposition to them, in introducing Western civilization to their country."

Cromer also says:

"I greatly doubt that my friend Muḥammad 'Abduh was anything but an Agnostic."

And his English friend Blunt says:

"I fear to say that Muḥammad 'Abduh – despite being the Grand Muftī – has no more confidence in Islām than I have in Catholicism."

The Nationalist Call at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

The most truthful word regarding Muḥammad 'Abduh and his shaykh is that of Shaykh Muṣṭafá Ṣabrī, the Shaykh al-Islām of the Ottoman State:

"Perhaps Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh and his friend, or his shaykh, Jamāl al-Dīn, intended to play the role in Islām that Luther and Calvin – the leaders of Protestantism – played in Christianity. However, they did not succeed in establishing a modern religion for Muslims. Instead, their efforts were confined to assisting disguised atheism under the banner of progress and renewal."

Shaykh al-Islām Muṣṭafá Ṣabrī also states:

"As for the reformist awakening attributed to Muḥammad ‘Abduh, its essence is that he shook al-Azhar from its religious stagnation, thereby bringing many Azharīs steps closer to irreligion, while not bringing the irreligious a single step closer to religion. He was the one who introduced Freemasonry into al-Azhar through his shaykh, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, just as he was the one who encouraged Qāsim Amīn to promote unveiling (sufūr) in Egypt."

As for the advocates of Arab nationalism, in addition to the Christians of Shām in Cairo who took charge of directing thought throughout Egypt, there were also some Syrian Christians working in the other center, Paris. Among them was Najīb ‘Āzūrī. He was a Syrian Christian who, in 1904, founded the "League of the Arab Fatherland" (‘Uṣbat al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī) society in Paris. Its declared objective was the liberation of Shām and Iraq from Turkish control. In 1905, he published the book "The Awakening of the Arab Nation" (Yaqzat al-Ummah al-‘Arabiyyah) in French. In collaboration with French writers, he launched the magazine "Arab Independence" (Al-Istiqlāl al-‘Arabī), the first issue of which appeared in April 1907; it ceased publication after the declaration of the constitution in 1908.

1. Note the English-European focus on principal matters, a focus repeated today by American colonialism. Among the most important of these are:

- Diluting the issue of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ (loyalty and disavowal), removing psychological barriers, and obscuring the clarity of Sharī‘ah rulings regarding the distinction between the believer and the kāfir.
- The insistence on corrupting women as a gateway to corrupting the family, society, and the entire ummah.

Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣārī, one of the leading nationalist writers, says: "Nationalism began with Najīb ‘Āzūrī, who placed his Syrian Arab hopes first in France and then in England." Najīb ‘Āzūrī's activities were a prelude to the Paris Conference of 1931.

The Paris Conference of 1913

Many writers on Arab nationalism consider the Paris Conference to be the foundation of modern nationalism. There were 24 participants, half of whom were Christians and half Muslims. Anīs al-Ṣāyigh says of it that it was devoid of demands for independence so as not to embarrass some European countries that were encouraging the nationalist movement and providing it with funds. Al-Zahrāwī, the president of the conference, stated to the correspondent of the French newspaper *Le Temps* (al-Ṭān) that the conference had no connection with non-Ottoman Arab provinces – meaning North Africa – as France was supervising the conference and ruling North Africa. He thanked the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conference refused to include Egypt. They demanded that Arabic be made an official language in Arab countries, and the Unionist government was forced to negotiate with them by including three Arab ministers and five Arab governors in the state apparatus.

Important Factors in the Development of the Nationalist Movement

There were important factors that had a significant impact on fueling the fire of Arab nationalism in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Among the most important of these factors were:

1. The Committee of Union and Progress (Jam‘iyyat al-Ittiḥād wa-l-Taraqqī) seizing power in Turkey after the overthrow of Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd on April 27, 1909. The call for Turkish Turanian nationalism began. Among its philosophers was Khālida Edib – a Jewess – who later became Minister of Education, and Ziya Gökalp, a student of the Jew Durkheim and another Jew, Moiz Alp. It is known that all the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress were Freemasons without exception, and not one of them was of Muslim origin or Turkish ethnicity. Enver was Polish; Javid was a Dönme

Jew; Carasso was a Spanish Jew. The Committee of Union and Progress began imposing the process of Turkification on all Arab and other provinces.

Turkish was imposed in government offices (Dīwāns), schools, and curricula. The process of Turkification also began in state apparatuses. This became evident in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Mab'ūthān), which was elected after the declaration of the constitution in 1908. The Committee of Union and Progress supervised the elections to ensure the results favored the Turkish race. The result was that 150 Turks and 60 Arabs were elected, while Arabs outnumbered Turks in population by a ratio of 5:2. Amidst the joy of shackling Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's hands, the "Ottoman Arab Fraternity Society" (Jam'iyat al-Ikhā' al-'Arabī al-'Uthmānī) was established on September 2, 1908, a month after the constitution. This society lasted for eight months before being dissolved by the Unionist Committee.

The forced Turkification process at the hands of the Dönme Jews led to violent reactions from the Arabs, including the establishment of secret and public societies.

2. The formation of public and secret societies calling for Arab nationalism and the separation of Arab countries from the Turks, at least through self-rule within the Ottoman State, such that Arabs would manage their internal affairs like education, economy, and culture, while participating with the Ottoman State in external matters such as defense and others.
3. The appointment of Jamāl Pasha as governor of Bilād al-Shām, with Khālida Edib – the Jewess – as his confidential secretary. Jamāl Pasha was forced to appease the Arabs and treat them well at the beginning of the Great War (World War I), lest the Arabs join the Allied camp against Turkey. Jamāl Pasha took command of the Fourth Army in Syria. He sensed the presence of secret nationalist gatherings in Bilād al-Shām and knew that the Arabs were fed up

with the actions of the Unionists and their Turkish chauvinism. So, the Arabs were looking for a way out, and their leaders contacted France. This led Jamāl Pasha to raid the French embassies in both Beirut and Damascus and seize documents proving contact between the leaders of organizations and societies with France, calling for Syria's secession from the Ottomans. However, Jamāl Pasha chose to turn a blind eye to the issue, hoping the Arabs would side with Turkey in the war.

After Jamāl sensed Sharīf Ḥusayn's intention to enter the war against Turkey on Britain's side, Jamāl Pasha became enraged and ordered the execution of 11 Arab figures on August 21, 1915, after a military trial in ʿĀlayh, Lebanon. On May 6, 1916, 21 other Arab figures were hanged, including ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī (president of the Paris Conference and member of the Turkish Senate), and Salīm al-Jazāʾirī, assistant to ʿAzīz al-Miṣrī in the Qaḥṭāniyya Society. This also took place for the second time in ʿĀlayh.

These executions caused a violent shock in the Arab world. Jamāl Pasha carried out the executions despite the intercession of Sharīf Ḥusayn and his son Fayṣal, but he did not listen to them. Prince Fayṣal ibn al-Ḥusayn was in Damascus at the time; he threw his kūfiyyah to the ground, stomped on it, and said: "Death has become sweet, O Arabs!"

4. Sharīf Ḥusayn's entry into the World War on Britain's side against Turkey. Sharīf Ḥusayn had remained in Turkey for sixteen years, and Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd feared him. After the declaration of the constitution in 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress chose him to be the Emir of Makkah, an appointment ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd opposed.

The constitution was declared on July 24, 1908, after long-term conferences managed by members of the Committee of Union and Progress, most of whom were Dönme Jews or Judaized Turks manipulated by the fingers of Freemasonry in the lodges of Salonica. The Committee used to hold its

meetings in the homes of Jews of Italian nationality.

Seton-Watson wrote:

"The prominent fact in the formation of the Committee of Union and Progress is that it was non-Turkish and non-Islamic. Since its establishment, not a single member of pure Turkish origin appeared among its leaders. Enver Pasha was the son of a Polish renegade. Javid belonged to the well-known Jewish sect (Dönme). Carasso was one of the Spanish Jews residing in the city of Salonica. Talat Pasha was of gypsy origin who embraced Islām as a religion. As for Ahmed Rıza, one of their leaders during that period, he was half-gypsy in addition to being a follower of Comte's philosophical school." Seton-Watson adds: "The masterminds behind the movement were Jews or Muslims of Jewish origin. Financial aid came to them through the (Dönme) and wealthy Salonican Jews. They also received financial aid from international – or quasi-international – capitalism from Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, Paris, and London."

And Aubrey Herbert says:

"The Jews of Salonica, known as the (Dönme) – meaning the apostates – were the true partners of the Turkish revolution. These are of Jewish race, but their creed may not be originally Jewish. The common belief among people is that they are Muslims in name, but in reality, they are followers of the Torah of Moses. During the period we are discussing, no one knew anything about them, except for a few scholars specializing in Near Eastern studies. And no one dared to predict that this Jewish group known as the (Dönme) would play a major role in a revolution that had dangerous consequences in the course of history."

Sharīf Ḥusayn was looking for an opportunity to rid himself of Turkish rule, especially since he sensed that the Unionists in 1914 wanted to get rid of him.

His son, ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥusayn, was then a deputy in the Turkish parliament. He contacted Kitchener (the British High Commissioner in Egypt) and Ronald Storrs (the Oriental Secretary at the British Agency in Cairo). He informed Storrs of the strong aversion between his father and the Turks and asked him about the possibility of Britain siding with the Sharīf if he declared war on Turkey. However, he received no encouragement from them. Kitchener told him: "It is not probable that Britain will stand by your father."

Prince ‘Abdullāh himself was a member of a secret society and believed in the benefits of Anglo-Arab understanding and was enthusiastic about it. The Great War broke out in August 1914. ‘Abdullāh was eager to declare war on Turkey, while Prince Fayṣal favored siding with them. In 1915, Fayṣal visited Damascus and Istanbul. In Damascus, he joined the "Al-‘Arabiyyah al-Fatāh" society and swore to support it.

The Sharīf declared war on Turkey on Monday, June 5, 1916. (And Subḥāna Rabbī! The Arabs' defeat was on Monday, June 5, 1967).

From near the grave of Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib – raḍiya Allāhu ‘anhu – in Madīnah, he declared war after Britain had promised him the independence of the Arab lands and his coronation as king over them. Kitchener had become the British Secretary of State for War, and McMahon took over as the British High Commissioner in Egypt. The well-known correspondence (the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence) occurred between him and McMahon, and they promised him the kingship of the Arab lands after their independence.

Sharīf Ḥusayn rushed with all his energy to fuel the fire of Arab zeal against the Turks. The Turks were defeated, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement occurred, dividing the Arab lands between Britain and France. Palestine was given to the Jews through the Balfour Declaration. The "beautiful" reward for Sharīf Ḥusayn was that Britain exiled him for six years and stripped him of his kingdom. The shock was severe to the Sharīf's nerves until paralysis struck

him, and his body wasted away in sorrow and pain. Throughout his life, he poured out his wrath on McMahon and Lloyd George – the well-known British minister.

George Antonius says:

"I visited him months before his death in 1931 CE. Paralysis had shrunken him, and his handsome face had turned white with the pallor of death. He said to me: 'The English, my son, are honorable people in their words and deeds, in good times and bad: honorable, except for His Excellency, the venerable and intrepid Lloyd George, who is more like a clown and a fox. I say: a fox, God forbid your station! May Allāh have mercy on His Excellency Kitchener.'"

This was the sorrowful, painful result of cooperating with the English. And Allāh the Almighty spoke the truth:

{O you who have believed, if you obey those who disbelieve, they will turn you back on your heels, and you will become losers.} (Āl ‘Imrān: 149).

Some truthful, wise individuals had warned Sharīf Ḥusayn of the consequences of English treachery and this expected catastrophe. Shakīb Arslān wrote to the Sharīf when he heard of his intention to invade Syria with the Allied armies, saying: "Are you fighting Arabs with Arabs, O Emir, so that the fruit of the blood of their killer and their killed is England's seizure of the Arabian Peninsula, France's seizure of Syria, and the Jews' seizure of Palestine?"

Lawrence says in "Seven Pillars of Wisdom":

"I knew that if we won the war, our promises to the Arabs would become dead letters. Had I been an honorable advisor to the Arabs, I would have advised them to return to their homes. The leaders of the Arab movement understood foreign policy in a tribal, Bedouin manner. The British and French were carrying out bold maneuvers, relying on the Arabs' naivety, weakness,

simplicity of heart and thought, and their trust in the enemy. I am most proud that English blood was not shed in the thirty battles I fought, because all the countries subject to us were not worth, in my view, the death of a single Englishman."

And Weizmann says, "Lawrence rendered us great services." This is the Lawrence they used to call – the uncrowned king of the Arabs.

The Committee of Union and Progress came to power and was relieved of the terrible ghoul that had long disturbed its repose and kept it sleepless (‘Abd al-Ḥamīd). Islamic Turkey became a puppet in the hands of Jewry, manipulated as it wished and whenever it wanted.

Its provinces became an open preserve for the Western wolves, enemies of Islam, and this mighty giant, the Ottoman State, was devoured piece by piece.

The West first swallowed the Balkan states: Austria, Hungary, Bosnia, and Herzegovina in October 1908 – that is, after the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) took power and only two months after the declaration of the constitution. Bulgaria seceded, Italy attacked Libya in the autumn of 1911, and then the Balkan War broke out in 1912. In these few years, the Ottoman State lost all its provinces in Europe (except for Eastern Thrace). It also lost that part of Libya consisting of the provinces of Tripolitania and Benghazi.

Turkey withdrew from Libya through an overt conspiracy of treason, evident to anyone with eyes. We should not fail to mention that Italian Jews were the masters of the Masonic lodges in Salonica, and in the homes of these Italian Jews, the meetings of the Committee of Union and Progress were held. So it is not surprising that the Committee of Union and Progress gave Libya as a modest gift to Italy in gratitude for their previous significant service.

In addition to this loss, Crete was lost, and Turkey's budget was groaning under the burden of military expenditures.

Nationalism after the First World War (1914-1918)

The Arabs' stance alongside the Allies against Muslim Turkey is considered a major turning point in nationalist thought and rallying on the basis of nationalism. The English never dreamed that the Arabs would stand with them, as kuffār, against their fellow Muslims in religion and creed, the Muslim Turks.

Lawrence (the British intelligence officer and "King of the Arabian Desert," as they call him) says:

"All the way to Syria, I was thinking and wondering: Will nationalism one day overcome religious sentiment? Will national belief overcome religious beliefs? More clearly: Will political ideals replace revelation and inspiration, and will Syria replace its religious ideal with its national ideal?"

The West considers this stance a turning point towards a new phase in nationalist thinking.

The Economist wrote in June 1962, under the title "Islam versus Nationalism," the following:

"Since the First World War, the Arabs have put nationalism first when they fought alongside the English – the kuffār – to liberate themselves from the Muslim Turks. With the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), there are no politically-minded people in the Arab world today who place the community of Islamic states above their Arab nationalism."

But after the First World War, although the nationalist experience was bitter, a new factor emerged: the heavy burden of colonialism weighing down the Arab world. This factor became a new string played by nationalist advocates and thinkers, especially after the increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine and the outbreak of the 1936 revolt in Palestine.

There are prominent points between the First and Second World Wars that led to an increase in nationalist thinking, the most important of which are:

British and French colonialism, which brought with it:

Secularism (lā-dīniyyah) into the state apparatus, and the elevation of a socially fragmented, morally unrestrained class, ready for hypocrisy, burning incense, and lighting candles for the new ruler. This class became the new colonizer, even though it was composed of people from the region.

The advocacy of nationalist ideas as an alternative to Islam, as a basis for thought and assembly, and the alienation from the religious direction, drawing lessons from the bitter, dark history of clergymen in medieval Europe.

The tune of liberation from colonialism became rich material for classes resentful of Islam, who wanted to portray certain periods of Turkish rule as an image of Islam representing stagnation, backwardness, and decline!!

The abolition of the Caliphate (al-Khilāfah) at the hands of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the subsequent serious consideration of establishing an Islamic activist organization to restore the Caliphate, and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) movement under Ḥasan al-Bannā.

3- The emergence of nationalist thought in the form of organizations led by Christians, and the rise of the Baʿth Party, Arab nationalists, and Syrian nationalists to the surface. The American University was a warm incubator for many of these ideas. End quote.

Let us examine a model of Arab nationalist thought and its political methodology, similar examples of which flourished in the Arab and Islamic world:

The Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party:

The Socialist Ba‘th Party was formed from two parties:

- 1- The Arab Ba‘th Party: Founded by al-Arsūzī and ‘Aflaq.
- 2- The Arab Socialist Party: Founded in 1938 by ‘Uthmān al-Ḥawrānī, its leadership later passed to Akram al-Ḥawrānī. Akram al-Ḥawrānī had joined the Syrian Nationalist Party in 1936 and withdrew from it in 1938 to join the Arab Socialist Youth Party.

On January 26, 1952, the first and second parties merged to form the Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party.

The Arab Ba‘th Party:

There is disagreement about the founder; some say Michel ‘Aflaq and Ṣalāḥ al-Bīṭār, while others say Zakī al-Arsūzī. However, the February 23 movement led by Ṣalāḥ Jadīd, the Nuṣayrī, in Syria in 1966, established al-Arsūzī as the spiritual father of the party. The Ba‘th is the heir to the "League of Nationalist Action" (‘Uṣbat al-‘Amal al-Qawmī), which was the organizational nucleus for both ‘Aflaq and al-Arsūzī. This league existed from 1932 to 1939. (1) (Al-Dhakhā’ir al-‘Āmm: vol. 1, pp. 882-889). In 1939, al-Arsūzī withdrew from it and formed the Arab Nationalist Party.

As for Zakī al-Arsūzī: he was a Nuṣayrī man, an atheist, who did not speak Arabic! Influenced by the principles of the French Revolution and Nazism, especially Nietzsche's book "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" regarding the death of God and the emergence of the Superman. He began learning Arabic after 1940! Al-Arsūzī

considered the Arab Jāhiliyyah his highest ideal and regarded it as the golden Arab era.

Sāmī al-Jundī says: "I discussed the Qur'ān with him in 1946, and he criticized my religious inclination."

Principles of the Ba'th Party:

Derived from the principles of the Nationalist Party formed by al-Arsūzī in 1939, whose symbol was the tiger.

1. Arabs are one nation.
2. The Arabs have one leader who emerges from the capabilities of the Arab nation, representing and expressing it.
3. Arabism (al-‘Urūbah) is our national conscience, the source of sanctities; from it, high ideals emanate, and according to it, the value of things is determined.
4. The Arab is the master of destiny. Al-Arsūzī interpreted this by quoting the Gospel: "Not a hair of your head will fall without the will of your Father in heaven."

Al-Jundī says:

"On November 29, 1940, we were in a room, and al-Arsūzī said: 'I think we should establish a party and call it the Arab Ba'th Party.'"

"The principles of the Nationalist Party became the very same principles of the Arab Ba'th Party."

Sāmī al-Jundī also says:

"We were rebels who revolted against all old values, enemies of everything humans had agreed upon; we disbelieved in all rituals, relationships, and religions."

"We were accused of atheism, and that was also true, despite all the justifications the Ba'thists later claimed."

As for Michel 'Aflaq:

In March 1949, Ḥusnī al-Zaʿīm came to power, and the Baʿth supported him. Then they disagreed with him, and he threw Michel 'Aflaq in prison. 'Aflaq wrote a plea for clemency and was released. Then al-Ḥinnāwī came after Ḥusnī al-Zaʿīm and chose Michel as Minister of Education. He seized this opportunity to send Baʿthists on study missions to France; they returned and took over universities and administrations.

The conflict was intense among the party leaders, to the extent that in the 1955 elections for the Regional Congress, they were saying, "'Aflaq is an English spy, al-Ḥawrānī is French, and al-Biṭār worked for more than one state."

As for accusations of theft and moral crimes, they were too numerous to mention.

Here we note some observations:

1. The party was a haven where all those resentful of Islam or ambitious for power gathered. The Nuṣayrīs noticed it and joined it to be a ladder to their Nuṣayrī state. Ismāʿīlīs like Sāmī al-Jundī and 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jundī also joined it. And Druze: like Salīm Ḥaṭṭūm. And Jews: like Aḥmad Rabāḥ, who was the head of the party in Damascus. And Eli Cohen: the Israeli intelligence officer who went to Argentina, befriended Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ, then entered Syria under the name Kāmil Amīn Thābit. He lived in the Abū Rummānah district of Damascus, and his apartment became the fortified stronghold where Baʿth leaders took refuge. Above Cohen's bed, Salīm Ḥaṭṭūm and 'Abd al-Karīm Zahr al-Dīn toasted victory on the day of the Baʿthist coup (March 8, 1963). Cohen was offered a ministry, but he consulted Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, who did not approve. He was called the "First Revolutionary Youth" and was the only civilian allowed to enter airports and military bases. Finally, the Indian embassy discovered he was Jewish through the wireless signals he sent daily to Israel. It was an international scandal. Cohen was tried, and those who tried him were his protégés and mentees. Perhaps he was promised release if he concealed the calamities of the ruling Baʿth Party. Salīm

Ḥāṭūm was the head of the military court that tried him. The case was swiftly closed, and Cohen was executed to bury in his chest the tragedies and misfortunes of the Baʿthist youths managed by international Jewry through women and wine.

2. The founders of the Baʿth Party were not originally Muslims. Zakī al-Arsūzī was a Nuṣayrī atheist, and Michel ʿAflaq was a Christian – it was said he was of Greek origin.

3. The principles of the Baʿth Party are clear kufr (disbelief): "Arabism (al-ʿUrūbah) is the source of sanctities; from it, high ideals emanate, and according to it, the value of things is determined. The Arab is the master of destiny." Thus, the high ideals are Arabism, not Islam or the Qurʾān and Sunnah.

4. The early followers of the Baʿth were atheists, enemies of all religions. Sāmī al-Jundī said in his book "Al-Baʿth": "We were Khawārij (dissenters/outsideers) against the laws that people had agreed upon, so we destroyed them all."

5. He also says: "Despite its claims of nationalism and patriotism, the party did not prepare a study on the Palestinian issue, the most dangerous Arab issue in the modern era."

6. The Nuṣayrīs climbed the Baʿth ladder and managed to take over the country militarily and civilly. On February 22, 1966, Ṣalāḥ Jadīd – the Nuṣayrī – removed Ahl al-Sunnah elements from positions of power. In 1970, when Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad came with the "Corrective Movement," he made the state purely Nuṣayrī.

7. Nationalist parties do not have an ideology (ʿaqīdah) regarding the universe, man, and life. Therefore, they remained merely a framework without substance. Thus, they were forced to fill their ideological vacuum with Marxism and socialism. Consequently, all nationalist parties became: "Arab in framework and appearance, communist in reality and essence." This was acknowledged by Jalāl al-Sayyid in his book "The Reality of Arab Nationalism," stating that a spontaneous current

formulated economic issues because the dregs had emerged under the guise of progressivism and socialism, and that communism is the reality of this current.

8. The party committed suicide as soon as it came to power. In 1965 in Syria, Michel 'Aflaq criticized the military's dominance over the party and the exclusion of civilians from the party's central committees. 'Aflaq was expelled; indeed, he and the other founder, Ṣalāḥ al-Bīṭār, were sentenced to death. Al-Bīṭār was then pursued until the Nuṣayrīs assassinated him in his exile in Paris in 1981. As for 'Aflaq, he was embraced by the Iraqi Ba'th after it came to power in the 1968 coup against 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ārif. His student, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, who became Vice President and then President of the Republic of Iraq, brought him in.

Ṣaddām Ḥusayn was asked in a newspaper interview printed and distributed in Jordan in 1981: "What is your relationship with Michel 'Aflaq?" Ṣaddām replied: "The relationship of a son to his father. Without Michel, Ṣaddām would have been nothing." It is known that Ṣaddām was Michel 'Aflaq's personal bodyguard from the early sixties, and Michel used him to eliminate his political opponents. In 1979, President Ṣaddām Ḥusayn – from the early days of his rule – eliminated most of the party leaders for their principled opposition to his presidency.

Some of its leaders wrote about the party's tragedy, such as Dr. Munīf al-Razzāz ("The Bitter Experience") and Muṭā' al-Ṣafadī ("The Ba'th Party: Tragedy of Birth and Tragedy of Destiny").

The party ended in Syria as the Nuṣayrīs climbed over it and then killed it. They began to revel in transgressing all religions, values, and principles. They first used the offspring of Muslims who joined the Ba'th Party, then gradually eliminated them. Kufr became the state's slogan in all its apparatuses. Ibrāhīm Khilāṣ wrote in the Syrian People's Army Magazine (Jaysh al-Sha'b) on April 25, 1967:

"The only way to build Arab civilization and construct Arab society is to create the new Arab socialist man who believes that Allāh, religions, feudalism, capital, colonialism, the overfed, and all the values that prevailed in the previous society are

nothing but mummified dolls in the museums of history." Exalted is Allāh above what the criminals ascribe to Him through their heresy!

Shafīq al-Kamālī said, praising Ṣaddām:

"Blessed be your sacred face among us... Like the face of Allāh, exuding majesty."

I seek forgiveness from Allāh the Almighty and repent to Him!! And exalted is Allāh above the slander of this dog, who soon met his retribution in this world before the Hereafter.

Tawfīq al-Kamālī's story with Ṣaddām is indeed one of the signs of Allāh. During the Iraq-Iran War (1979-1986), Khomeini offered to stop the war in exchange for Ṣaddām's resignation. In one of his private gatherings, this poet, Tawfīq al-Kamālī, said to his companions, "If only His Excellency the President would accept and spare the bloodshed..." Intelligence services reported this. Ṣaddām summoned al-Kamālī, who admitted his suggestion, apologizing that he thought it would be one of the President's many virtues for the nation. Ṣaddām ordered him to stick out his tongue, took it in his hand, and cut it off with a sharp knife. Thus, Ṣaddām cast away the tongue that had likened his filthy face to His (Allāh's), Exalted and Glorified. It was thrown into the dunghill it deserved, by the hand of the very tyrant he had praised. So, Glory be to Allāh, Lord of the Worlds.

I heard this story from one of the recordings of Shaykh ‘Abdullāh ‘Azzām, may Allāh have mercy on him.

When Ba‘th forces entered Ḥamāh in 1964, they were chanting:

"Bring a weapon, take a weapon... Muḥammad's religion is gone and vanished."

In 1980, the Defense Companies and party members came out chanting: "Allāh has fallen!" "Al-Asad is our Lord!" "No god but the homeland, and no messenger but the Ba‘th!" "No god but Sājī!" (the son of Sulaymān al-Murshid, who claimed divinity among the Nuṣayrīs in the forties!).

In the second half of the eighties, after the suppression of the Jihādī revolution in Syria, a Ba‘thist-Nuṣayrī demonstration took place in the city of Ḥimṣ, whose soil contains the graves of tens of thousands of Ṣaḥābah (Companions of the Prophet), may Allāh be pleased with them. And they were chanting: "Depart, O Allāh, depart! Appoint Ḥāfiẓ in Your place!"

- (Ḥallak) means, in the dialect of that region, (ḥāna laka) – that is, (it is time for Allāh) to appoint Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad as a lord in His place. I seek forgiveness from Allāh, the Most High, the Great – and may Allāh’s curse be upon the atheist ṭāghūt.

9. The Ba‘th Party began at the start of the Second World War (1939), when Nazism and Fascism filled the world with their clamor, and thus it was influenced by them. For example, Zakī al-Arsūzī was influenced by Nietzsche, the philosopher of Nazism, especially by his book "Thus Spoke Zarathustra, concerning the death of God..." As for ‘Aflaq, he was similarly influenced by Nietzsche and Gide. Their ideas came as a summarization of the atheism and anxiety from which Nietzsche suffered, who used to call Christianity "the religion of lame dogs." The most important features of Nietzsche's philosophy are summarized in three points:

1. Atheism.
2. The idea of resurrection is what made Christianity "the ethics of slaves," as the hatred of the weak towards the strong made them suggest to them the idea of the Hereafter, so the strong surrendered to myths, and the darkness of Christianity enveloped the world.
3. Despair and anxiety: which are permanent conditions for human greatness.

Here is a comparison between the words of ‘Aflaq and the words of Nazism and Fascism:

1. "The Ba'ṯh is the destiny of the Arab nation" corresponds to Mussolini's statement, "Fascism is the destiny of the Italian nation," which is the divine right according to Hitler, and it is the same as Trotsky's statement: "The Communist Party does not err because it is the embodiment of historical determinism."
2. "The Ba'ṯhist creed cannot be reached by reason but by faith alone" corresponds to Mussolini's statement, "Fascism is not debated; it is perceived by intuition."
3. "The destiny that carried us the message of Ba'ṯh has given us the right to command with force and act with cruelty" is the same as Mussolini's statement: "The destiny that carried us the message of Fascism has given us the right to command with force and act with cruelty."
4. "The Ba'ṯh is the vanguard, and the masses must walk behind it," which is the same as Mussolini's statement: "Fascism is the rule of the chosen elite, and it must lead the masses." (Al-Dhakhā'ir al-'Izām: Vol. 1, pp. 889-892)

These testimonies remind me of what caught my attention during my history studies at Beirut University. I found in one of the assigned books on the unification of Italy a great similarity between the thought and actions of one of the proponents of Italian nationalism and unity – his name escapes me now – and what we used to hear of the ideas of 'Aflaq, al-Arsūzī, and the Ba'ṯh Party in Syria. This included the tripartite slogan, naming their newspaper "Al-Ba'ṯh," and other things. I have no doubt now that the ideas of the Ba'ṯh were manufactured in the cellars of Freemasonry and Crusader conspiracies. I even read in a newspaper that the Pope said to 'Aflaq in one of their meetings: "You have succeeded, Michel, where the Crusades failed!"

Then came the experience of ‘Abd al-Nāṣir and the Free Officers, and their call for Arab nationalism, a model in Egypt similar to the preceding Ba‘th model in Syria and Iraq.

Military Coups and Nationalism

New ideas inevitably require military leadership to impose their views by force. In this way, Islam was replaced by nationalism and socialism.

Therefore, Western circles in our countries and the Orientalists recommended the necessity of bringing in young military leaders through whom the West could impose the principles it desired.

Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq says:

"The Arabs, in their new era, must have capable and progressive leadership, and they must discard the reactionary elements of their traditions. Only then can the enlightened group continue its struggle against reactionary elements in cooperation with the West."

And Gibb says:

"The success of development depends to a large extent on the leaders in the Islamic world, especially the young among them."

The idea of nationalism is an attractive, glittering issue that can easily deceive the masses in the name of liberation, progress, and patriotism.

Gibb says:

"The method by which the Westernized class was able to secure a firm grip on power in the state... Nationalism is a completely Western idea."

It is well known that military men have no knowledge of administering nations, caring for peoples, or managing the masses; hence, countries are run through them.

Steve Mead, an envoy from the US State Department, described the military faction of the 1952 coup in Egypt with a precise description that fits all military men: "These boys think they are members of a comical Robin Hood gang. They are happy to carry the title 'heroes of the revolution,' but I haven't found one who could explain to me what the goal of this revolution is... They don't care about politics... Perhaps this is fortunate for us, and for 'Abd al-Nāṣir with us... They need someone to tell them what to think and do."

After the assassination attempt on 'Abd al-Nāṣir in Manshia Square in 1954, some army officers asked 'Abd al-Ḥakīm 'Āmir what the revolution had achieved and the reasons for the incident. He frankly said, "He does not know what the revolution is achieving, and that Jamāl planned and executed everything, and he is the one who knows the future steps."

Morroe Berger says in his book "The Arab World Today":

"The military elite in the Near East—in Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—were important factors in bringing about change... So the Arabs became Westernized without having to go to Europe."

Miles Copeland says:

"If 'Abd al-Nāṣir had not been born, our game would have had to create him, meaning, to cultivate a dictator like him."

Therefore, 'Abd al-Nāṣir's call for nationalism in 1954 was at America's signal, as Miles Copeland – the American intelligence operative – explained. 'Abd al-Nāṣir's call had a profound impact on the Arab world, and nationalism would not have spread so widely were it not for Egypt and its leader. 'Abd al-Nāṣir paved the way for this nationalist proliferation, as well as the success of the Ba'ṯh, the infiltration of communism, and the decline of Islam from the entire region. But the ideas imposed on the region by force were uprooted from the earth – {like a wicked tree uprooted

from the surface of the earth, having no stability}. As Bernard Lewis says:

"Taking any ready-made political system not only from a different country but from a different civilization and imposing it by Westerners or Westernized rulers in the East is a wrong act. Democracy was imposed by orders and decrees of the absolute ruler... The result was the establishment of a system unrelated to the country's past or present, nor to its future needs." (This is exactly what America imposes by force today in Arab and Islamic countries, which it calls the "Greater Middle East"!)

Ziya Gökalp, the Turk, called for the separation of religion from the state (secularism of the state) and advocated for adopting Western culture in its entirety, while retaining national culture. Or, to be more precise, he wanted to completely exclude Islam from life, without allowing people to call this act atheism or heresy; rather, people should call the destruction of Islam "peace."

Westerners consider Gökalp "the one who laid the theoretical foundations for the modern Turkish state," as Harold Smith says.

Turanian Turkish Nationalism

The first seeds of Turkish nationalism were sown within the military academy in Istanbul by German military professors who came to the college to train the Turks, who needed a strong army trained in modern means of power and advanced fighting techniques, especially as Turkey was fighting the entire world, which was attacking it from all sides. A German military mission arrived in 1883, headed by Colonel von der Goltz, and he worked for nearly thirteen years, during which the seed of nationalism was sown.

The second factor in the rise of Turanian nationalism was the migration of Hungarian and Polish refugees to Turkey after the failure of their revolution in 1848, and their conversion to Islam, whereby they became part of the influential class in the state. Among these was Konstanty Borzęcki, who later named himself

Muṣṭafá Jalāl al-Dīn Pāshā. This man was the head of the nationalist serpent that spread its venom into the minds and souls of the Turks. Bernard Lewis says:

"Borzęcki worked to transfer Polish nationalism and cast it in a Turkish mold. He was aided in this by the works of Western Orientalists researching Turkish affairs, which had a significant impact on the appreciation of ancient Turkish history and the belief in a distinct identity."

We must not fail to recall that all members of the Committee of Union and Progress (Jam‘iyyat al-Ittiḥād wa-l-Taraqqī) were Masons (a global Jewish organization), and that the Jews of Salonica were the driving force behind this committee. We recall again the words of Seton-Watson: "The prominent fact in the formation of the Committee of Union and Progress is that it was non-Turkish and non-Islamic." Thus, it overthrew ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, Turkey, and Islam.

This call for Turkish nationalism had a detrimental effect, reflected in the souls of the Islamic peoples subject to Ottoman sovereignty. They began to demand independence and form secret societies to fight Turkey, especially after the shameful and strange behavior pursued by the Committee of Union and Progress. At the forefront of these peoples were the Arabs, who used this behavior as a justification to side with Britain against the Turks in the Great Arab Revolt led by al-Sharīf Ḥusayn. This had dire consequences for the Islamic world.

Toynbee says:

"The officers in Hamidian Turkey were the only class that could open a permanent intellectual window through which Western influences could penetrate. Therefore, in 1908, after thirty years of dark despotism, the new Turkish generation of military men was the spearhead of the Western liberal attack on Turkey."

Comparison between Turanian Nationalism and Arab Nationalism

Turanian and Arab nationalism converged on several key points, the most important of which are:

The purpose of both was to eliminate Muslim Turkey, and Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd in particular.

Both nationalisms began at approximately the same time, although Arab nationalism preceded Turanianism slightly.

Both nationalisms were secular and agreed on excluding Islam from life.

Both nationalisms originated in foreign environments: Arab nationalism in American institutions and the American University, while Turanianism originated in Jewish Masonic lodges supervised by Spanish, Polish, and Italian Jews.

The early pioneers of both states were not originally Muslims, nor were they of the ethnicity whose nationalism they advocated. For example, Borzęcki, who called himself Muṣṭafá Jalāl al-Dīn Pāshā – of Polish origin – worked to transfer Polish nationalism and cast it in a Turkish mold. Since the founding of the Committee of Union and Progress, not one of its leaders or commanders of pure Turkish origin emerged: Anwar Pāshā was a Polish renegade, Jāwīd was from the Jewish Dönme sect, Carasso was one of the Spanish Jews in Salonica, Ṭal‘at Pāshā was of Gypsy origin, and Aḥmad Riḍā was half Circassian and half Hungarian, influenced by Comte.

The early pioneers of Arab nationalism were all non-Muslims: Buṭrus al-Bustānī, Nāṣif and his son Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī, al-Shidyāq, Adīb Ishāq, Naqqāsh, Shumayyil, Taqlā, Ṣarrūf, Zaydān, Nimr, and Mishāqah – all of them, without exception, were Christians. Then came the twentieth century, and among their leaders were: Zakī al-Arsūzī (a Nusayri Turkmen) and Michel ‘Aflaq (a Christian) – leaders of the Ba‘th;

Anṭūn Sa'ādah and George 'Abd al-Masīḥ – leaders of the Syrian Nationalist Party; and Ḥabash – one of the leaders of the Arab Nationalists Movement. All of them Christians!

Cardinal Bertoli said to the Pope: "Christianity in the East is what planted the revolutionary movements and movements of change. Names like Michel 'Aflaq, Anṭūn Sa'ādah, and George Ḥabash may explain what I mean."

Masonic-Jewish fingers were manipulating the vanguards of both movements. The first five who established the "Beirut Secret Society" were all Masons. Likewise, those who called for Turanian nationalism were Masons.

There were some masterminds orchestrating the overthrow of Islam in Turkey who moved to Cairo to continue their work! For example, 'Azīz al-Miṣrī was in the Committee of Union and Progress, then he established "al-Jam'iyyah al-Qaḥṭāniyyah" and "Jam'iyyat al-'Ahd." The Jewish Rabbi in Istanbul, Ḥāyīm Nāḥūm, moved to Cairo after the fall of the Caliphate in Turkey and had influence in Egyptian politics during 'Abd al-Nāṣir's time. Similarly, Ismā'īl Aḥmad Adham came from Turkey to Egypt, wrote the book "Why I am an Atheist," and founded "The Eastern Forum for Spreading Atheism."

Arab nationalism was influenced by American theories, and Turanianism was influenced by the French Revolution. Philip Hitti says: "It was a product of the contact between the Syrian mind and Western intellectual output that the principles of comprehensive Arab nationalism were born, drawing its inspiration mostly from American theories, unlike Turkish nationalism, which came later than Arab nationalism and drew its inspiration from the principles of the French Revolution."

Jewish fingers were prominent in Turkish nationalism. The Jews are still keen to tie the Arabs to their nationalism. Abba Eban – who was Israel's Foreign Minister – said in a lecture at Princeton University in America: "Some Arab leaders are trying to

assess the extent of the Islamic tide after the recent defeat (1967), and in that lies the real danger to Israel. Therefore, it was one of our primary duties to keep the Arabs firmly convinced of their nationalist, not Islamic, lineage." (Al-Dhakhā'ir al-ʿIzām: Vol. 1, pp. 893-895)

Shaykh ʿAbdullāh ʿAzzām said:

Finally, we say: The reality of the Arabs clearly indicates that the results achieved by the nationalist, regionalist, and secularist calls are:

Severing the Arabs' connection to the Islamic state.

Tearing the Arab world into feeble statelets so that they remain in the grip of the Western and Eastern worlds, competing in their loyalty to America or Russia to protect their regimes in the region. (Al-Dhakhā'ir al-ʿIzām: Vol. 1, pp. 893-895)

The expansion of the Israeli entity, which has become a dragon opening its jaws, swallowing parts of Arab lands periodically.

Collapses in most social, political, economic, and military aspects.

The emergence of generations that have no specific identity, nor any principle in life, not knowing why they live. They are morally torn, socially decayed, familially disintegrated, their hearts are void. You see them with a new opinion every day, changing their ideas as they change their clothes in belief, economy, culture, and society. Zwemer – the leader of the missionaries – says, addressing the missionaries: "Indeed, you have prepared a youth in the lands of Islām who know no connection to Allāh, nor do they wish to know it. You have removed the Muslim from Islām, so the Muslim generation emerged according to what colonialism desired: uninterested in great matters, loving comfort and laziness, and focusing its worldly concerns only on desires."

This East has never witnessed unity or honor, nor did it have an entity except through Islām, which united it the first time, and it will not find itself again except through Islām.

Nationalism tore Europe apart, so the Arabs imported it to tear apart their Islamic Ummah, and even to fragment the Arab peoples themselves.

As Toynbee says, questioning and admitting the guilt of his country and civilization: "Is it really necessary for the Arab world to fragment as the Spanish Empire in America unfortunately did—into twenty independent states, living in narrow, Western-style molds? This is the second grim face of our Western civilization, and it is regrettable that the Arabic-speaking peoples imitate it completely. The allure of nationalism is attractive in such scattered Islamic societies, but nationalism will not lead these societies to a new life, but rather to a sentence of death and annihilation."

The tune played by the ruling classes in the Islamic and Arab world is the tune of nationalism. It is embellished and beautiful, delighting the ears and gladdening the hearts, but it is a narcotic through which peoples are slaughtered on the altars of desires, cheap sacrifices for the sake of tyrants and ṭāghūt. The gurgling sound reflecting the bloody hemorrhage has attracted many flocks to be led to their miserable and painful slaughter.

Gibb says:

"The method by which the Westernized class was able to secure its firm grip on power in the state... was nationalism... Nationalism is an entirely Western idea."

The reason for the spread of nationalism in the Arab world is the West's own domination over the Islamic world.

The English historian Toynbee says in his book "The West, the East, and the Future": "At the present time, when the West finds itself, since the Second World War, divided into more than forty independent, sovereign nation-states, it threatens the

collapse of the entire house upon its inhabitants due to this internal division. Nevertheless, the West's prestige still holds enough power in the world to keep the germ of Western nationalism capable of spreading and infecting. It is hoped, however, that the Islamic world will be able to halt the spread of this Western political disease—nationalism—through the Islamic national sense of unity!!"

Nationalism is not the effective cure for our diseases; rather, it is a terminal illness from which we suffer.

Smith says: "The modern history of the Near East shows that abstract nationalism is not the appropriate foundation for undertaking the arduous duty. Unless the ideal is Islamic in some way, efforts will bear no fruit at all."

And how beautiful is the saying of our master ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, with which we conclude this discussion:

"We are a people whom Allāh honored with this religion (Islām), and whenever we seek honor in anything else, Allāh will humiliate us."

Allāh the Exalted said: *{We have certainly sent down to you a Book in which is your remembrance. Then will you not reason?}* (Al-Anbiyā’: 10). So, Muslims and Arabs are reminded by the Qur’ān; because of this Book, this Ummah is remembered. The Arabs first advanced humanity under the guidance of this Qur’ān, and they took the reins of humanity after adhering to the Book and establishing it in their lives.

{And indeed, it is a remembrance for you and for your people, and you are going to be questioned.} (Al-Zukhruf: 44). *{Say, "O People of the Scripture, you are upon nothing until you observe the Torah and the Gospel and what has been revealed to you from your Lord."}* (Al-Mā’idah: 68).

So, the people of the Qur’ān are upon nothing, and they have no weight or value unless they establish it among themselves, act by it in their lives, and apply it in their reality.

{And if We had decreed upon them, "Kill yourselves" or "Leave your homes," they would not have done it, except for a few of them. But if they had done what they were instructed, it would have been better for them and a firmer position.} (Al-Nisā': 66).

It was stated in the report of Delessert – the French Consul General in Syria – on 19/8/1956, which he wrote with the assistance of his aide, Blanc, the following: "One of the most prominent facts observed by anyone wishing to study these countries is the place that religion occupies in the souls of the people, and the authority it has in their lives. Religion appears everywhere and in every matter. In Eastern society, the effect of religion appears in public morals, in language, in literature, and in all social institutions. The Eastern man does not belong to a homeland in which he was born – the Easterner has no homeland – but to the religion into which he was born. Just as a man in the West belongs to a homeland, in the East he belongs to a religion. The nation of the Eastern man is the group of people who adhere to the same religion as he does, and every individual outside the fold of the religion is, to him, a foreigner, a stranger."

Jāhilī Nationalisms and Regionalisms

The West and its disciples everywhere have stirred up the tunes of connection to the Jāhiliyyahs (pre-Islamic states of ignorance) that predate Islām in order to sever the connection with Islām and bypass it.

In Morocco: The French administration tried to bolster the ethnic spirit among the Berbers of Marrakesh, so it issued the Berber Dahir on May 16, 1930, which decreed the implementation of Berber customary laws and their personal status law instead of the Islamic Sharī'ah.

In Indonesia: The Javanese-Hindu civilization was "discovered."

In Lebanon: Sa'īd 'Aql, Yūsuf al-Sawdā, and Victor stirred up the spectre of Phoenicianism, and they said that Lebanon does not belong to the Arabs, but is part of the Mediterranean civilization – Italy, and Greece.

In Egypt: Pharaonic civilization was promoted, especially after the discovery of Tutankhamun, and after Champollion solved the riddles of the Rosetta Stone. Salāmah Mūsā, Luṭfī Sayyid, then Sa'd Zaghlūl, and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn took up the call for Pharaonism. Names like Ramses, Pyramids, Nefertiti, Sphinx began to appear. The Sphinx was adopted as a symbol representing Egypt's renaissance. During Nasser's time, the High Dam was built, and UNESCO rallied the world to save the Pharaonic temple of Abu Simbel. The statue of Ramses – the Pharaoh of Moses – was moved to Cairo, costing millions. And the Turks began to chant the slogan "Turkey for the Turks" and Egypt "for the Egyptians."

Cuyler Young says of Louis Thomas:

"He was able to outline the historical and social circumstances of the movement that ended with modern Turkish leaders achieving the principle of Turkey for the Turks, and this principle was followed by most peoples of the region."

Therefore, the Kemalists used to say:

"We want to build a Turkish Islām that will be our own and part of our new society, like the Anglican Church, which is Christianity in the English style."

In Arab Egypt, the echoes of these cries resonated, mobilizing the Egyptian "parrots" manipulated by Western (specifically English) fingers, calling for the "Pharaonization of Egypt." Ṭāhā Ḥusayn said, "The Egyptian is Pharaonic before he is Arab," and he also said, "If Islām stood between me and my Pharaonism, I would renounce my Islām!"

Therefore, it is not surprising to see the West's great interest in antiquities and national museums, as Western bodies were established about a century ago to

supervise excavations in the Islamic world to link Muslims to antiquities and to the values and figures that existed before the advent of Islām. So, Botta and Layard came to Iraq, Mariette worked in Egypt, and Schliemann in Turkey. Then they established departments of antiquities and national museums. It is not surprising after this to realize that the Jewish Rockefeller Foundation donated ten million dollars to establish a museum for Pharaonic antiquities and an institute to train archaeologists. Perhaps after this, we can understand the reason for the provision in Article 21 of the British Mandate for Palestine: "The Mandatory shall enact into law, and enforce, within the first year from the date of this Mandate, a special law for antiquities." All this is to cut their connection with their Islām and link them to the first Jāhiliyyah, so that the West can enslave them and humiliate them under its control.

Dr. Wilson said at the conference on Islamic Culture and Contemporary Life held at Princeton University in 1952: "In the countries of the Near and Middle East these days, there is a civilizational renaissance that is, on the one hand, new, and on the other hand, a revival of the old. The renaissance of the Christian West and its revival of knowledge were based on processes of thought and debate therein on classical and pagan works."

In Iran: The Safavids and the Pahlavi regime weakened the relationship with the Islamic world. The Pahlavi regime established an academy to get rid of Arabic vocabulary in Persian. The academy "discovered" the glory of ancient Iran, and the doctrine of Zoroaster re-emerged, occupying a prominent place in the Land of the Lion and Sun. New buildings began to be built in the old Achaemenid style. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi held a celebration for the 2500th anniversary of Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire. Other nationalisms also arose in Iran, such as the Baloch, Kurds, and Arabs.

In Iraq: Chauvinistic cries arose. Some called for Arab nationalism, the Kurds for their Kurdish nationalism, and the Turks for Turkish nationalism. Assyrian and Chaldean calls also emerged.

In India: The fire of Indian communalism flared up. Indians began to take pride in being Indian, and they looked to sever ties with the water of Zamzam in Makkah in favor of the Ganges River, and they sang praises of Hindu heroes (Bhima, Arjuna, Rama). They began to view the Arab conquest as colonialism, subjugation, and foreign occupation of the homeland. This, which Muslims take pride in, led Muslims to call for the establishment of a state where they could live an Islamic life, with Islamic thought, where the nationality of a Muslim is his creed, his religion, and his Islām.

Iqbāl said, addressing the Muslim – wherever he may be:

"Do not compare the nations of the West to your Ummah, for the Ummah of the Hashemite Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is unique in its composition. They believe in their association based on homeland and lineage, but your association, O Muslim, is strengthened by the power of religion."

In Jordan and Palestine: Voices rose, glorifying ancient tribal glories, and disputes arose between the northern and southern tribes in eastern Jordan, and between Palestinians and the people of eastern Jordan. We began to hear of cities like Moab, Philadelphia, and Ammon.

The word of our Lord of Glory has indeed come true for us:

{Indeed, those who oppose Allāh and His Messenger - those will be among the most humiliated.} (Al-Mujādilah: 20). {And whoever turns away from My remembrance - indeed, he will have a depressed life, and We will gather him on the Day of Resurrection blind.} (Tāhā: 124).

And the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) spoke the truth: "I have been sent with the sword before the Hour so that Allāh alone is worshipped. My provision has been placed under the shadow of my spear, and humiliation and subservience have been decreed for those who disobey my command. Whoever imitates a people is one of them."

We have tasted the bitterness of our distance from the Book of Allāh, we have drunk the pain of our deviation from the path of Allāh, and we have reaped from the seeds of nationalism the fruits of estrangement, fragmentation, loss, abandonment, and ruin:

{Do they not see that they are tried every year once or twice but then they do not repent nor do they remember?} (Al-Tawbah: 126).

The time has come for us to return to Allāh, to cast aside all the burdens of Jāhiliyyah from our hands, and to call ourselves to return to the path of happiness: *{Then whoever follows My guidance will neither go astray [in the world] nor suffer [in the Hereafter].}* (Tāhā: 123). It is either Allāh or annihilation, either Islām or destruction.

End of quote.

Communism in the Arab World during the Twentieth Century

"Jews supervised the organization and formation of communist parties in the Arab world; they were their leaders and planners.

The French Jewish communist, Robinson, says:

'Communist parties and sympathetic organizations were not established except in foreign circles in Arab countries, in Egypt and Palestine. They found few followers and were disconnected from the reality of those countries, and they ended without attracting much attention.'

Below are the Jewish names of the founders of communism in Arab countries:

1 - The Communist Party in Egypt:

The organization began in 1921 in Alexandria by a Russian Jew named Joseph Rosenberg, accompanied by his daughter Charlotte. In 1927, Moscow sent three Jews to form and monitor the organization.

Then Russia delegated the Egyptian Jew Henri Curiel and provided him with vast sums of money, with which he founded the Curiel Bank in Egypt and formed the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (Hadeto).

Then the 'Iskra' (Spark) organization was formed, the same name as the newspaper Lenin published in Switzerland before the success of the revolution. This organization was formed by the Jew Elie Schwartz, who later changed its name to 'Nahshem' (Towards an Egyptian Communist Party), and then it joined Hadeto.

The 'New Dawn Organization' was founded by the two Jews Yusuf Darwish and Raymond Douek, and later its name became '[D.Sh.](#)' (Al-Dimuqrāṭiyyah al-Sha‘biyyah - Popular Democracy).

The 'Egyptian Communist Organization' (M.Sh.M): Founded by the two Jews Odette and her husband Lémon Sidney.

The 'People's Liberation Organization': Founded by Marcel Israel.

2 - The Communist Party in Iraq:

Founded by Jews, and most of its members initially were Jews. Its leaders included Sasson Dallal, Naji Shamil, Sadiq Yehuda, and Yusuf Hizqil, all of whom were Jews.

Qadri Qal‘aji narrates in his book 'An Arab's Experience in the Communist Party' (pp. 21-22), Professor Badr Shākir al-Sayyāb recounts – in addition to moral scandals we do not wish to dwell on – how he worked with his Iraqi communist

comrades to spread communism, saying: 'We started playing every string whose tune matched what we wanted. We spread among Kurdish students that nationalists hated Kurds and their nationalism, while we considered them our brothers. We began to insult Arab nationalism in front of them, even disparaging Arabs, claiming that Arab history was nothing but a series of massacres and slaughters, and their great leaders were nothing but feudal executioners, and so on. We passed by our Jewish brothers without needing to invite them. And we exploited some female comrades to influence some students.'

3 - The Syrian-Lebanese Communist Party:

The party was founded in 1924, after the Palestinian and Egyptian Communist Parties. It was headed in Lebanon by Jacob Tepper, a Russian Jew, who was assisted by three Jews: Mik, Oscar, and Muller."

The Syrian-Lebanese Party was affiliated with the Jewish Communist Party in Palestine, and then it became affiliated with the French Communist Party.

4 - The Palestinian and Jordanian Communist Party:

The issue of Palestine was one of the major concerns occupying the minds of the leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution from its earliest days. Lenin in Russia issued a two-part decree concerning the Jews:

First: Considering hostility towards Jews (anti-Semitism) a legal crime.

Second: Supporting the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine.

This decree was issued less than twenty days before the Balfour Declaration by Britain's Foreign Secretary on November 2, 1917.

Therefore, Russian communists focused on communist organization in Palestine.

The party founded in 1919 was the first in the region, initially formed by the

Russian Jew Rozhstein. Moscow dispatched two Jewish stalwarts of the Russian Communist Party to organize in Palestine: Jack Shapilev and Radool Karn Borg. Initially, all members of the Palestinian Communist Party were Russian Jews.

Then Moscow sent Vladimir Jabotinsky, who became notably active in Palestine. Later, S. Averbukh, a Jew nicknamed Abū Ziyam, was delegated to organize the Communist Party in Arab countries. Averbukh was a friend of Lenin in Switzerland and one of the most prominent communists in Palestine. He headed the Communist Party in Palestine from 1924 to 1929.

Membership in the Palestinian Communist Party was initially restricted to Jews. A few Palestinian Arabs joined, but they were not trusted by the communist majority and were not privy to their secrets. In 1937, the first overt movement of the Palestinian Communist Party was established behind the facade of a workers' union in Haifa, with Emile Tuma as its secretary.

In Nazareth, a workers' union with Emile Habibi as its secretary, and in Jaffa, with Fu'ād Nassār as its secretary.

In 1939, the communists established the National Liberation League. Its secretary was the Jew Ben Faki, and his assistant was Tawfiq Tubi. The demands of this league were the evacuation of Britain and then the formation of a joint government between Jews and Arabs.

In the 1948 war, members of the National Liberation League transformed into leaders of armed gangs, slaughtering the Palestinian people. Some misguided youth withdrew, while enthusiastic communists defended the Jews and stood by them, including the lawyer Ibrahim Bakr in Nazareth, Fu'ād Nassār in Jaffa, and other Arab communist leaders in Palestine.

After the Nakbah of 1948, the Jewish Palestinian Communist Party began to oversee the remaining, unoccupied parts of Palestine. The party leadership included Emile

Tuma, Tawfiq Tubi, and Emile Habibi; the latter two are members of the Knesset today. Communication between communists in the two parts of Palestine was facilitated by an Israeli officer and a communist press secretary working in the armistice committee. The Communist Party's publications were footnoted with a phrase in Hebrew at the bottom: "Printed by the presses of the Palestinian Communist Party," meaning (the occupied part).

In 1950, the West Bank was annexed to Jordan. Tal'at Ḥarb, a communist, was arrested in Ramallah while distributing communist leaflets he had brought from Israel. In 1951, security forces in Amman discovered a communist printing press registered with Hebrew numbers and phrases.

In 1952, Moscow ordered the separation of the Jordanian Communist Party from the Palestinian Communist Party. Fā'iḳ Warrād was still in the occupied territory, so Israeli forces allowed him to leave to become one of the leaders of the communist movement. The Ramallah region nominated him in 1956 as its representative in the Jordanian Parliament. On that day, Jerusalem presented Ya'qūb Ziyādīn – the Christian communist – as its representative.

In 1957, the Jordanian Communist Party was dissolved, its leaders arrested and imprisoned in the al-Jafr detention center. Fu'ād Nassār, secretary of the Jordanian Communist Party, delivered several lectures, the first of which was "Communism and Israel," in which he said: "We know, and everyone knows, that Israel is a de facto reality and a state with its political, economic, and military entity. The Jews are a people like any other, with the right to life. I recognize the Jews as a state because the sun cannot be hidden with a sieve."

When Fu'ād Nassār died in Amman in 1977, the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) held a memorial service for him in Nazareth. The party leader, Meir Vilner, attended, as did Tawfiq Tubi, Emile Tuma, and Tawfiq Ziad – the originator of the idea of

Yawm al-Ard (Land Day) – March 30. This Tawfiq [Ziad] is a member of the Israeli Knesset and was collecting donations in America in 1978 with the Israeli flag.

Telegrams are still exchanged between the Jordanian and Israeli Communist Parties. For instance, the Jordanian communist bulletin in April 1977 stated the following: "The Council also highly appreciated the principled and firm positions of the progressive forces in Israel itself, foremost among them the Communist Party (Rakah)."

Mahmoud Darwish and Samih al-Qasim, the two Palestinian communist poets – representatives of the occupied land – carried the Israeli flag at the Sofia International Conference.

Professor Sa'd Jum'ah says: "It has been proven beyond any doubt that there is a unified organization, ideological coherence, planning, and integration in planning and objectives between the Israeli Communist Party and the Arab communist parties. Anyone who has experienced the troubles of governing in Jordan knows that many Arab communist publications used to reach us across the border from Israel, and that many leaders of the Jordanian Communist Party were thrust upon us from Israel after being mentored and trained by the misleading masters of the Zionist party." End quote. (Al-Dhakha'ir: 974-976).

Arab Communists and the Palestinian Cause:

We have seen previously that communist organizations in the Arab world were all supervised and nurtured by Jews. As for the communist leaders who claim Arab identity, they were raised by Jewish masters after their minds were changed to become Jewish. The Jews pinned great hopes on these pupils and on the advancement of socialism in the region.

In 1948, Arab communists – from Palestine – wrote to Moscow: "Making Palestine a national homeland for the Jews is the only way and the successful means to Bolshevize the Arab world."

When the partition plan was announced, and after Russia declared its blatant support for the resolution, Arab communists reverted to supporting partition. The Secretary-General of the Arab Communists, Khalid Bakdash, declared: "The reactionary Arab governments are responsible. They opposed the friendly Soviet Union until the last moment and did not seek its friendship. It is true that the Jews are not a nation, but they are a people with the right to life."

Rafīq Riḍā (a member of the leadership of the Lebanese-Syrian Communist Party), who defected from Khalid Bakdash and was his assistant, revealed: "The Communist Party leadership was as enthusiastic as Ben-Gurion about the revival of the Jewish state in Palestine. In their view, Israel was an oasis of democracy in the Near East, and the dispersed Israeli people had to meet in the Promised Land. The duty of international solidarity, according to the aforementioned leadership, is at the core of Marxist principles. Therefore, in their view, Israel's existence has humanitarian justifications that transcend national justifications and realities."

Everyone knew the shameful position of communism towards their brethren. They collectively condemned the displaced Arabs – who were defending their entity, their lives, their dīn, and their honor. They attacked them and considered them aggressors, while describing the Jews as oppressed. They considered the defense of Palestine to be religious reactionism and a conspiracy against the Jews.

In Iraq, the communists said: "The Iraqi people proudly refuse to fight the brotherly Israeli people."

The party secretary in Iraq, Yusuf Salman (nicknamed Fahd), said: "Welcome to the establishment of two states, Arab and Jewish, in Palestine, provided they embrace socialism and ally against Arab religious reactionism."

The Egyptian Communist Organization wrote on May 15, 1948, under the title "The Armies of the Arab Countries Invaded Palestine": "This war is a reactionary war that serves the Arab bourgeoisie and suppresses the rising revolutionary proletariat (the Jews) in Palestine."

After the establishment of Israel, communists began to call for peace with it. They continuously distributed articles by Samuel Mikunis, secretary of the Israeli Communist Party, which he published in the Cominform newspaper under the title "For a Lasting Peace."

Fu'ād Nassār (secretary of the Jordanian Communist Party in 1957) delivered a lecture in al-Jafr in which he said: "We know, and everyone knows, that Israel is a de facto reality and a state with its political, economic, and military entity. The Jews are a people like any other, with the right to life. I recognize the Jews as a state because the sun cannot be hidden with a sieve."

After the Palestinian revolution began and gained strength, communists infiltrated its ranks and began to promote their slogan "Differentiate between Jew and Zionist" in order to dilute the Palestinian cause.

They said: We do not fight honorable Jews; we only fight Zionism.

And we do not know how to differentiate in the public sphere between an "honorable Jew" – as they claim – and a Zionist, while the leaders of Zionist organizations believe that every Zionist is a Jew. Indeed, Zion refers to the southern part of Jerusalem (Mount of the Jebusites), then the Jews began to apply it to Jerusalem, calling it "Daughter of Zion." And in the Torah: "Sing, O Daughter of Zion; shout, O Daughter of Jerusalem."

Herzl says: "Zionism is the return to the fold of Judaism before it becomes the return to the Promised Land."

Ben-Gurion says: "I am a Jew first and an Israeli second, because I believe that the State of Israel was created for the entire Jewish people and on their behalf."

The leaders of the Palestinian revolution and its organizations began to educate the youth with "revolutionary culture"!! The culture of Mao and Guevara, the revolutionism of Lenin and Stalin, the ideas of Marx, and the life of Castro. They taught the youth twenty terms around which they would revolve... imperialism, bourgeoisie, demagoguery, proletariat...

And the youth thought they had acquired something new, for which they had replaced the dīn of Allāh – Exalted and Majestic is He – and they exchanged the verses of Allāh and the sacred things for a paltry price.

They declared war against "reactionism" (the dīn of Islam), leading to internal conflict that spread to every home, between brother and brother, son and father, and daughter and mother.

The officials of the Anṣār organization (the communist one) – which we only heard about through papers – began to attend the trade union complex in 1969-1970, saying: "Our enemies are (Zionist imperialism, not the honorable Jews!!)."

The revolutionary factions in the municipality of the capital, Amman, celebrated Lenin's centennial birthday for a whole week on April 10, 1970. Not a crossroads, nor a door, nor a grocery store, nor a shop remained without a picture of the "great" Lenin plastered on it!! – The planter of the state of atheism on earth –.

As for their bases, we saw them up close. Their codenames were Abū Jahl, Abū Lahab, Mao, Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh.

As for their night's secret: it was cursing the dīn of the Lord. As for their food: they used to hunt dogs with their rifles and then eat them, because for them there is no difference between a dog and a sheep, as the claim of differentiation is a reactionary

myth brought by a Bedouin in the desert named Muḥammad (peace and blessings be upon him).

And we saw them when the Muslim mujāhid youth, who carried arms, would raise the adhān in fida'ī gatherings, the sons of Lenin and Mao Zedong would clap, curse, and raise their voices, saying: "If you ask about me, these are my values... I am a Marxist-Leninist internationalist!"

And Allāh the Great has spoken the truth: *{And when you call to prayer, they take it in ridicule and amusement. That is because they are a people who do not use reason.}* (Al-Mā'idah: 58).

And the Muslim mujāhid youth who languish in chains in Israeli prisons – when they perform ṣalāh – still suffer from the commotion created by those who work for George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh. How many disputes and clashes have occurred because a Muslim youth criticized Mao, Guevara, Lenin, or Marx.

After the end of revolutionary activity in Jordan, we saw some leftist leaders like George Habash reappear in (Democratic South Yemen) – the land of 'Ād – organizing universities and institutes for Mao, Marx, and Lenin.

And I wondered how the English could cooperate with the proponents of Arab communist nationalism, were it not that it is a single front dedicated to fighting Islam and its people.

("The English Cross enables the communists in Yemen to raise their sickle and (their hammer) and organizes the vanguards of Arab nationalism represented by a person named George – his name is not Arabic –") this is to terrorize the Yemeni Muslim people in their fiṭrah, and to send explosive devices to North Yemen to demolish installations and kill children and girls.

Then I realized the dimensions of the global conspiracy against Islam and its people. As for values and morals, they have no consideration among the socialist

revolutionaries. How many female "comrades"!! were deceived in the name of Palestine. You would enter their bases – especially – in city offices like Amman, and find those in tight trousers who sleep to the tunes of music and wake up to the strings of the oud among groups of "beetles" and hippies!!.

In a demonstration at the University of Jordan in 1979, their voices rose, saying: "Our legitimate demands are bread, freedom, and the young man next to the young woman."

I saw a young man approach them as some regional chauvinism began to appear. This good young man said to them: "O brothers, I address you in the name of Islam." Then one of the misguided revolutionary socialist "comrades" stood up to him, saying: "Our demands on the lists are reactionary; we don't want to see it," meaning: We do not want to see Islam. End quote. (1)

The Defeats and Disintegration of Arabs and Muslims and Their March Towards the Abyss During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century:

Thus, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed the independence of Arab and Islamic countries. It was a formal, orchestrated independence that, in reality, was no more than a transformation in the methods of the colonial occupiers to what became known as modern colonialism. Colonialism fragmented the Arab world into about 22 states and the Islamic world into a total of more than 55 states. Various models of ruling regimes were imposed on these countries through precise and direct arrangements by the colonial powers. Among them were hereditary ruling families, especially in areas of significant natural resources, particularly oil regions. There were also oppressive military dictatorial regimes, especially in areas of activism, awareness, and culture, such as in Iraq, al-Shām, and Egypt. And there were dictatorial regimes that cloaked themselves in the Western liberal system, among others.

However, all these regimes governed their peoples with oppression, injustice, and subjugation. They subjected them to policies of impoverishment and enforced ignorance, leading them down paths of immorality, spreading indecency, and into misguidance and error.

Furthermore, all these regimes, without exception, ruled by man-made laws imported, wholly or partially, from the colonizing West.

During those years, the Islamic world declined to the bottom of the list of underdeveloped nations, suffering from a massive and diverse range of crises. (1) (Al-Dhakhā'ir al-'Izām: 984-986). Because of this, and because of the various intellectual and political currents of differing inclinations and desires that the West introduced into these lands—ranging from the philosophies of the atheist, communist, socialist East to the heresies of the permissive, licentious, liberal West—a bitter struggle for power arose in many of these countries. Political blocs opposing the ruling regimes managed to come to power, presenting alternative models that were no less in their kufr, injustice, misguidance, and decay. The saga of loss and crises continued.

Many of these artificial regimes also engaged in regional wars among themselves. Neither a shared religion nor even nationalistic ties between rulers prevented these wars. There was war between Iran and Iraq, between Iraq and Kuwait, between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Wars occurred between Libya and Chad, between Algeria and Morocco, between Syria and Jordan, and between Syria and multiple factions in Lebanon. Border disputes arose between the Gulf emirates, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and between Qatar and Bahrain. Fierce fighting took place between the Jordanian regime and the Palestinians, between the Syrian regime and the Palestinians, and between various Lebanese factions and the Palestinians. Threats nearly ignited wars between Syria and Turkey, between Syria and Iraq, between Sudan and Eritrea, and between Sudan

and Chad... and so on, with these conflicts and wars that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and impoverished both lands and people. Not a single one of these conflicts could be considered a struggle between right and wrong, nor did any of them have a trace of legitimate cause for shar‘ī fighting. Rather, it was fighting based on the whims of kings and rulers, so that glory might belong to so-and-so, from the ruling gerbils in Muslim lands.

In light of these conditions, our enemies became covetous of us. The Jews occupied two-thirds of Palestine in 1948, due to the treachery of the leaders of the seven Arab armies. Then, in 1967, they occupied what remained of Palestine, including East al-Quds and the blessed al-Masjid al-Aqṣā, in addition to lands from Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, an area more than five times the size of Palestine. All of this was due to the treachery of the regimes in Ba‘thist and Nuṣayrīyyah Syria, Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir's Egypt with its Arab nationalism, and the regime of the long-standing Freemason King Ḥusayn in Jordan. In 1973, the Nuṣayrīyyah regime in Syria and the regime of the traitor Anwar al-Sādāt transformed the Arabs' sole, orphaned victory against the Jews into a military and then political defeat in the famous Ramaḍān War, after the historic crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces under cries of Allāhu Akbar, and the magnificent advance of Syrian forces that reached Lake Tiberias and landed their troops in the Golan Heights.

Since the treacherous agreements of President Sādāt in 1980, followed by the disengagement agreements between al-Asad's Nuṣayrīyyah Syria and Israel, and then the subsequent betrayals primarily orchestrated by Yāsir ‘Arafāt, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and then the so-called Palestinian National Authority, the Arabs lost everything, including their land, holy sites, and even their dignity, before an Israel backed by America and Europe. As for the Islamic world, various forces of kufr encroached upon and occupied many of its regions. India occupied Kashmir, Russia retained the Caucasus and the Central Asian republics, and Muslims lost their

independence and most of their lands in Eastern European countries, as well as in many African and Southeast Asian countries.

Since 1990, when America took up the banner of aggression, controlled the world, and made the "Greater" Middle East—comprising most of the Arab and Islamic world—an arena for its invasions, imperial ambitions, and colonial plunder, the Arab and Islamic world reached the abyss of decay, disintegration, and defeats. The prelude to this was the occupation of Afghanistan and the entry of joint American-Jewish-Crusader forces into the capital of al-Rashīd (Baghdad) in April 2003.

In short, the last seven decades have recorded a black, sorrowful history for Arabs and Muslims, in which the land was filled—between the tyranny of rulers and the aggression of colonizers—with injustice, oppression, tribulation, darkness, defeats, and calamities whose extent only Allāh knows.

Roots of Tribulation and Causes of Defeat:

Shaykh ‘Abdullāh ‘Azzām (may Allāh perfume his resting place) said:

"The Lord of Might (Jalla Jalāluhu) summarized the causes of defeat in a single line.

Allāh the Exalted said: *{Indeed, those who oppose Allāh and His Messenger – those will be among the most humbled.}* (Al-Mujādilah: 20). And Allāh the Exalted said: *{And whatever strikes you of disaster – it is for what your hands have earned; but He pardons much.}* (Ash-Shūrā: 30). And Allāh the Exalted said: *{O you who have believed, if you obey those who disbelieve, they will turn you back on your heels, and you will become losers.}* (Āl ‘Imrān: 149). And Allāh the Exalted said: *{And do not incline toward those who do wrong, lest you be touched by the Fire, and you will have not protectors besides Allāh, nor will you be helped.}* (Hūd: 113). And in the authentic Ḥadīth narrated by Aḥmad:

“I have been sent with the sword until Allāh alone is worshipped, and my provision has been placed under the shadow of my spear, and humiliation and subservience have been decreed for those who disobey my command, and whoever imitates a people is one of them.”

So, the summary of the causes of defeat is:

- We disobeyed Allāh, so we were defeated.
- We forgot Allāh, so we were forgotten.
- We defied Allāh, so we were humiliated.

He (may Allāh have mercy on him) added: "And I present to you some news from the Arab world during the sixties and seventies as proof:

1. The Syrian army kidnapped the intelligence director of Irbid (northwest Jordan). The intelligence director of Daraa (southwest Syria) immediately responded by cursing the Āl al-Bayt. When told, "Should you not exclude the noble Messenger?" he replied, "He is at the top of the list."
2. One of the (accursed) leaders of Palestinian organizations in Jordan, before the Black September turmoil, said: "If the hand of Allāh reached out to us, we would cut it off." Exalted is Allāh above what they associate with Him.
3. In Egypt in 1967, a play called "The Origin of the Story," written by (Bakr al-Sharqāwī), was performed. Its hero was (Allāh, Glorified is He), and the play claimed that man was created before Allāh. Exalted is Allāh above what the deniers blaspheme.
4. The Egyptian tanks that entered Sinai in the 1967 war had written on them "Our Nāṣir (helper) is Nāṣir!" meaning, the one who will grant us victory is

(Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir)! Meanwhile, the Jews wrote texts from the Torah on their tanks.

5. On January 24, 1965, for the first time in Damascus's history, tanks entered the Umayyad Mosque while worshippers were inside. Two hundred of them were martyred, and the mosque was closed for days to remove the Muslim blood that had stained its curtains and miḥrāb.
6. On that day, the Damascus radio announcer said: "We will not allow those who lived in this country fourteen hundred years ago to impose their old systems on us and to lay down for us foundations for life in this era."
7. In the city of Jenin / West Bank / Palestine, a demonstration emerged from Jenin Secondary School. They attacked the Ikhwān center, took out copies of the Qur’ān and exegeses, tore them up, and trampled them underfoot along the main street. This was in April 1967, two months before the [Israeli] attack.
8. When Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir executed the Islamic thinker Sayyid Quṭb – may Allāh have mercy on him – the people of Nablus / Palestine distributed Kunāfah in celebration of this "victory."
9. One educated woman told me while debating: "Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb did not achieve what ‘Abd al-Nāṣir did." Her husband became angry and said: "By Allāh, Muḥammad did not achieve what ‘Abd al-Nāṣir did."
10. The night password in some bases of the Democratic Front in Jordan in 1969 was: "Curse the Lord, and revile the religion." For example, the (Harasta) base.
11. In a gathering of fedayeen in the village of al-Rām / Irbid / Jordan in 1969, when the Muslim youth (the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) would call the adhān for

prayer, members of the Democratic Popular Front / Nayef Hawatmeh and the Popular Front / George Habash would line up opposite them chanting:

"If you ask about me, these are my values... I am a Marxist-Leninist internationalist."

I saw this with my own eyes.

- i. (Leila Khaled) calls her group the (Guevara) group and declares in a Lebanese newspaper that she is (Marxist) and that she is too great to believe in Allāh because it is "absurd."
- ii. (Fadwa Tuqan) declared in an Israeli newspaper that she denies the existence of Allāh. The Israeli writer tells her: "This is why we built and you demolished... and we triumphed and you were defeated."
- iii. Sa'd Jum'ah says: "We have documents proving that American and British intelligence were behind the Ba'th coup in Iraq on September 17, 1968. The liaison with foreign intelligence was the notorious agent (Lutfi al-'Ubaydi), and al-'Ubaydi was in constant contact with a number of Ba'thists, foremost among them Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr."
- iv. Haykal writes in Al-Ahrām (January 15, 1971), borrowing the words of the French writer Malraux: "I have a vision of Islām spreading rapidly in Egypt, and that Egypt is always searching for a Pharaoh to represent the sublimity of its spirit... Islām did not spread rapidly after the Arab conquest, but it spread rapidly after the Caliphate when the Caliph – with temporal and spiritual authority in his hand – became a Pharaoh wearing a turban instead of a crown."
- v. The Iraqi Ba'th newspaper wrote – when the Ba'th first took power in Iraq – about Michel 'Aflaq "(the returning god)." Their poet said:

"O my master, my object of worship, and my god... The torment of your divine fragments is enough for me, enough!"

vi. Ibrāhīm Khlāṣ said in the Syrian "People's Army Magazine" on April 25, 1967 (one month before the defeat):

"The only way to build Arab civilization and construct Arab society is to create the new Arab socialist man who believes that: Allāh, religions, feudalism, capitalism, colonialism, the over-satiated, and all the values that dominated the previous society are nothing but mummified puppets in the museums of history."

vii. Elements of the units, companies, and party members – affiliated with the authorities in Syria – put up banners saying the following: "Down with Allāh," "Al-Asad is our Lord,"

"No god but the homeland, and no messenger but the Ba‘th."

This was in Rajab 1400 AH, corresponding to May 1980 CE.

And I think this quotation of such scum is sufficient.

And I will take you to another page about our enemies – the Jews.

1. Dayan's daughter says in her book "A Soldier of Israel": "Our muscles were trembling [with fear] when we heard that the enemy was on the southern front, but when the Rabbi came and prayed with us, fear turned into security." (And she says: "The rituals in the Torah stipulate that soldiers be given canned food on the Sabbath. When they brought us fresh, cooked food before the battle – on Saturday, June 3, 1967 – the soldiers refused to eat, so the Chief Rabbi issued a fatwā permitting this during mobilization.")
2. Golda Meir says: "The sole basis of our strength is the connection of every Jew in the world to us, a connection of faith."

3. Ben-Gurion and Zalman Shazar attended Churchill's funeral procession. It was a Saturday, so they walked about 6 km because riding in a car is forbidden for them on the Sabbath, even though they had reached extreme old age.
4. Ben-Gurion wrote to De Gaulle – Prime Minister of France – in 1967, saying: "The secret of our survival after the Babylonian and Roman destruction and the hatred of the Christians who surrounded us for a thousand years lies in our spiritual connection to the Holy Scripture. When the British Royal Commission came at the end of 1926 to study the future of the Mandate, I told them: Our Mandate is the Torah. We have drawn our strength from it to resist an ordinary world and to continue in the faith of our return to our land."
5. In the final pages of Weizmann's memoirs – which is considered a general recommendation for Israel – "Our goal is to build a civilization based on the strict ideals of Jewish ethics; from those ideals we must not deviate.... If Jews, in their activities, aim for true values... when God looks with compassion upon His children who have returned after a long wandering to their home to serve Him, with a psalm on their lips, reviving their ancient land and making it a center of human civilization."
6. When Dayan entered al-Quds in 1967, he said: "O, the vengeance for Khaybar!" And the Israeli soldiers – I heard their recorded voices from Israeli radio – said: "Muḥammad died... Muḥammad died... and left behind daughters."
7. The Rabbi refused to officiate the marriage contract of (Ben-Gurion's daughter), the Prime Minister of Israel, because her mother was not Jewish, and the Torah considers lineage through the mother.

8. Begin said during a meeting with Sādāt about the West Bank: "I am a man who believes in the Torah. My spiritual father Jabotinsky raised me – just as Ḥasan al-Bannā raised Sayyid Quṭb among you. I consider withdrawing from the West Bank a violation of the Torah and my spiritual principles."
These brothers told me about our brothers in the occupied territory of 1948 who translated it from Hebrew.
9. Ben-Gurion said when he entered al-Quds in 1967: "This is the dearest day to me since I entered the Promised Land."
10. After the occupation of al-Quds (1967), Levi Eshkol came carrying a small piece of paper on which he had written his wishes and placed it in a crack in the Wailing Wall (al-Burāq Wall for Muslims), as old women do among us.
11. In a radio interview with an Israeli soldier on the Suez Front in the summer of 1969, the announcer said to him: "You are a young man of twenty, and you came to Israel after the Six-Day War from California. What motivated you?"
The young man said: "My religion motivated me and my faith drove me to come to the Holy Land to fulfill the message of the prophets, and the happiness I feel in defending my religious beliefs is unparalleled by any happiness in this world."
12. Israel has revived the Hebrew language – the language of the Torah – after it had become archaic for three thousand years. So names like Histadrut, Knesset, and Eilat have become the names of institutions and cities.
13. Have you understood, after this comparison, why the Jews were victorious?
And let not some be deceived by their saying: "We Muslims are better than the Jews in any case." ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (may Allāh be pleased with them) wrote to Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ: "Now then, I advise you and the soldiers with you to have taqwá of Allāh in all circumstances, for taqwá of Allāh is the best

preparation against the enemy... Indeed, the sins of the army are more to be feared than their enemy, and Muslims are only granted victory through their enemy's disobedience to Allāh... If we are equal to them in disobedience, they will have an advantage in strength... And Allāh gave the Zoroastrian disbelievers authority over the Jews, even though they were People of the Book." (End quote).

End of the quotation from the words of Shaykh ‘Abdullāh ‘Azzām (may Allāh have mercy on him).

The New World Order 1990 and the Launch of the Third Crusades Led by America

The West consolidated its control over the resources of the Islamic world. And its plan succeeded in appointing its allies to manage its affairs without incurring any losses. Major American and European monopolies siphoned off the cream of our countries' bounties and wealth, without any oversight or accountability, and without any sign of resistance. The Soviet Union collapsed after its historic mistake in Afghanistan, as we have seen. And the leaders of NATO declared that they had chosen Islam as an alternative strategic enemy. The international and regional campaigns to combat terrorism, following the Afghan Jihād against the Russians, bore their fruit. The cadres of the Jihādī current and its organizations were dispersed, and the West achieved what it wanted in dismantling them. The political Islamic Awakening (Şahwah) was besieged, its parties were domesticated, and led into labyrinths of futility and paths of deviation. The situation stabilized for Israel, and Palestinian revolutionaries became engaged in the Oslo Accords! And senior Muslim scholars issued fatāwā affirming the legitimacy of the American presence in the Arabian Peninsula! They also issued fatāwā affirming the legitimacy of normalization with the Jewish occupation of Palestine and Bayt al-Maqdis!!

Thus, there was apparently no visible reason for the West to return to the method of military campaigns against Muslims. But the surprise was that the West, led by America and with the subservience of Britain, NATO Europe, and Russia, decided to advance militarily on the Islamic world in general, and the Middle East in particular, in what appeared to be a new direct reoccupation, and a new American-British Crusader Sykes-Picot.

So why did the West take this step? Knowing that its spoils were arriving effortlessly, without toil or blood, delivered by Arab and Muslim leaders!

In my opinion, this is due to several reasons. Some relate to the Crusaders and their new leadership—America and its allies. Some relate to the Jews and their Zionist project in Israel. And some relate to the new circumstances in our Islamic world and its Jihādī awakening. I will summarize these in the following points:

Reasons for the Third Crusader Campaigns against the Islamic World since 1990:

First: Reasons Related to the New Romans (America - Europe - Russia):

1. The severe economic deterioration, recession, inflation, and decline in financial revenues in the Western industrial world, due to many reasons, the most important of which is the shrinking of colonial revenues from the Third World as a result of the awakening of peoples and their realization of the value of their wealth, and the emergence of some national regimes working to alleviate poverty in their countries and stop the bleeding of plunder from their national reserves towards the colonial West. Western civilization also suffered as a result of luxury and affluent living, from a decline in the productive sector of society in the fields of agriculture and basic industries, at the expense of a massive expansion in the non-productive consumer

segments of luxury professions (Arts - security - research - merchants - athletes, etc.). The trade balance also declined due to the inability of poor countries to consume what rich countries produce and their decreased purchasing power, consequently, the industrial West's ability to sell its products decreased. There are also two fatal factors that have eroded the economic and social structure of Western civilization, which many Western researchers and writers have recently elaborated on with boldness and frankness, sounding the alarm about them: these are (the spread of *ribā* in all joints of the Western economy) and (women working in men's fields of work and abandoning their position in the home). Due to (*ribā*), the Western economy has experienced what Allāh warned would happen to those who engage in it—destruction (*al-mahq*), as Allāh the Exalted said: {*Allāh destroys ribā*}. So the Western economy, and most of the global economy, is practically heading towards (*al-mahq*). Women's work also led to the spread of unemployment among men. It also led to the destruction of the family's social structure and economic decline. All this and more made colonial powers, led by America and Britain, need to increase their colonial revenues to cover their economic deficits by controlling the sources of wealth, especially energy sources (oil and gas) in the Middle East, the Arab-Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea region. So that America could control the nerve center of the global economy and consequently drain it for the benefit of its own economy.

2. The allure of power that dominated the American administration and the madness of the imperial dream:

American military power swelled enormously, to the point where it alone became greater than the combined capabilities of NATO and Russia, according to reports from global strategic studies centers. Its technological capabilities also advanced astoundingly, making it a legendary, undisputed power, especially in air capabilities, cruise missiles, and control over the entire earth

through the vast espionage capabilities of satellites and its ability to direct missile, air, and naval strikes. Its possession of the world's largest nuclear arsenal naturally gave rise to the American administration's dream of unilaterally ruling the world. The writings of its theorists were replete with this, perhaps even two decades before the demise of the Soviet Union, as they adopted and theorized about unilateral world rule, planning for the twenty-first century to be an American century, for America to lead the Roman civilization, inherit its glories, and conquer the world. It was natural for America to think of subjugating its allies and defeating its adversaries by seizing the lifeline and nerve center of the industrial world—that is, by directly occupying and possessing the oil sources. And controlling the world's strategic passages, deploying its forces in all its corners, preventing the rise of any opposing power, and possessing strategic weapons of mass destruction. These convictions crystallized in the late twentieth century among a group of theorists and politicians in the Republican Party who called themselves (the Neoconservatives). Who unfortunately adopted the doctrines of the Zionist dream, the establishment of Israel, and the gathering of Jews therein as a prelude to the descent of the Messiah after a global war with Muslims... and so on with their nonsense, in which religious myths are mixed with colonial dreams.

3. The endeavor of European countries and Russia to assist America out of fear and greed, in addition to the deeply rooted Crusader doctrinal motive common to all of them:

The fear that America alone would effectively possess the sources of energy and power and control them. And greed for the gains that participation could bring, with which to patch up their collapsing economies. Led them all to participate effectively in the Second Gulf War. European participation reached no less than 25%, while Britain alone contributed 15%, and the American

proportion of the forces, which numbered one million soldiers, exceeded 55%. The (Desert Storm) or (Liberation of Kuwait) war, as they called it, resulted in the destruction of Iraq and its army, and the entrenchment of Britain and America in the heart of the Arab and Islamic region in 1991. Europe, France, Britain, and the Vatican also participated principally in the Crusader war against Muslims in Bosnia (1994-1996) in order to unify religion on the European continent, which was striving for unity based on a Crusader identity. As for Russia, it undertook an independent Crusader chapter in Chechnya in the Caucasus from (1994) to the present day, where the bloody saga continues with European and American participation through silent support or political and media stances. Until America launched its major campaign against Iraq in the Third Gulf War, which they called (Iraqi Freedom!), carried out by America and Britain with active logistical participation from all NATO countries, despite the opposing stance of France, Germany, and Russia, who soon joined the colonial bandwagon for a share of the Iraqi cake. They unanimously recognized the American occupation of Iraq in the Security Council, then continued their descent towards the American path with a reluctance that faded over time into blatant impudence. Thus, the Crusader campaigns materialized due to this intrinsic motive.

Second: The Maturation of the Zionist Project and the Jews' Approach to the Date of Demolishing Al-Masjid al-Aqṣā and Announcing the Kingdom of Greater Israel According to Talmudic Dreams:

Senior Zionist leaders did not hide in their writings and interviews their greatest dream, which is the establishment of Greater Israel from the Euphrates to the Nile. Nor were they ashamed to declare their intention to demolish Al-Aqṣā and erect the alleged Temple of Solomon on its ruins. They also did not hide their intention to

establish a purely Jewish state and what that entails of expelling the remaining Muslims and Arabs from the land of Palestine.

After Israel, in cooperation with America, domesticated the ruling regimes in neighboring countries, or what are called the "collar states," and managed, through Sadat, to dismantle the Egyptian army, reducing it to less than a third in number and armament, and after the traitor King Hussein, ruler of Jordan, and his son after him, guaranteed them their longest border with a neighboring country. The Nuṣayrīs in Syria also undertook the gradual dismantling of the Syrian army, the largest and most heavily armed in the region, and the Christians of Lebanon ensured the security of its northern borders. The Jews moved to the stage of imposing political, economic, and cultural normalization on Arab countries, and even aspired for this to include the Islamic world. No Arab military powers remained in the region except Iraq, and no Islamic powers except Pakistan, so the Jews set their sights on the goal of destroying the Iraqi army first. Then the Pakistani [army]. And since they could not do this themselves, it was necessary to bring in Crusader armies, especially the American army, to carry out the mission. Also, the Jews, due to their inherent humiliation, abjectness, fear, and cowardice, do not trust their own army—superior in numbers and armament to the sum of the remaining military strength in neighboring countries—even with more than 250 nuclear warheads ready to destroy any targets they wish around them. They fear that the Arab and Islamic peoples will rebel against their ruling puppets in Arab and Muslim capitals, and find themselves, with their six million, surrounded by hundreds of millions of angry people who harbor hostility towards them and possess enough sacred grudges to crush them if those peoples get the chance. Therefore, the Jews worked to bring in Christian armies to be stationed in the region, to remain, and to work on fragmenting its states into smaller entities and instigating internal sectarian and ethnic wars. This would ensure stability, sovereignty, and military superiority [for

Israel], and even ensure that Israel is the only state in the region possessing an army.

This goal was not difficult for the Zionists after their intrigues, cunning, acts of infiltration and espionage, buying of loyalties, and penetration in the Jewish manner over half a century, led to Jewish control over the American government and the governments of most NATO countries. Statistics indicate a frighteningly high percentage of ministers, government members, parliament members, influential agencies, major political parties, all global media outlets, cinema and television production apparatuses, and newspapers... all of them are Jews, or children or spouses of Jewesses. This means their Jewishness is determined according to the doctrine that considers the son of a Jewess to be Jewish. This is in addition to their complete control over the banking system, major global financial institutions, and their control over the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations. The Jews have reached the great 'uluww (haughtiness) mentioned in the Qur'ān, and here they are, spreading corruption in the land as they wish. Jewish rabbis who infiltrated Christianity, especially the prevalent Protestant denomination in America and Britain, were able to invent and establish in America extremist Crusader ecclesiastical denominations and organizations based on a duality of doctrinal source, such that the doctrine in the United States became Zionism, Israel's hopes and dreams, and the superiority of its chosen people. Until the supporters of these organizations and churches reached tens of millions, their financial resources amounted to billions, and their ownership of television networks and media outlets made them a tyrannical empire, enabling the Zionist lobby to manipulate the US Congress and American elections as it pleased. Thus, new theorists emerged in American politics in both the Democratic and Republican parties, especially in the latter, and they undertook to support Israel's programs, which were close to achieving their goals. And so the Jews drove the American army and the Crusader

armies of Europe to occupy the Middle East, commencing this by destroying the last remaining army, the Iraqi army, through the 1991 war and the 2003 war.

Thus, they would avenge the Jews against Iraq and the land of Babylon, according to their beliefs, avenge the Babylonian captivity period, and make the descendants of those ancestors taste the most heinous forms of humiliation and disgrace, just as they ensured the dismantling of Iraq and the crushing of its capabilities. Pressure was renewed towards Syria, where the compulsory conscription system was abolished for the first time in its history since independence. This will reduce the size of the Syrian army, which numbers nearly a million soldiers, to less than 20% of its strength, to be based on volunteers, the vast majority of whom are Nuṣayrīs and members of other religious minorities. Sunni Muslims, who are the overwhelming majority of Syria's population, will remain an unarmed majority whose skin the Jews and their agents can flay whenever they wish. America's attention is also openly turning towards dismantling and dividing Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. And it deploys in the Near Middle East—what they call the Central Command area of operations—more than 1.5 million American soldiers, about a million of whom are stationed in Arab countries from Baghdad to Tangier, with about two-thirds of them in the Middle East region!!! Thus, Zionist reasons were fundamental to the presence of the Crusaders. And Bush's announcement these days of the launch of what he called the (Greater Middle East) project.

Third: Reasons Related to the Conditions of the Islamic World:

As will be detailed in the following two chapters regarding the path of the Jihādī Islamic Awakening. The activity of the Islamic Awakening, which proceeded along three axes – da‘wah (proselytizing), political, and armed Jihādī – led to it becoming a terrifying specter threatening the interests of the Crusaders and the Zionist project in the region. Parties adopting the Islamic project spread and managed to form large parliamentary blocs in several Arab and Islamic countries. Some even formed

governments, as in Turkey, or nearly did so, as in Algeria. The da'wah activities of various schools of the Awakening also led to the Islamization of large sectors of society, even if only emotionally. However, more dangerously, the authorities' suppression of various peaceful fields of the Awakening, which was an arrangement to besiege it, led to the expansion of the Jihādī Awakening and an increase in its achievements and experiences, especially after its cadres matured and grew through the first experience of the Arab Afghans in Afghanistan (1984-1992). The Islamic phenomenon posed a real threat to Arab and Islamic regimes, and the Crusaders became uneasy about the performance of those regimes they had established in the region, as well as their fate. Despite the success of these regimes in suppressing all schools of the Awakening, causing them to fail in achieving their goals and practically pushing them into the mire of crisis, the West, having studied our civilizational makeup, knows the danger of the ember hidden beneath the currently still ashes. It saw its actual military presence as the best guarantor of its interests and decided it must implement a new Sykes-Picot agreement to divide the already divided and fragment the already fragmented entities, thereby securing its interests, as it imagines, by itself and under the guard of its soldiers' bayonets.

Thus, these three reasons converged for these Third Crusader Campaigns to advance and once again sweep through the Middle East.

Stages of the Third Crusader Campaigns (1990 - 2003)

1. The First Iraq War (Desert Storm – Kuwait Liberation War)

America inaugurated its Crusader campaigns immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1990) by implementing its program, prepared since the mid-seventies, for which it had formed the Rapid Deployment Forces to control oil sources. Many studies and books at the time discussed scenarios of fabricating a threat to the Gulf states, either from Iraq or Iran, to justify American intervention.

Indeed, as became known in the media, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn was lured by the American ambassador in Baghdad and enticed to occupy Kuwait. The Iraqi army had reached a high level of proficiency after the first Gulf War with Iran (1979-1987). Since then, American and British forces established a heavy presence in the region. As I mentioned earlier at the beginning of this research, the governments of Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey, actively participated. Their armies fought the Iraqi army under American command. However, the most prominent factor in the shifting power dynamics of the Third Crusader Campaigns was the entry of official religious institutions, the establishments of the "scholars of the Sultan," and a large segment of the Islamic Awakening's leadership into this American-led alliance. The treacherous rulers pushed them to issue Fatāwā that legitimized the presence of the Crusaders, their stationing in the Arabian Peninsula, and their control over the heartland of Muslims. But the most calamitous aspect of this matter was the slide of the domesticated and corrupt among some Awakening leaders into signing Fatāwā that legitimized this, as a result of their entry through the gates of democracy to become part of the official authorities in apostate governments. This Fitnah was part of the price paid by those who dabbled in the swamps of un-Islamic politics, as they transgressed what was narrated from the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him):

"Whoever frequents the gates of rulers will be put to trial (iftutan)," and "A servant does not draw nearer to the ruler except that he becomes further from Allāh."

American forces crushed the Iraqi army, leaving more than 300,000 dead among civilians and military personnel, and destroyed Iraq's infrastructure, built over half a century of independence. Then, they imposed a deadly siege on Iraq for thirteen years, during which more than one and a half million Iraqi children were killed, not to mention their relatives who died due to acute shortages of food and medicine.

Thus, America prepared Iraq for the next war, in which it finished it off in March and April 2003.

Immediately after the first Iraq War, and as a precautionary measure against the anticipated resistance that would arise in reaction to these Crusader campaigns – a resistance expected from Jihādī movements and the youth of the Islamic Awakening – America launched its campaign to hunt down Jihādīs and symbols of the Jihādī Awakening under the pretext of combating terrorism. The pace of global and regional security conferences escalated during the Clinton administration, which succeeded Bush Sr., as America continued its attacks on the Islamic world. It maintained the siege on Iraq, forced Arab and Islamic countries into normalization projects with the Jews, and took upon itself the task of combating "Islamic terrorism," as they described it.

2. Crusader Massacres of Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus (1994 - 1997)

Amidst the momentum of the American Crusader onslaught against the Islamic world and claims of combating terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, the Russians exploited the global circumstances to confront Muslims and launched their bloody war on Chechnya. The most heinous massacres were committed, and Chechen Muslims were subjected to a war of extermination, for which they continue to offer sacrifices in the thousands to this day...

Similarly, Serbs and Croats, with support from the Vatican and the backing and silence of European countries, waged a war of extermination against Muslims in Bosnia and then Kosovo. The most horrific massacres were perpetrated, claiming hundreds of thousands of Muslim lives under the very eyes and ears of the United Nations, even within its protected zones, as happened in the Srebrenica massacre. There, French protection forces, tasked with guarding a UN safe haven, withdrew to

allow Serb militias to kill more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians, mostly women, children, and the elderly, in the largest series of genocidal massacres in Europe since World War II.

3. The Siege of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan and its Destruction (2001)

It did not sit well with the Americans and NATO-Europe, who had planned and executed the civil war between Mujāhidīn factions in Afghanistan (1992-1996) to implement the United Nations program. This program stipulated that the Western Red Cross, succeeding the Eastern Red Hammer and Sickle, should rule Afghanistan after the weapons and Jihādī expertise accumulated in Afghanistan were consumed in that civil war. It did not sit well with them that fate would surprise them with the emergence of the Ṭālibān and their success in implementing Sharīʿah and establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Nor did it sit well with them that the global anti-terrorism campaigns against Jihādī current cadres and Arab Afghans would result in their return to Afghanistan, forming, alongside the Ṭālibān, a focal point that deeply troubled America, the West, and their deputies among the apostate rulers.

So, America and Europe began economic and political siege operations against the Islamic Emirate from its inception. This continued under the Clinton administration, which concluded it by firing 75 cruise missiles at some camps of Arab Mujāhidīn and the Ṭālibān. The siege persisted under Bush Jr., who proclaimed he was entrusted by the Lord with a message to reform the world and was heading a Crusader campaign to combat Islamic terrorism. He inaugurated that campaign after the September events by invading Afghanistan, destroying the Islamic Emirate, and exterminating whomever he could of the Arab and Muslim refugees in Afghanistan in December 2001.

4. The War of Occupation of Iraq (March 2003) and the American Advance on the Middle East

We have already discussed this sufficiently, which obviates the need for repetition.

The State of Authorities in the Islamic World and the Jihādī Current Standing Alone Against the Third Crusader Campaigns

As for the political authority for Muslims:

As we have discussed, Crusader colonialism destroyed it with the fall of the Khilāfah, and it has not been re-established since. Instead, the rulers of Muslim lands became part of the power equation alongside the Crusaders, and this became even more atrocious during the Third Crusader Campaigns.

As for the religious authority:

The treacherous agent governments undertook its liquidation in all Arab countries and most of the Islamic world, as previously mentioned. The Islamic Awakening attempted to offer an alternative and take the reins of authority. Prominent scholars, qualified and distinguished leaders, and numerous leading figures from its various schools emerged and became qualified. However, for many reasons that we will discuss in detail in the following paragraphs, the Awakening was unable to provide an alternative to the classical authority represented by the Imāms of the four Madhāhib, jurisprudential references, and Imāms of the Ṣūfī orders. In essence, it could not become a popular authority possessing the obedience and allegiance of the Muslim populace...

Thus, there was no qualified religious authority to confront the Third Crusader Campaigns.

As for the social authority:

We had previously spoken of its disintegration since the mid-twentieth century due to colonialism, social development towards industrialization, migration to major cities, and the breakdown of tribal bonds. This process continued at an accelerated pace. The role of nomadic and rural areas in politics declined in favor of major cities and urban life, which gives no weight to these bonds. With the exception of some Islamic countries like Afghanistan, Yemen, and a few others, this authority was too weak to play a role in the confrontation. It had been the policy of all rulers to eliminate this authority, disarm tribes and clans, implement policies of division among them, and weaken each one individually. Naturally, these authorities were always subordinate to the religious authority, or to both religious and political authorities. Therefore, this authority was also absent from the arena of confrontation, like its predecessors in this recent confrontation.

So, who stood up to the Third Crusader Campaigns from 1990 to 2001?

In truth, and in short...

The Third Crusader Campaigns advanced after having cleared away all potential for resistance before them. They had virtually eliminated all authorities and, to a large extent, the elements necessary for the emergence of resistance and confrontation among Arab and Islamic peoples. If the Second Campaigns had proceeded with insight and experience from two centuries of the First Campaigns, and from 500 years of studies and research on this Ummah at all levels thereafter, then these new American-Jewish Crusader campaigns come against the backdrop of all that, in addition to the experiences of the Second Campaigns and the services provided by the class of apostate rulers and their Westernized agents for half a century or more.

All means of success were also available to them. While there might have been some balance in the on-the-ground confrontation data between the forces of the First and even Second Crusader Campaigns and the Mujāhidīn forces that faced them in numbers and equipment, the regression of Muslims to the abyss of backwardness in

most fields, the rise of American civilization technologically and militarily to the peak of development, and the aforementioned destruction by their ruling deputies of all potential for resistance, practically left the arena almost empty in this conflict. The confrontation today has become completely imbalanced.

As for a summary of the pulses of resistance to the Third Crusader Campaigns and their apostate and munāfiqīn (hypocrite) collaborators during (1990 - September 2001), the most important can be mentioned in chronological order, as I recall them now, as follows:

- The Armed Jihād Movement in Algeria (1991-1995), which was eliminated over the following two years through a successful and highly complex intelligence operation involving cooperation between Algerian, French, and some Arab intelligence services. The Jihād was derailed and destroyed after being isolated from its popular base due to its deviation (for details on that experience, one can refer to the book - My Testimony on the Jihād in Algeria - by the author).
- The armed Jihādī confrontations that took place in Libya against the Gaddafi regime (1993-1995), the most prominent of which was the attempt by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The regime managed to curtail its military activity within Libya, and it shifted to clandestine organizational da‘wah work and activity in exile.
- The Movement for the Enforcement of Sharī‘ah in northwestern Pakistan (1996), which the Pakistani government crushed amidst the indifference of the Muslim populace and the failure of the Awakening movements in Pakistan to support it.

- The Aden-Abyan Army Movement in Yemen, led by the martyr Abū al-Ḥasan al-Miḥḍār (may Allāh have mercy on him), which was nipped in the bud (1998).
- The Jihādī Youth Movement in the Nabatiyeh mountains, northern Lebanon, led by the martyr Abū ‘Ā’ishah al-Lubnānī, which was nipped in the bud (1999).
- The Ṭālibān movement, which started in 1994, established the Emirate in 1996, and fell in late 2001. Along with the Arab, Pakistani, and Central Asian Jihādī groups that joined it, it was one of the most significant Jihādī phenomena of the past decade.
- The Palestinian Armed Intifāḍah, which began in 2000 and continues to this day. It is one of the most important chapters of Jihādī confrontation and resistance against the Third Jewish-Crusader Campaigns.
- A number of limited Jihādī attempts and individual initiatives undertaken by Mujāhidīn against various forms of Crusader presence in the Arab and Islamic world, which occurred in different countries during the past decade. This includes some modest resistance operations in Saudi Arabia against the Americans, the most important of which were the Riyadh and Khobar bombings.
- Resistance and self-defense operations carried out by remnants of the Jihādī current in the face of the post-September manhunt campaign in various countries around the world. This was particularly true in confronting the disaster perpetrated by the Pakistani government during its pursuit of survivors on its territory, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of Arab Mujāhidīn and the capture of over 600 of them, who were handed over to

America to be held in the historic Guantanamo detention camp and other American prisons in various locations...

- Jihād movements that spread in Central Asia against communist governments backed by the Soviet Union, especially in Tajikistan (1993-2001), followed by those in Uzbekistan (1997-2001).
- Likewise, the Jihād of Muslims in East Turkestan (Xinjiang) (1996-2001) against the Chinese government.
- This is in addition to the resistance and confrontation movements against Crusader forces in various Jihād arenas during this period, such as the Jihād in Bosnia (1994-1996), as well as in Chechnya during the same period and subsequently, which is still ongoing. Also, the heroic confrontation carried out by Mujāhidīn in Somalia. And the old and ongoing Jihād movements during this phase in the Philippines, Kashmir, Eritrea, Burma, Indonesia, and other fronts that ignited or were already active and continued against the Crusaders and other colonialist Kuffār.
- In addition to some operations carried out by the al-Qā'idah organization against the American presence in the region, the most important of which were the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden. Then came the last of them, the martyrdom operations in New York and Washington (September 11, 2001), which opened a new chapter of confrontation between the Crusaders and the Muslims and changed the face of history and the dynamics of the conflict.

Upon careful study of the equation of conflict between the Muslims and the Third Crusader Campaigns from 1990 to the occupation of Iraq in 2003, we find that its equation has taken the following form:

The nation of Jews (headed by Israel) + The nation of Christians (headed by America, Britain, NATO countries, and Russia) + Factions of apostate rulers in the Islamic world + Forces of hypocrites (headed by the official religious establishment, the scholars of the Sultan, and the corrupt among the leaders of the Awakening in our lands) vs. The armed Jihādī current (groups and individuals) = The resistance forces were defeated, the Jihādī current was besieged, the Islamic Awakening was paralyzed, and the Ummah exited the battle.

● A Contemplative Pause with the Equations of Conflict between Muslims and the Three Crusader Campaigns:

We found that the equations of conflict with those campaigns were as follows:

The First Crusader Campaigns (1050-1291): Its equations were:

Nation of the Cross vs. Nation of Islam = The Nation of Islam was victorious... (1)

The Second Crusader Campaigns (Old Colonialism Phase) (1800-1970):

Nation of the Cross + Nation of Jews vs. Nation of Islam = The Nation of Islam was victorious... (2)

The Second Crusader Campaigns (Modern Colonialism Phase) (Independence Phase):

Nation of the Cross + Nation of Jews + Factions of Apostate Governments vs. The Islamic Awakening (Sahwah) =

The Islamic Awakening was defeated, and the Ummah exited the battle (3)

The Third Crusader Campaigns (American Phase) (1990-2003):

The nation of Jews (headed by Israel) + The nation of Christians (headed by America and Britain) + Factions of apostate rulers in the Islamic world + Forces of hypocrites (headed by the official religious establishment, the scholars of the Sultan, and the corrupt among the leaders of the Awakening in our lands) vs. The armed Jihādī current (groups and individuals) =

The resistance forces were defeated, the Jihādī current was besieged, the Awakening was paralyzed, and the Ummah exited the battle (4)

And if we wish to make some explanatory observations for a deeper understanding of these terrible historical equations and the great lessons we can derive from them, so that we may realize the reasons for defeat and seek the components of victory where it occurred, so that it may be repeated for us, by Allāh's permission, we find the following:

1. The first truth these equations present to us is that, in summary, we were victorious in equations (1) and (2), defeated in (3), and crushed in (4). It is perfectly clear that we were victorious when the Ummah confronted its enemy militarily despite the vast disparity in numbers and equipment. In our current contemporary reality, there are repeated examples of this, as happened in Afghanistan when the Ummah confronted its enemy with all its strata, and this was partially repeated in Chechnya and Bosnia, even though we are in a time of defeat and retreat.

Likewise, the equations clarify that we were defeated when a limited segment confronted the enemy while the Ummah stood by watching, and we were crushed when most of this segment withdrew from the confrontation, and indeed a portion of the Ummah joined the enemy, leaving only a small handful of Jihādīs in the confrontation. It is as if the equations can be simply summarized in two equations:

Ummah of Islam... vs. Nations of Kufr... = ...We were victorious.

Elite of the Ummah vs. Nation of Kufr + Hypocrites of the Ummah = ...We were defeated.

So, the first lesson learned from this example and these equations is that we must bring the Ummah back to the confrontation so that "the confrontation becomes a battle of the Ummah and not conflicts of an elite," as is currently

the case. The first thing this necessitates is that the elite convinces the Ummah that whoever stands with the enemy is not from it but is part of the enemy – {*And whoever is an ally to them among you, then indeed, he is [one] of them*} – and that confronting him is from the core of Jihād and not a fitnah.

2. That the Ummah mobilized when it had an exemplary Shari‘ah authority/reference point to move it, whereas neither the Sahwah nor its Jihādī elite could form an authority that could convince the Ummah to move with it. Any elite undertaking resistance must work to form an authority that includes Jihād leaders, its scholars, thinkers, and symbols, and rally the Ummah around it.
3. That the enemy was defeated before us in the arenas of military confrontation, but it triumphed over us when it paved the way for its invasion with an intellectual and civilizational invasion, and dismantled the infrastructures that generate the seeds of resistance in the Ummah. We must begin by restoring this structure, in addition to what is necessary for launching the resistance as we previously indicated. (Refer to: The Presented Levels of Resistance).
4. That the Jews entered the Second Crusader Campaigns as an auxiliary element in old colonialism, but they transformed into a leading and driving vanguard for the Third Crusader Campaigns. We must confront them in this capacity and give the destruction of their vanguard, Israel, and their tool, America, a priority commensurate with the scale of their role and danger in the coming stage.
5. Equations (3) and (4) show that the murtaddīn (apostates) practically decided the battle in favor of the Crusader-Jewish enemy by deceiving the Ummah with their false affiliation to Muslims and their forged national

identity. Therefore, the vanguards of Jihād and resistance, their directed media, and their intellectual leaders who theorize about the future of action must re-emphasize the role of the primary instigators of the murtaddīn – who are the Crusaders – and direct the resistance towards them. This is because doing so will re-engage the Ummah in the battle and convince it to fight the murtaddīn as followers of the Crusaders, seeing them as part of the real and primary enemy, and as nothing more than a mere cover for it.

6. The last equation highlights America's role as a leading power in the campaigns and as a main bloc in military weight, which gives confronting it a major priority. It also draws attention, by understanding the internal contradictions within the Crusader alliance and between its three axes (America-Britain / Western Europe / Russia), to the necessity of working to dismantle this alliance and isolate the American-Zionist axis as much as possible. A detailed explanation of this will come in the political theory section of Chapter Eight, inshā'Allāh.
7. Through observation, we find that all European peoples stood behind their armies and kings, supporting and endorsing them in the First and Second Crusader Campaigns. However, the spread of concepts of civilizational communication and peace movements in many segments of European society, and the increased knowledge of Islam in Europe, led vast, million-strong crowds to adopt positions of opposition and condemnation towards those campaigns, even in Britain. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of the Zionist-leaning American society stood behind its Judaized Crusader president, Bush, and his soldiers. This is a matter that must be considered as we formulate future theories of resistance.
8. A look at the final picture of the equation shows it has returned to its form in the early days of Islam, to be:

Jews + Christians + Mushrikīn + Murtaddīn + Munāfiqīn vs. The Jihādī Believers.

Thus, we return as we began, and Islam and its steadfast, patient, believing people return as strangers, just as they began as strangers. So, ṭūbā (glad tidings) to the ghurabā' (strangers) of the first and the last, and we ask Allāh to make us among them.

9. The final observation. It is of utmost importance and constitutes a fundamental pillar in understanding the nature of our current conflict, and it must be a fundamental pillar of the Jihādī creed of the resistance in this era. It is the following important paragraph:

- The role of the hypocrites from among the scholars of the Sultan, and the corrupt from among the leaders of the Islamic Awakening, in the defeat of the Muslim Ummah and its Jihādī vanguard before the enemies:

10. Before the contemporary Crusader campaigns during the independence era, especially after the new American Crusader campaign.

As we discussed in the previous chapter regarding the emergence of the school of the scholars of the Sultan in Islamic history, since the transformation of the Khilāfah Rāshidah into the biting kingship, then the coercive kingship, then the establishment of the rule of the ṭawāghīt. And how Muslims followed the sunan (ways/patterns) of those before them, the Jews and Christians. And authority among them became, as it had been throughout history in all misguided kingdoms, based on "the ruler, the priest, and the aides." The scholars of the Sultan lined up at the gates of the Umayyad sultans from the second half of the first Hijrī century, merely fifty years after the death of the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him). And the sayings of the scholars of truth who shunned the gates of the emirs have

recorded for us some texts forbidding those scholars of the Sultan, denouncing them, and warning the common people of their corruption. For, in opposition to that miserable group of scholars of the Sultan, there arose scholars of truth who proclaimed it, held the emirs accountable, and upheld Allāh's right concerning rulers and ruled. This group (scholars of truth) continued to dwindle while the faction of the scholars of the sultans expanded over time, and its role became corrupted with the increase and development of the corruption of kingship from biting, to coercive, to the kingship of the ṭawāghīt. Until today, a category of "scholars of colonialism" and "jurists of the Pentagon" has arisen, and the machinery of the war of ideas has been equipped with "scholars of counter-terrorism" under the leadership of Rumsfeld...! And to Allāh belongs the command before and after.

The role of this wicked faction of scholars of the Sultan was limited in supporting the First Crusader Campaigns, as the Ummah and its religious authorities stood against that Crusader invasion. The role of the corrupt among them was limited to supporting kings and emirs who betrayed their Ummah and collaborated with them, such as al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā'īl Ayyūb, king of Damascus, who allied with the Crusaders, allowed them into the markets of Damascus, sold them weapons, and gave them possession of some Muslim fortresses, as well as some emirs of al-Andalus who collaborated with the Christians, gave them possession of Muslim fortresses, and cooperated with them. Historical documents have mentioned some of this, such as what was said by Imām Ibn Ḥazm, who lived at that time in the fifth Hijrī century, i.e., the eleventh Gregorian century. Ibn Ḥazm said about the emirs of al-Andalus in his time, in his book *Al-Talkhīṣ fī Wujūh al-Takhlīṣ*:

"This is a matter by which we have been tested, we ask Allāh for safety. It is an evil fitnah that has destroyed religions, except for whom Allāh the Exalted has protected, for many reasons that would take long to discuss. The crux of it

is that every administrator of a city or fortress in any part of this al-Andalus of ours, from one end to the other, is at war with Allāh and His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), striving to spread corruption in the land. This is due to what you see plainly of their launching raids on the wealth of the Muslim subjects who are under the rule of their opponents, and their permitting their soldiers to commit highway robbery. They impose jizyah, customs duties, and taxes on the necks of Muslims. They give Jews and Christians authority over the main roads of the Muslims, excusing themselves with necessities that do not permit what Allāh has forbidden. Their aim in this is to perpetuate the enforcement of their commands and prohibitions.

So do not deceive yourselves, and do not be fooled by the fussāq and those affiliated with fiqh, who wear sheep's skins over wolves' hearts, who beautify evil for the people of evil, and support them in their wickedness.

So, our deliverance from it is to hold our tongues, completely and in detail, except for enjoining good or forbidding evil and condemning all of them. By Allāh, if they knew that worshipping crosses would advance their affairs, they would rush to it. We see them seeking help from the Christians, empowering them over the sanctities of the Muslims, and perhaps even giving them cities and fortresses willingly, emptying them of Islam and filling them with church bells.

May Allāh curse all of them and unleash upon them a sword from His swords. Whoever is unable to do that, I hope that taqiyyah will suffice him, and that he denounces [it] with his heart. This is despite the fact that if all those who denounce [it] with their hearts were to unite, they would not be overcome in their affair." End quote.

Thus, the Crusader colonialism that led the Second Crusader Campaigns from the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century did not overlook the role of this malicious segment in supporting its occupation, aborting

resistance, and drying up its roots in the Ummah. Just as the Muslim kings and sultans of that era did not neglect their role in subjugating and enslaving the peoples and extracting their obedience, the colonizer did not neglect it either. The English were able, in every place they occupied in the Islamic world, to recruit some scholars and some Sufi leaders of ṭarīqahs for themselves in Egypt, Sudan, the Indian subcontinent, and elsewhere. Cromer, the British delegate overseeing the colonization of Egypt, wrote many letters to Muḥammad ‘Abduh (Shaykh of al-Azhar at the time), praising him and his cooperation. And when Muḥammad ‘Abduh died, Cromer wrote to his government mourning him as one of Britain's most loyal friends in Egypt!! As Muḥammad ‘Abduh and his teacher al-Afghānī before him had played a prominent role in the Westernization movement and the intellectual invasion among Muslims, even to the extent of becoming members of the first Masonic lodge in the Middle East!!

Indeed, the English went further than using scholars of the Sultan; they created new madhhabs (sects/schools of thought) from scratch and found millions of followers for them over time in the Indian subcontinent, such as the Qādiyāniyyah, the Bahā’iyyah, and others, the most important objective of their creation being to abolish Jihād against the English. France also managed to recruit some scholars from al-Shām and North Africa, and leaders of some Sufi ṭarīqahs, who issued fatwās stating that "France is the decree of Allāh (qadar Allāh)." And whoever fights it is like one who fights the decree of Allāh and rejects what has been decreed and written for the Muslims!

Some Muslim scholars and Shaykhs of ṭarīqahs in Central Asia and the Islamic kingdoms in the Caucasus and surrounding areas also played a prominent role in hypocrisy towards the Tsars, the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin, and Stalin himself. Documents are available for those who wish to collect them, and this is not the place for exhaustive investigation.

When colonialism departed and national governments and local political parties were established, every party came to have its shaykhs and religious scholars for their electoral campaigns and candidate lists. And every government since that time has had its ministers of Awqāf and fatwā authorities who act hypocritically towards it. Among what we recall in Syria is that Aḥmad Kaftārū, the then Minister of Awqāf, throughout the Nuṣayrī rule in Syria from 1970 until the time of writing (i.e., throughout the era of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad and his son Bashār), was, in 1954, leading the electoral campaign for Khālīd Bakdāsh, the founder of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Party, who introduced atheism and communism to Bilād al-Shām. He led his electoral campaign in the mosques! In opposition to the electoral campaign of the Muslim Brotherhood and its candidate, Dr. Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, may Allāh have mercy on him. He used to deliver a sermon after the Jumu'ah prayer in the Umayyad Mosque to praise Khālīd Bakdāsh, who would pray eight rak'ahs of the Sunnah prayer after Jumu'ah! While the people and the shaykh waited for him to finish his nawāfil (supererogatory prayers) so they could begin the electoral campaign... Ponder this!!

And so, the Ba'th Party had its scholars of the regime in Syria, until Shaykh Dr. al-'Allāmah Sa'īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī, in a lecture in Istanbul, Turkey, when asked about the Ḥamāh massacre, which claimed the lives of approximately 50,000 Sunni Muslims from the Syrian Muslim populace at the hands of the Nuṣayrī army and its commander Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, al-Būṭī said: "The criminals used them as human shields (he means the Mujāhidīn when the city rose up with the Mujāhidīn), so it became permissible for the Wālī al-Amr (ruler) to kill them!" Al-Būṭī's spectacles are numerous, and it would take too long to mention them here. The latest of them was when he led the Janāzah prayer upon the death of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, choked with tears as he prayed aloud so that the official television would broadcast his (audible!) du'ā' during the Janāzah prayer. He said: "O Allāh, we – meaning he and those praying

behind him from the intelligence services, senior Nuṣayrīs, and Ba‘thists – [testify] that he – meaning Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad – has met You testifying that there is no god but You and that Muḥammad is Your servant and Messenger. O Allāh, gather us – meaning this esteemed assembly and their imām, al-Būṭī – with him in the highest Firdaws!!!!!!!!!!."

This al-Būṭī had his exploits and endeavors in supporting the Lebanese (Christian) and Jordanian (Masonic) governments, and some rulers of the Gulf states. He held a high position in the Ḥasaniyyah Lectures under King Ḥasan II in Morocco. And al-Būṭī's strange book, *Al-Jihād: Kayfa Numārisuhu wa Kayfa Nafhamuhu* (Jihād: How We Practice It and How We Understand It), in which he concluded that those who wage Jihād against the rulers in this era are not martyrs of truth, nor even rebels!! Rather, they are mischief-makers in the land whose ruling is that they be killed, or crucified, or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides, or that they be exiled from the land!... Among his latest 'achievements' was his fierce stance with the Algerian government against the pioneering Jihādī uprising in Algeria, before the intelligence services took over its leadership and tainted it with takfīr! He did not even approve of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), so he attacked it and considered it to be rebelling against the legitimate government!.

In Egypt, ‘Abd al-Nāṣir had some shaykhs of al-Azhar who issued fatwās for him to kill Sayyid Quṭb and his brothers, and that their repentance was not permissible after he had power over them. And al-Sādāt after him in Egypt had fuqahā’ (jurists) for normalization and peace with the Jews, such as Shaykh al-Sha‘rāwī, who wrote poems praising Fārūq, then wrote poetry praising ‘Abd al-Nāṣir's coup against King Fārūq! And he praised the latter! Then he deified al-Sādāt, and it was he who responded to those who opposed al-Sādāt after his treacherous visit to Jerusalem by saying that the President is in the position of one who is not questioned about what he does, while they are questioned!! Thus, he placed him in the position of the Lord,

Exalted is He above what the deniers deny! Then al-Sha‘rāwī acted hypocritically towards Mubārak until just days before his grave closed upon him, in a well-known incident... And he was the one who read the statement signed by six scholars, including the Shaykh of al-Azhar, the Muftī of the State, the Minister of Awqāf, Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, and Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī, in which it was stated that the acts of violence against the government were not Jihād but rather forbidden terrorism. They stated verbatim: "That is because we do not know that the rulers of Egypt have rejected any ruling of Allāh"! This was during the era of Ḥusnī Mubārak, who inherited the Pharaonic throne and with it inherited those who went astray from Egypt's sorcerers and soothsayers. For it was not seen that he rejected any ruling of Allāh in (Egypt)! The Muslim country where prostitutes pay income tax by law to the Ministry of Finance, being considered part of the tourism facilities! As for the series of 'Ṭanṭāwiyyāt' (Ṭanṭāwī-isms) from the fatwās of the recent Shaykh of al-Azhar, Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī, they are too infamous for me to recall and too numerous to be present in mind. The latest of them was his support for France in banning Muslim women from wearing the ḥijāb...!

Similarly, the Āl Sa‘ūd in Saudi Arabia had the Council of Senior Scholars, the Call and Guidance (Da‘wah wa al-Irshād), the Supreme Judiciary, and other official religious institutions that had their 'achievements' since King Fayṣal established them. And say the same about the scholars of Morocco (al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā) who bow and prostrate to the king, excusing themselves with the claim of the angels' prostration to Ādam, arguing it was a prostration of gratitude and not of worship. And why should they not prostrate as the angels prostrated to Ādam, when the angels are better than them, and the king is one of Ādam's descendants – most likely –!

And let us not forget the testimony of Abū Shaqrah, the (Salafī) scholar in Jordan, who said that he examined the state of the Ummah and found that the Mujaddid

(reviver) of the fifteenth Hijrī century is His Majesty King Ḥusayn the Great, may Allāh protect him. And we do not know how the problem was resolved with the scholars of Saudi Arabia who held a conference on the centenary of King ‘Abd al-‘Azīz's entry into Riyadh with the help of the English, and found that the Mujaddid was King ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl Sa‘ūd! And so, say the same about all Arab and Islamic countries and the stance of the scholars of the regime with their kings, presidents, and princes, and their justification of their ruling by other than what Allāh has revealed, and the torment and taxes they inflict upon the people, leading up to their allegiance to the Jews and Christians...

But more calamitous than the hideous role played by the scholars of the regime alongside the governments of the ṭawāghīt and the Second and Third Crusader campaigns, is the surprising role played by some corrupt individuals from the leadership of the Islamic Awakening (al-Ṣaḥwah al-Islāmiyyah) itself. For if the hypocritical scholars played the role of the evil muftī alongside the regime, then some of those Awakening leaders themselves entered the regime and became its pillars, under the pretext of maṣlaḥah (public interest) and the art of the possible. As we shall see in the next chapter, in shā’ Allāh. And so, as they represent the Dīn and Islamic work, and some of them belong to the sector of scholars, the tribulation was completed by them, forming, along with the scholars of the regime and the official religious establishment, the crutch of soothsaying alongside the rulers.

But the most malicious role of the faction of the scholars of the regime emerged with the advent of the Third Crusader campaigns led by America since 1990 against the Middle East. When the hordes of Americans, Europeans, their apostate allies, and their soldiers advanced upon us, the scholars of the regime, the jurists of misguidance, and the corrupt ones in the Awakening undertook to clear the mines before those soldiers, destroy any possibility of resistance that might arise, and preemptively strip it of legitimacy. The ruling regime in Saudi Arabia and its

religious apparatus organized this, initiating the issuance of fatwās permitting seeking help from kuffār (disbelievers) out of necessity by the legitimate Wulāt al-Umūr (rulers), and conferring legitimacy upon what happened. Thus, they blocked the path for anyone thinking of Jihād. The Makkah Conference of 1990, to which 413 prominent Muslim scholars, Awakening leaders, and religious figures from all fifty-eight countries of the Islamic world were invited, was a key event. Of them, 398 figures attended. They issued a final communiqué that legitimized the American presence and cooperation with it against Iraq, deeming it a legitimate seeking of assistance. Then the calamities continued with fatwās being issued from Saudi Arabia permitting normalization with the Jews, as the Muftī of the land, Shaykh Ibn Bāz, issued the fatwā. The enormity of this fatwā can only be understood when we know that Peres, the then Prime Minister of Israel, when he mentioned it before the Knesset members, they stood up applauding it. Peres praised the 'moderate' Shaykh and called on Muslim youth to follow the opinions of this 'venerable' Shaykh and not to pursue the opinions of the likes of the extremist Ḥizbullāh... So Ponder to what extent the fitnah and tribulation have reached!

Over a black decade (1990-2000), the official religious apparatus, the scholars of the regime, and the agents of the Islamic Awakening within the ruling apostate authorities, their parliaments, and ministries, undertook to combat the Jihādī current, hand in hand with the counter-terrorism project led by America, for which dozens of security conferences were held in the world and in Arab and Muslim lands. This led to the displacement of the Mujāhidīn and their being torn to shreds.

And when the state of Sharīʿah was established in Afghanistan at the hands of the Ṭālibān (1994-2001), these agent religious authorities undertook to overthrow it, hand in hand with the American Crusader efforts, at the behest of their rulers. Even in blatantly sensitive matters, those agent scholars and leaders were not ashamed to render those 'noble' services. One of the clearest and most heinous examples of this

is when the Amīr al-Mu'minīn in Afghanistan, Mullā Muḥammad 'Umar, made the decision to demolish the giant ancient statues of Buddha, a team of these scholars and symbols of Islam, headed by Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī, rushed to Afghanistan – pushed by their rulers who were pushed by their masters, and instigated by international Crusader organizations – to prevent the demolition of the idols! It was a scandal for the official religious apparatus in the Arab and Islamic world, especially in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who took that glorious deed of the Ṭālibān as a cause to defame them and work for their downfall. This is what America achieved in late 2001, with the active participation of the government of Pakistan, the Gulf states, and their hypocritical religious structures.

And when some limited Jihādī operations were carried out shortly after the First Gulf War in 1991 until the year 2000 against the Crusader invaders, the Council of Senior Scholars issued the ugliest fatwās, ruling that the Mujāhidīn were causing 'corruption in the land' (ifsād fī al-arḍ) and that their punishment was execution, amputation, and exile. So they called the people to fight them and threatened them with not entering Paradise, which had become the property of the Muslim 'Popes' residing in Saudi Arabia, distributing its estates to the people, and determining who would smell its fragrance and who would not, just as the Christian Popes did in the Middle Ages!

And when the events of September 2001 occurred, and America used them as a pretext, marched on Afghanistan, and overthrew the legitimate Imārah (Emirate) there, George Bush then launched his Crusader campaign under the banner of 'Combating Terrorism.' The hypocritical structure of Muslim scholars and many leaders of the Awakening rushed to join that campaign with all competence, sincerity, and dedication.

It is enough to fill the heart with sorrow and the soul with grief to follow the religious programs and Jumu'ah sermons on satellite channels today, from al-Masjid

al-Ḥarām to al-Masjid al-Nabawī to al-Azhar Mosque to the major mosques in the capitals of Arab and Muslim countries, to witness the leading role played by the official religious establishment and the 'noble' services it provides to America. It has reached the point where programs for combating terrorism, pouring out wrath and misguidance, and accusing of belonging to the Khawārij, criminal gangs, and drug cartels are directed against anyone who dares to resist America in its Crusader invasion and to confront the apostate rulers of our lands who lead the vanguards of its campaign. There is no space for evidence here, though I have collected much of it in drafts of a research I was preparing before the fall of Kabul, titled *Al-Furqān bayna ‘Ulamā’ al-Raḥmān wa ‘Ulamā’ al-Sultān* (The Criterion Between the Scholars of the Merciful and the Scholars of the Regime), and their examples from the scholars of Banū Umayyah to the fuqahā’ of the Pentagon today. I ask Allāh to help me compile and publish it once again.

I summarize the role that the scholars of the regime and the corrupt leaders of the Awakening have played, and continue to play, alongside the modern Crusader campaigns, in four basic objectives, in addition to a fifth, which is more evil than them in the long run. These objectives are:

1. Ruling that the apostate rulers governing Arab and Muslim lands are Muslims, despite their legislating without Allāh's permission, their ruling by other than what Allāh has revealed, their allegiance to the kuffār enemies, their safeguarding of their interests, and fighting in their defense alongside their armies and under their command – not to mention the various forms of kufr and corruption they commit – and considering all of this to be *fiṣq* (immorality) and *ẓulm* (injustice) that does not go beyond being minor kufr (kufr aṣḡhar) which does not expel them from the fold of Muslims. Consequently, ruling that they are legitimate *Wulāt al-Umūr* (rulers) over the

Muslim subjects, deserving all rights of obedience, allegiance, and cooperation.

2. Ruling on the legitimacy of the American Crusader occupation and other occupations of Muslim lands, under the pretext that this is a legitimate seeking of their assistance justified by necessity. Issuing fatwās on the legitimacy of normalization with the Jews. And bestowing legitimacy upon the occupation of Palestine under the pretext that all of this was done under political, military, and economic agreements and treaties concluded between the kuffār and the 'legitimate' Wulāt al-Umūr, including 'Arafāt and his authority, the architects of Oslo, Madrid, and the Road Map.
3. Prohibiting resistance against the Crusader and Jewish occupiers, describing it as terrorism against the musta'minīn (those granted security) and mu'āhadīn (those with covenants), and as rebellion against the 'legitimate' Wulāt al-Umūr. Thereby, withdrawing legitimacy from any form of their Jihād.
4. Ruling that the Mujāhidīn and resistance fighters are 'mischief-makers in the land' (mufsidūn fī al-arḍ). Permitting their killing, imprisonment, torture, and pursuit by the (Muslim!) ('legitimate!') Wulāt al-Umūr and their (musta'minīn!) and (mu'āhadīn!) masters, who, with all their equipment, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, planes, smart bombs, and destructive missiles, have become (dhimmiyyīn!). And prohibiting the violation of the dhimmah (covenant of protection) of the Wālī al-Amr who granted them security and brought them for 'our benefit' and 'our victory'!. So how can the 'terrorists' frighten them!!
5. As for the fifth, the most calamitous and malicious of all, and the one with the farthest-reaching impact in destroying the roots of Islam and resistance among Muslims, it is

To discuss this malicious, far-reaching, and long-established institution, and its satanic role in the war against Allāh, His Messenger, and the believers, would require independent volumes. I wish I could provide the documents and references concerning its genesis, its fatāwā, and its record in the world of hypocrisy; if so, I would have dedicated myself to producing this important work. I ask Allāh to appoint for this task pens of truth from the people of the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries themselves, who are undoubtedly more knowledgeable of its intricacies. There are critical issues that the Saudi government has undertaken through these official religious institutions that must be investigated. I will mention some of these by title for those who wish to research and investigate, such as: Saudi Arabia's role in (destroying the Afghan Jihād and pursuing Arab Afghan Mujāhidīn), (destroying the Arab Jihād in Bosnia), (besieging Arab Mujāhidīn and their brothers in Chechnya) and supporting Russia, considering the Chechen issue a Russian internal affair – as recently stated by Saudi Crown Prince ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz during his visit to Moscow in September 2003 – as well as (its role in infiltrating and co-opting Muslim minorities worldwide), (its role in infiltrating and co-opting Muslim communities in the diaspora), (its role in overthrowing the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan), (its role in the first and second Iraq wars), (its role in combating the Jihādī current as part of the campaign against terrorism), (its role in supporting Arab regimes that faced confrontations from Jihādī movements, such as what happened in Syria and Algeria)... The issues are numerous, and the role of this religious institution, its history, and its "achievements" constitute a lengthy research topic. However, for the sake of brevity and benefit, I draw attention to the following concise points:

The nucleus of this religious institution began to form during the era of King ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, who managed to deceive some well-intentioned people in Najd, convincing

them that he came to revive the da‘wah of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (may Allāh have mercy on him). When the Ikhwān discovered his deception and confronted him—after the English had installed him as sultan over Najd and the Ḥijāz—he annihilated them in the Battle of al-Sabīlah with the cooperation of the English, as the Ikhwān were divided amongst themselves, and some sided with him under the pretext that he was the walī al-amr. That was the beginning.

After ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, the religious institution, which had not yet fully crystallized, in cooperation with the princes of the ruling family, undertook the ousting of Sa‘ūd and the installation of King Fayṣal as the new walī al-amr. One of the first acts of this cunning man (the founder of secularism in Saudi Arabia, as the author claims) was to codify this institution and make it official. Over time, the (Council of Senior Scholars) and other bodies and institutions were established, such as (Da‘wah and Guidance), the (Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), and the (Supreme Judicial Council), etc. It was engineered so that the Muftī of the land would head it, forming the first real (Vatican) for Muslims, headed by a (Pope) for Muslims, which the Saudis, with the power of (petrodollars) and the sanctity of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, sought to impose on the Arab and Islamic world. They succeeded in this to a large extent... This was aided by the external wing of the Saudi religious institution, spearheaded by the (Muslim World League), the (Saudi Red Crescent), the (World Assembly of Muslim Youth), the (International Islamic Relief Organization), and other official institutions, in addition to dozens of theoretically non-governmental, private charitable da‘wah organizations. The billion-dollar budgets, the influence of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, and the legitimacy and authority they bestowed upon the Saudi kings and their scholars, enabled them to achieve their objectives, which were carefully drawn up in London, inherited thereafter by Washington, and executed with great skill by Riyadh. With time and the succession of kings after Fayṣal, the corruption of this religious institution increased, especially after the death of its scholar who attempted reform, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-

Shaykh (may Allāh have mercy on him), who discovered the beginnings of kufr and misguidance in the ruling establishment and clashed with it through his valuable treatise ("The Arbitration of Laws") and his famous letters to the princes of Āl Saʿūd. Then death overtook him before he could achieve anything. Subsequently, deviation became entrenched during the era of his successor, Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz, and the other strong pillar, Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn, who, along with the Muftī of the land, formed the main pillar for the legitimacy of Āl Saʿūd and the frontline in patching up their flaws.

Then they were succeeded by even worse, after they had passed on to what they had put forth. Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl al-Shaykh took over the banner of soothsaying in the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries in the year 2000, along with the rest of the anṣār from the Shaykh's (instruments) and the kings' (machines)!

Several factors contributed to the success of this institution, foremost among them:

1. Exploiting the religious authority of the Two Holy Sanctuaries and their existence under the rule of Āl Saʿūd.
2. The enormous financial budget spent on the work and activities of these institutions.
3. The enormous budget spent on propaganda for these institutions, their men, their scholars, and their "achievements," until it was implanted in the minds and reality of Muslims throughout the Arab and Islamic world.
4. The presence of a vast number of sincere preachers and workers for daʿwah and Islām, serving with full dedication in these institutions out of a desire to deliver good to its people and cooperate in righteousness and taqwā, unaware of the final outcome and who would reap the fruits of these efforts: Āl Saʿūd, then the Crusaders and the Jews.

5. Exploiting the Salafī identity and the Wahhābī madhhab (may Allāh have mercy on its founder), which spread and gained foundations and acceptance within the circles of the Islamic Awakening (Ṣaḥwah), especially its Jihādī elements in the Arab and Islamic world, and what these institutions practiced in terms of printing books and distributing pamphlets carrying the Salafī ‘aqīdah and other sciences, and the good therein. This work found acceptance in the Islamic world. This continued until the Saudi government recently found itself burdened with carrying the message of the Wahhābī da‘wah, which formed a basis in the intellectual foundation of most contemporary Jihādī groups. This has recently plunged it into a real crisis with America, so, under duress from America, it suddenly decided to fight this identity after the September events when the Americans discovered their predicament with the Muslim ‘aqīdah of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, which the Wahhābī da‘wah focused on extensively.

The real problem that this Saudi institution has caused for the Islamic and Arab Ummah in general is that while the destructive role and hypocrisy of all institutions and personalities of the Sultān's scholars in most Arab and Muslim countries are limited to the local sphere, expanding partially in proportion to the size of their state, the strength of their government, and their regional role, the Saudi institution is an exception. For the aforementioned reasons, its harm extends to encompass the entire Islamic world, as it has gained accepted authority in all countries. This is due to the confusing overlap that occurred between it and the blessed Islamic Awakening (Ṣaḥwah) that became active in Saudi Arabia and had its scholars and du‘āt during the last two decades of the 20th century (1400-1420 AH). The problem was that this Ṣaḥwah emerged from the womb of that official religious institution, graduated under its scholars, and senior sincere du‘āt within it became entangled in carving great idols out of the symbols of that religious institution, foremost among them the ill-mentioned Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, who played a disgraceful role

alongside the invading campaigns and the existing agent governments in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. This reached the point where senior Mujāhidīn leaders and du‘āt in Saudi Arabia itself cried out from the affliction of this clerical institution, after it issued fatāwā to imprison their best and most prominent figures in the prisons of Āl Sa‘ūd and decreed, under the directives of Nāyif ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, to ban hundreds of them from teaching and delivering khuṭbahs.

The Muslims' crisis with this institution deepened when its affair, and the affair of its scholars and its fatāwā—which supported colonialism and its agents, and fought against Jihād, Mujāhidīn, and anyone who contemplated resistance—became confused. This is because the contemporary Jihādī current, as I mentioned earlier, has relied for many of the fundamentals of its thought and beliefs—especially in adopting the fiqh of evidence, the principles of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, and many fundamentals of ‘aqīdah—on the same intellectual-creedal school (Salafiyyah) that the Saudi religious institution trades in. Many well-intentioned du‘āt whose activities overlapped with it adopt this school. This led large segments of Jihādī thinkers inside and outside the Kingdom to hold much respect and veneration for these references. The effect of this was extremely detrimental to Jihādī circles. Those who realized the true state of this institution faced clashes and fierce debates within Jihādī circles and endured much hardship while trying to expose the falsehood of this institution. Thus, this institution fought Jihād and the Mujāhidīn inside and outside the Kingdom, had a detrimental effect on Jihād in a number of Arab and Islamic countries, played a role in besieging the Islamic Emirate and overthrowing the Taliban, and in the campaign against Jihād and the Mujāhidīn led by America under the banner of the global war on terrorism. Today, it stands as an obstacle to acts of Jihād and resistance against the Americans in Saudi Arabia, especially after the triumphant attacks in May (2003) when Saudi istishhādiyyūn blew up the luxurious residences of American military families and their intelligence personnel in Riyadh.

- A simple survey of Saudi media—newspapers, magazines, radio, and television—is enough to see the flood of fatāwā and interviews with dozens of scholars from the official and unofficial institutions, all lined up to hurl insults and false accusations at the Mujāhid youth, exploiting some of their mistakes, and to lavish praise and expressions of loyalty upon the "sole Islamic regime in the world that is based on Islamic Sharī'ah," as they claim! And to fill the world with noise about the rights of kuffār and mu'āhadīn, knowingly confounding truth with falsehood...
- The shameful positions of the official religious institution in Saudi Arabia have provoked the anger of the Mujāhidīn, sincere scholars, and honorable sons of the Arabian Peninsula, and they have stated this in much literature and many statements.
- I have compiled some of what Shaykh Usāmah ibn Lādin has issued regarding this religious institution, as well as some of what was issued by one of the most prominent political opponents of the Saudi regime, Dr. Sa'd al-Faqīh, in a book titled "Testimony of the Mujāhidīn Leaders and Heads of Reform and Opposition in the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries Regarding the Sultān's Scholars in Their Country Called 'Saudi Arabia'."
- Both men are trustworthy, regardless of our opinion on their differing methods of confronting the Saudi regime and its religious and other institutions. I will quote short excerpts from my aforementioned book of some of what they said:

It came in Statement No. (11) of the Advice and Reform Committee, signed by (Usāmah ibn Lādin), dated 27/7/1415 AH - 29/12/1994 CE, titled:

"An Open Letter to Shaykh Ibn Bāz on the Invalidity of His Fatwā Permitting Peace with the Jews..."

"Your Eminence, Shaykh: We intended by mentioning the foregoing to remind you of your duty towards the dīn and towards the Ummah, and to alert you to your great responsibilities, for indeed, the reminder benefits the believers. We wanted to remind you at this time when falsehood has swelled, and the purveyors of falsehood and misguidance have run rampant, truth has been buried, du‘āt have been imprisoned, and reformers have been silenced. Stranger still is that this did not happen merely with your knowledge and silence, but rather it was passed on the back of your fatāwā and positions. We will remind you, Your Eminence, Shaykh, of some of these fatāwā and positions to which you may pay no heed, although they could cause the Ummah to plummet seventy autumns into misguidance, so that you may realize with us, even if only partially, the gravity of this matter and its detrimental consequences.

Here are some examples:

1 - It is no secret to anyone the extent to which rampant corruption has spread, encompassing all aspects of life, where various munkarāt, no longer hidden from anyone, have become widespread, as detailed in the Memorandum of Advice submitted by a group of scholars and reformers. Among the most dangerous things they clarified was shirk with Allāh, represented in legislating and enacting man-made laws that permit prohibited things, the most heinous of which is dealing with ribā, which is rampant in the country, through state institutions and its usurious banks whose towers compete with the minarets of the Two Holy Sanctuaries and fill the country from one end to the other.

It is necessarily known that the usurious systems and laws by which these banks and institutions operate are legislated by the ruling regime and approved by it. Nevertheless, we have only heard from you that dealing in ribā is ḥarām and not permissible!!, paying no attention to the talbīs (deception) your words cause among

the people by not differentiating between the ruling on one who merely deals in ribā and the ruling on one who legislates and codifies ribā.

Although the difference between them is clear and significant: one who deals in ribā is a perpetrator of one of the major destructive sins, whereas one who legislates and codifies ribā is an apostate, a kāfir whose kufr expels him from the millah by this action, because he has made himself an equal to Allāh and a partner with Him in permitting and prohibiting – and this is what we have detailed in an independent research paper that will be published soon, in shā’ Allāh.

And although Allāh and His Messenger have declared war on the one who deals in ribā and does not desist – *{And if you do not, then be informed of a war [against you] from Allāh and His Messenger.}* (Al-Baqarah: 279) – we still hear from you expressions of praise and adulation for this regime, which has not only become addicted to dealing in ribā but has also legislated, codified, and permitted it. And he (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Ribā has seventy-three gates, the mildest of which is like a man marrying his own mother." (Ṣaḥīḥ, narrated by al-Ḥākim).

Ibn ‘Abbās (may Allāh be pleased with them both) said: "So whoever persists in ribā and does not desist from it, it is the right of the Imām of the Muslims to demand his repentance; if he desists, fine, otherwise, he should strike his neck." (Narrated by Ibn Jarīr with his isnād from Ibn ‘Abbās). This is regarding one who deals in ribā, so what about one who declares ribā permissible and legislates it?!!

The economic and political crises in which the country is floundering, and the astonishing spread of crimes of all kinds, are nothing but a punishment from Allāh and part of the war He, the Exalted, declared on those who do not desist from dealing in ribā and similar munkarāt, and the destruction He decreed for ribā: *{Allāh destroys ribā and gives increase for ṣadaqāt.}* (Al-Baqarah: 276).

2 - And when the King wore the cross on his chest and appeared with it before the world, joyful and pleased, you interpreted his action and justified it, despite its heinousness and ugliness, and despite the clarity that this act is kufr, and the apparent state of its doer being one of contentment and choice with knowledge.

3 - And when the invading Crusader and Jewish coalition forces in the Gulf War – in collusion with the regime – decided to occupy the country in the name of liberating Kuwait, you justified that with a strained fatwā that rationalized this heinous act which insulted the honor of the Ummah, stained its dignity, and desecrated its sanctities, considering it a matter of seeking help from the kāfir in times of necessity, while neglecting the restrictions of such assistance and the Sharī‘ah-recognized parameters of necessity."

4 - And when the ruling Saudi regime assisted and supported the heads of socialist-communist apostasy in Yemen against the Yemeni Muslim people in the recent war, you remained silent. Then, when the tables turned on these communists, you issued – at the behest of this regime – an "advice!!" calling for everyone to reconcile and make peace, considering them Muslims!! This deluded people into thinking that communists are Muslims whose blood must be spared. When were communists ever Muslims? Were you not the ones who previously issued a fatwā declaring their apostasy and the obligation to fight them in Afghanistan? Or is there a difference between Yemeni communists and Afghan communists? Have the concepts of ‘aqīdah and the principles of Tawḥīd been lost and confused to this extent?

The ruling regime continues to harbor these imāms of kufr in various cities of the country, and we have not heard any condemnation from you. The Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) said: "Allāh curses whoever shelters an innovator." (Narrated by Muslim).

5 - And when the regime decided to oppress Shaykh Salmān al-‘Awdah and Shaykh Safar al-Ḥawālī – who proclaimed the truth and endured harm for the sake of Allāh –

it procured a fatwā from you by which it justified all the oppression and abuse that the two Shaykhs and those with them among the du‘āt, mashāyikh, and youth of the Ummah were and are subjected to. May Allāh release them from their captivity and lift the oppression of the oppressors from them.

These are some examples, not intended to be exhaustive, but the situation required their mention as we address your recent fatwā concerning what is slanderously called "peace with the Jews." This fatwā was a calamity for the Muslims, as you yielded to the political desire of the regime when it decided to reveal what it had previously concealed: its intention to enter into this farcical surrender with the Jews. So you issued a fatwā permitting peace, both unconditional and conditional, with the enemy. The Prime Minister of the Zionist enemy and its parliament did nothing but applaud it and praise it. The Saudi regime subsequently announced its intention to implement further normalization with the enemy.

As if you were not content with permitting the land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries to the Jewish and Crusader occupation forces, you even dragged the third of the Holy Sanctuaries into the calamity by adding Shar‘ī legitimacy to the deeds of surrender signed by the traitors and cowards among the ṭawāghīt of the Arabs and the Jews.

Indeed, this talk is gravely dangerous and a general catastrophe because of the deception it entails for the Ummah.

A group of scholars and du‘āt of the Ummah have preceded us in alerting you to this. They submitted several appeals to you in this regard, including their appeals to you some time ago to refrain from issuing a fatwā permitting this alleged "surrender-peace" with the Jews, clarifying that it does not meet the necessary Shar‘ī conditions, and warning of the immense religious and worldly dangers resulting from it. Among the signatories to that appeal were the esteemed Shaykhs: ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Jibrīn, ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥasan al-Qu‘ūd, Ḥammūd ibn ‘Abdullāh al-

Tuwayjirī (raḥimahullāh), Ḥammūd ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Sha‘ībī, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Nāṣir al-Barrāk, Salmān al-‘Awdah, Ibrāhīm ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Khuḍayrī, ‘Abd al-Waḥhāb al-Nāṣir al-Ṭurayrī, Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Dubayān, ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥammūd al-Tuwayjirī, ‘Abdullāh al-Jalālī, ‘Ā’id al-Qarnī, and many others (ḥafīzahumullāh jamī‘an). You will find the text of their appeal with this letter, in shā’ Allāh.

In the recent Yemen war, when the aforementioned statement was issued, twenty-five scholars issued a fatwā opposing it, clarifying the correct Shar‘ī position on the matter. Among these esteemed scholars were: ‘Abdullāh Sulaymān al-Mas‘arī, Ḥammūd ibn ‘Abdullāh al-Sha‘ībī, ‘Abdullāh al-Jalālī, Salmān al-‘Awdah, Dr. Safar al-Ḥawālī, Dr. Nāṣir al-‘Umar, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Yaḥyā, Dr. ‘Abdullāh ibn Ḥammūd al-Tuwayjirī, and many others (ḥafīzahumullāh jamī‘an).

And in Statement No. (12) of the Advice and Reformation Committee, signed by Usāmah bin Lādin, dated 28/8/1415 AH (29/1/1995 CE), titled: "The Second Letter to Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Bāz." It included the following, from which we quote:

"However, everyone was surprised, not only because you reaffirmed your previous fatwā in what was published by the newspaper called 'Al-Muslimūn' on 19 Sha‘bān 1415 AH, corresponding to 20 January 1995, in its issue No. 520, but also because of the additions and interpretations this reaffirmation contained regarding your understanding of what is called 'peace with the Jews.' These interpretations included matters that the Jews and their agents would not have dreamed of you issuing when they praised and applauded the previous fatwā.

The Ummah in general, and the people of Palestine in particular, were expecting you to fulfill your Shar‘ī duty by inciting to Jihād, rousing determination for it, urging people towards it, and supporting and backing those individuals and groups shouldering its burdens.

They did not expect such a fatwā from you, which criminalizes the mujāhidīn striving to liberate Al-Aqṣā and Palestine. Yes, it criminalizes them, because through their Jihād operations against the Jews, they violate the Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed by the 'Walī al-Amr of the Muslims in Palestine,' as you claimed. And violating an agreement signed by the Walī al-Amr of the Muslims is not permissible!!

With this fatwā, you discourage and dishearten those who offered their fathers, sons, brothers, and husbands as shuhadā' in the path of Allāh to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine. Because, according to this fatwā, they would have died in a state of sin, as they violated an agreement made by the 'Walī al-Amr of the Muslims in Palestine.' This is the meaning of your words and the implication of your fatwā. Do you comprehend what you are saying?! Or do you say about Allāh that of which you have no knowledge?!

If you do not know, then that is a calamity; but if you do know, then the calamity is even greater.

Fifth: What causes fear and anxiety is not merely the issuance of this fatwā by you, but what is more calamitous is that this fatwā was issued according to a methodology you follow in issuing such fatāwā, the most important characteristics of which are:

1 - It stems from the principle of accommodating evil rulers in their political whims and justifying their positions and actions.

2 - In pursuit of that, it distorts evidence and twists the necks of texts to make them conform to those desires.

3 - And if the applicable texts in the given situation do not suffice for this, the ruling is made ambiguous in a way that allows the rulers to achieve their desired outcome.

4 - It is based on ignorance of the reality (al-wāqīʿ), which is the basis (manāṭ) of the ruling, and it is not permissible to issue a fatwā based on ignorance of it (1).

5 - And because it is based on the fluctuating desires of rulers, it has been characterized by much contradiction and inconsistency.

6 - We have provided examples in our previous letter that attest to the truth of this statement.

The clear invalidity and manifest corruption in this methodology are not hidden, because it is based on caprice and favoritism in issuing fatāwā." End quote.

As also stated in the publications of the Islamic Movement for Reform, headed by Dr. Saʿd al-Faqīh in London: Bulletin "24," titled "Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn: Answers that Raise Questions," dated 12 Rabīʿ al-Thānī 1417 AH (26/8/1996 CE). This bulletin was issued after the "Al-Muslimūn" newspaper published an interview with Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿUthaymīn. It is titled: "Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn... Answers that Raise Questions."

Excerpts from some of Ibn ʿUthaymīn's Sharʿī political fatāwā, including the following:

The Shaykh said, in response to a question about obedience to the Walī al-Amr: "And if we assume, in a remote scenario, that the Walī al-Amr is a kāfir, does that mean we should incite people's hearts against him until rebellion, chaos, and fighting occur? Undoubtedly, this is a mistake. The maṣlaḥah (benefit/interest) obtained through this path is not hoped for; the maṣlaḥah that this person desires cannot be achieved this way. Rather, great mafāsīd (corruptions/harms) result from it. Because, for example, if a group of people rises against the Walī al-Amr in the country, and the Walī al-Amr possesses power and authority that no one else has, what will happen? Will this small group overcome? It will not overcome; on the contrary, chaos and corruption will occur. And matters will not become stable. A

person must first look with the eye of the Sharīʿah, and not look at the Sharīʿah with a one-eyed view, looking at texts from one angle while ignoring another. Rather, one must reconcile between the texts."

As for the other question about bayʿah (allegiance), the Shaykh said: "No doubt, this is mistaken. And if he dies, he dies a death of jāhiliyyah, because he will die without having a bayʿah to anyone upon his neck. And the general principles in the Islamic Sharīʿah are that Allāh says: *{So fear Allāh as much as you are able}*. So if there is no general Khalīfah for the Muslims, then whoever is a Walī al-Amr in a region is its Walī al-Amr. Otherwise, if we were to adopt this misguided opinion, people today would have no Khalīfah, and everyone would die a death of jāhiliyyah. Who says this? The Islamic Ummah has been divided since the era of the Ṣaḥābah. You know that ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Zubayr was in Makkah, and Banū Umayyah were in Shām, and likewise, there were people in Yemen and people in Egypt. And the Muslims have continued to believe that bayʿah is to whoever holds authority in the place where they are; they give him bayʿah and call him Amīr al-Muʾminīn, and no one denies this. So this person is splitting the unity of the Muslims by not adhering to the bayʿah, and by contravening the ijmāʿ (consensus) of the Muslims from ancient times."

And in the course of his answer on the issue of bayʿah, the Shaykh said: "Then, if a person is given bayʿah for leadership over a country, and then a crown prince (walī ʿahd) is appointed for him, he is his successor. When the term of the first ends, the second becomes the Walī al-Amr without a new bayʿah, and people's affairs cannot be set right except by this. If we were to say that the crown prince does not have the authority of succession until he is given a new bayʿah, chaos would ensue. But Shayṭān casts such opinions into the hearts of some people so that the Muslim community (jamāʿah) may be divided and the instigation (taḥrīsh) occurs, about which the Messenger (ʿalayhi al-ṣalātu wa al-salām) said: 'Indeed, Shayṭān has

despaired of being worshipped in the Arabian Peninsula, but [he seeks to sow discord] through instigation among them.' " End quote.

Al-Faqīh commented on Ibn ‘Uthaymīn's fatāwā with scathing and sarcastic remarks, befitting the charlatanry and falsehoods they contained, which reach the point of contradicting the clear Qur’ān, the authentic Sunnah, and the ijma‘ of the Ummah's scholars throughout its history.

And in Bulletin (28), dated 11 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1417 AH (23 September 1996 CE), this bulletin was issued after a comment by Shaykh Ibn Bāz was published regarding Bin Lādin's statement and the call to fight the Americans. It is titled: "Ibn Bāz between Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and Ibn Taymiyyah."

Sa’d al-Faqīh said: "But we were deeply pained by this great tazkiyah (commendation/purification) that the Shaykh gave to the current Saudi state under the leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. The Shaykh said: 'This Saudi state is a blessed state through which Allāh has given victory to the truth, supported the dīn, united the word, eliminated the causes of corruption, and secured the land. Through it, great blessings have been achieved that none can enumerate except Allāh.'

This statement from the Shaykh is very dangerous because the Shaykh knows full well that what he said is the exact opposite of reality. Those who reiterate that the Shaykh is being misled are mistaken, because we know with certainty – and we are witnesses to this in this world and the Hereafter – that this is not true. And that the Shaykh is fully and detailedly informed about what is happening in the country and knows all the details of the Shar‘ī violations committed by the regime at the state level and at the level of influential individuals. Indeed, the Shaykh, as those close to him know, is much more knowledgeable than those who claim to be aware of what is happening, because most of the people of reform convey news, information,

observations, and advice from themselves to the Shaykh himself. We have personally witnessed many sessions in which the reality was explained to the Shaykh in detail, without ambiguity. Indeed, we can say that the ḥujjah (proof/argument) has been established against the Shaykh, and that responsibility has been discharged towards him by a large number of mashāyikh, university professors, and reformers. And the establishment of the ḥujjah by clarifying the reality in detail to the Shaykh has occurred repeatedly by people whom the Shaykh trusts and whose words he accepts. Whoever doubts this need only read the Memorandum of Advice that was presented to the Shaykh and reviewed by the Quintipartite Committee and the Council of Senior Scholars, both of which the Shaykh heads. No one can argue that this memorandum is not a ḥujjah against whoever has read it. Those who try to defend the Shaykh by portraying him as a naive man sitting in a cellar, only aware of what the regime informs him of, are mistaken. For the Shaykh is in contact with the whole world, internally and externally, and has detailed knowledge of the situations, a follow-up forced upon him by a large number of du‘āt, reformers, and students of knowledge.

Therefore, the Shaykh commits a grave error and a dangerous slip when he gives this tazkiyah to the state while knowing its true condition, and he also knows, through his Shar‘ī knowledge, the danger of such an act. The Shaykh is not unfamiliar with the writings and sayings of the scholars of the Da‘wah, especially Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. The Shaykh, for example, knows with certainty that the regime rules by other than what Allāh has revealed, despite repeated warnings and advice.

So what does the Shaykh say then about the statement of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb concerning those who give tazkiyah to those who rule by other than what Allāh has revealed? He (raḥimahullāh) said: 'Indeed, these ṭawāghīt in whom people believe obedience is due, apart from Allāh, are all kuffār, apostates from Islām. How

could they not be, when they make ḥalāl what Allāh has forbidden, and make ḥarām what Allāh has permitted, and strive to spread corruption in the land through their words, actions, and support? And whoever argues on their behalf, or denies [the rightness of] those who declare them kuffār, or claims that this action of theirs, even if it were false, does not take them into kufr – then the least that can be said of such an arguer is that he is a fāsiq (transgressor). Because the dīn of Islām is not sound except by disassociating from these [ṭawāghīt] and declaring them kuffār.' (Al-Rasā'il al-Shakhṣiyyah, p. 188).

So if merely not performing takfīr [of them] is a major crime according to Shaykh Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, then what about one who describes them with the best descriptions of Islām, gives tazkiyah to their state and system, and attacks those who denounce them?"

Allāh the Exalted said: *{Indeed, those who conceal what We sent down of clear proofs and guidance after We made it clear for the people in the Scripture - those are cursed by Allāh and cursed by those who curse.}* (Al-Baqarah: 159).

And this is regarding merely one who conceals knowledge. So what about one who goes further than merely concealing knowledge, to giving tazkiyah to the ṭāghūt, and giving tazkiyah to one who allies with the enemies of Allāh, and giving tazkiyah to the oppressor who wages war against Islām and the Da'wah, and who spreads ribā and corruption?

We would be pleased if the Shaykh were to repent from this matter and cease such dangerous endorsements that implicate him in the words of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. We would also be pleased if the Shaykh transformed from a defender of the regime into a defender of truth and Dīn, and an exposé of the regime's crimes against Islām. However, this is not the most important thing. The most important thing is for Muslims to remember that they only take their Dīn from those whose words align with the Book (the Qur'ān) and the Sunnah, and who apply

the knowledge of Sharīʿah with honesty and sincerity to reality, so that they may be among the reforming scholars who speak on behalf of Allāh. A Muslim is not bound by the words of Ibn Bāz or Ibn ʿUthaymīn; rather, he is bound by the word of Allāh and the word of His Messenger (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam). Among Allāh's favors upon us is that there is no priesthood or Vatican in Islām that monopolizes the interpretation of the Qurʾān and the understanding of the Sunnah. Instead, the truth in the Book and the Sunnah is the judge of men, and men are not the judges of the Book and the Sunnah. The problem with Shaykh Ibn Bāz is not merely his endorsement of the regime; rather, the Shaykh was forced to contradict himself more than once in his fatāwā due to his appeasement of the regime. Among the examples of this explicit contradiction is the Shaykh's fatwā prohibiting seeking aid from non-Muslims, which was directed at Jamāl ʿAbd an-Nāṣir, in which the Shaykh stated that seeking aid is not permissible even in cases of necessity [1].

(1) The Shaykh issued a similar prohibition for the Mujāhidīn in Syria against Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad when he forbade seeking aid from apostate parties and the Iraqi regime in that Jihād. The text of his fatwā was "The absolute prohibition of seeking aid." Refer to the author's book, *The Jihādī Islamic Revolution in Syria* (1/264).

This was in line with the regime's desire at that time. Years passed, and the situation reversed. Āl Saʿūd needed to overturn the fatwā, so the Shaykh changed his stance along with them. He did not merely permit seeking aid out of necessity but considered it obligatory, and deemed anyone who did not act upon it a sinner. Another contradiction the Shaykh fell into was when he issued a statement advising Ḥikmatyār to join the Walī al-Amr, Rabbānī, even though Ḥikmatyār had his own army and land under his control, while Rabbānī's advantage was that the state's whim was with him. When the Yemen war occurred, the communist separatists were, according to the Shaykh's theory, in the position of Khawārij against the ruler. Nevertheless, the Shaykh issued a statement calling for the sparing of blood and

reconciliation between the two parties, and did not call for joining the Walī al-Amr, because the regime's whim was with the communists. This is in addition to a list of fatāwā issued by the Shaykh according to the regime's desire, foremost among them the fatwā to summon foreign forces, which the Shaykh considered obligatory and not merely permissible. Then came the statement of the Council of Senior Scholars against the Charter of Demands, the Council's statement against the Memorandum of Advice, the Council's statement against the Defense Committee, and the Council's statement ordering the arrest of the two Shaykhs, Salmān and Safar, for the purpose of "protecting society from their errors." And the recent fatāwā that declared Americans to be mu'āhadīn (those with a covenant) whose blood is inviolable, and considered killing them one of the greatest forms of corruption in the land.

One wonders, has the Shaykh read the words of Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah regarding one who issues fatāwā contrary to the Book and Sunnah in agreement with the ruler's whim?

Imām Ibn Taymiyyah said in Al-Fatāwā:

"Whenever a scholar abandons what he knows from the Book of Allāh and the Sunnah of His Messenger, and follows the ruling of a ruler that مخالف to the ruling of Allāh and His Messenger, he becomes an apostate, a kāfir, deserving of punishment in this world and the Hereafter."

(Al-Fatāwā, Vol. 35, pp. 372-373).

We ask Allāh to grant all Muslims insight into their Dīn and bestow upon them al-furqān (the criterion) by which they can distinguish between the scholars of ar-Raḥmān and the scholars of the Sulṭān. (End of quote).

In Bulletin (31), dated 2 Jumādā al-Ākhirah 1417 AH, corresponding to October 14, 1996, titled:

"A Major Crime in the Prisons of Āl Sa'ūd," al-Faqīh reported dangerous information about torture in Saudi Arabia and held the official scholars responsible for it, saying:

"It has been confirmed to the Movement from informed sources within the security apparatus that torture squads have committed the heinous crime of violating the honor of a large number of detainees and repeatedly sexually assaulting them, in an attempt to crush their personalities and destroy their high morale.

Information coming from inside the prisons has indicated that those detained because of their Jihādī past are subjected to a series of pressures that end in that shameful outcome – and refuge is sought in Allāh (wa al-‘iyādhu billāh). Anyone connected to that current is required (under duress) to confess that he believes in the takfīr of rulers, society, and scholars. If he does not agree, he is severely tortured with various types of psychological and physical torment. If he persists in refusing, he is threatened with sexual assault, at which point these human dogs do not hesitate to carry out that threat and commit the filthy crime. He might even be filmed in this shameful position to further humiliate and blackmail him to the greatest extent possible.

The Movement has learned that this despicable crime, occurring in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula at the hands of the henchmen of the 'State of Tawḥīd,' is carried out in implementation of the program proposed by advisors to the Ministry of Interior from North Africa [1]. These advisors succeeded in convincing the Minister of Interior of the effectiveness of this method in achieving the important goal of 'drying up the sources' by destroying the personalities of those young men and crushing their morale and psyche. Yes, perhaps some threats of assault occurred in the past against those believed to have no backing to protect them. Perhaps investigators even exploited their authority in isolated, rare individual cases without the knowledge of their superiors. But it never crossed anyone's mind that

these practices would turn into routine work with the knowledge, direction, and approval of senior officials, headed by the Minister of Interior personally.

That Nāyif bears responsibility for this crime does not in any way absolve his influential brothers. Every decision-maker in this state's policy is responsible for this filthy crime and bears its consequences just as Nāyif does, and deserves what results from it in the present and the future. His being outside the Ministry of Interior will not and cannot absolve him. If Nāyif places no value on honor (ʿarḍ), dignity (sharaf), or protective jealousy (ghayrah), as he has done in his personal life, then this crime will extend to his brothers, and they will all be accused of what Nāyif is accused of.

(1) Among the most prominent advisors to the Minister of Interior, Nāyif ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, was a team of Egyptian security experts headed by the former Egyptian Minister of Interior, Zakī Badr, who was known for his immorality, obscenity, depravity, as well as his kufr.

Indeed, the responsibility extends beyond the influential figures of Āl Saʿūd to those who bestow upon them and their actions the legitimacy of Tawḥīd, and who persist in endorsing this regime and its supposed concern for Dīn, daʿwah, and serving Islām, claiming that it has achieved at its hands 'blessings that none can count except Allāh.' We do not consider these individuals merely negligent in denouncing explicit and public evil (munkar) – for which they deserve the threat mentioned in Sūrat al-Baqarah for those who fail to speak out. Rather, they are, in truth – and we say this with full conviction, knowledge, and understanding – partners in the crime. Yes, partners in it, and they will be held accountable for it on the Day of Resurrection as if they had committed it themselves. For they are among the strongest pillars upon which the regime relies for its stability, and their statements and positions are among the strongest arguments the regime uses to justify its practices. In fact, their crime is greater because they have donned the robes of

scholarship and assumed the responsibility of issuing fatāwā, yet they did not shy away from lying about Allāh and His Messenger and deviating from the truth with which Allāh entrusted them. The tragedy is that they know all this from their knowledge of the biographies of the scholars of the Salaf, such as Imām Mālik, Imām Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah, and others. They know that they are not merely helpers of oppressors, but are the oppressors themselves. They know all this, and they know that the sin, crime, and fate of a scholar who defends and endorses an oppressor are greater than the sin, crime, and fate of the oppressor himself. We truly do not know why some naive individuals insist on seeking refuge with them and complaining to them while they see them endorsing Kufr, Shirk, ḡulm (oppression), fusūq (immorality), and ‘iṣyān (disobedience). Indeed, they see them competing and scheming to find an excuse and an interpretation for every crime of the regime, no matter how heinous, in a way that would not even occur to the regime's own stalwarts. If people have been impressed by memorized texts and manuscripts, the Qur’ān described the learned men of the Children of Israel who do not act upon their knowledge as being 'like a donkey carrying books.' In fact, many Orientalist scholars, enemies of Islām, have not fallen short in memorizing texts and manuscripts, studying them, serving them, classifying them, and arranging them, despite their enmity towards Islām and their war against it.

We say it once again: the official scholars are partners in this filthy crime, and we bear witness before Allāh and then before the people that the proof has been established against them, both in terms of knowledge of the Shari‘ah and knowledge of the reality. (End of quote).

And in Bulletin (33), dated 16 Jumādā II 1417 AH - October 28, 1996, titled: "Who are the Scholars of Islām?" al-Faqīh said:

"The distinction between official and unofficial scholars was not clear before aṣ-Ṣaḥwah (the Awakening) entered into a confrontation with the regime, which began

clearly with the Second Gulf Crisis. It escalated thereafter with the reformist steps that followed the events of that crisis, and then reached its peak with the fierce campaign against scholars and du‘āt (preachers), launched by the regime two years ago and still ongoing.

This is not the place to categorize scholars, but rather to piece together the picture that has formed in the wake of that ordeal and harsh experience, and subsequently to review stances and perspectives regarding official scholars, especially those who until recently were classified as if they were part of the aş-Şaḥwah entity and the reformist movement.

No one disputes that Āl Sa‘ūd rely heavily on a massive religious establishment that secures 'legitimacy' for them. All members of Āl Sa‘ūd – even the atheists among them – agree on the necessity of this institution to ensure the obedience of the people, for whom Dīn constitutes a major part of their psychological and cultural makeup. The most important components of this religious establishment are the Council of Senior Scholars, the judges, and the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Despite the largeness of this institution in terms of numbers, its moral value is tied to a very small number of scholars who have given it its weight in the present time and turned it into an effective force. Were it not for the connection to one or two symbols from among those scholars, this entire institution and its influence would have completely collapsed. The reason for this is that those who make up this institution, whether they are members of the Council of Senior Scholars, judges, or the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, are of two types: The first is obscure, unknown, and has no scholarly or da‘wah history that would make him influential enough for the regime to benefit from. The second is famous and well-known but is exposed for his betrayal of Dīn, and it is agreed upon that he 'eats by his religion,' sells fatāwā, and trades in his Sharī‘ah knowledge. All that remains apart from these are one or two individuals known and

famous for their extensive knowledge of Sharī'ah sciences and their scholarly and teaching activities, and at the same time, their integrity at the financial and behavioral level, and their avoidance of the problem of (financially) trading in fatāwā and religious positions.

Before the confrontation between aṣ-Ṣaḥwah and the regime began, and before the scholars entered the test of 'changing evil' (denouncing munkar), the star of these few had risen for the two aforementioned reasons, and for another reason: the absence of a confrontation between Islām and the regime. This limited the criteria to personal righteousness, financial honesty, and the degree of asceticism and piety. As for testing scholars on the extent of their confrontation with oppression, their proclamation of truth, and their denunciation of evil, that field had not yet opened. Therefore, a small number of official scholars gained acceptance among the people and earned great credibility.

The Gulf Crisis came, and it was the first test. The official scholars were exposed from the very first moment; not one of them spoke a word of truth. Indeed, some of them went beyond issuing a fatwā permitting seeking aid from the kuffār to making it obligatory, and consequently, declaring anyone who did not do so a sinner. When the du'āt and scholars moved to criticize the wrong situations, seeking to change the evil with their tongues and fulfilling the duty of conveying the message and proclaiming the truth which those official scholars had abandoned, another development occurred.

A five-member committee, chaired by Shaykh Ibn Bāz, was formed by royal decree. The task of this committee was to discipline those du'āt, dismiss them from giving khuṭbahs (sermons), and prevent them from performing their Sharī'ah duty. This committee studies the lists submitted to it by the Ministry of Interior and the reports prepared by the Mabāḥith (secret police), and then decides based on that information that so-and-so must be stopped from preaching or teaching, so-and-so

must be completely dismissed, and so-and-so must be warned. When the lists are presented to this committee, rarely does anyone escape; everyone is suspended or dismissed. At the hands of this committee, tens, perhaps even hundreds, of preachers and du‘āt were dismissed. While the Council's fatwá legitimizing the kuffār's occupation of the Arabian Peninsula was unlimited Sharī‘ah support for the regime, the formation of the five-member committee was the first time it was revealed that this institution was part of the regime. Many du‘āt and reformers thought that this development was alien to the members of this institution, but the reality is otherwise. There was no change in the policy and thinking of those scholars; all that happened was that they came to the forefront with the regime, and their role was exposed after there had been no confrontation.

After that, the religious establishment's confrontation with ad-da‘wah took an overtly political form when the Council of Senior Scholars issued a statement against the Charter of Demands, transforming itself into a defender of the regime against the du‘āt and reformers, as well as against the entire populace that supported these demands. The Council's statement against the Charter of Demands was not a slip or a lapse but a deliberate, foundational act. This was proven when this stance was repeated in the Council's statement against the Memorandum of Advice – a statement that contained expressions unacceptable even to a lay Muslim, because it attacked intentions and objectives and accused the preparers of the memorandum of bad faith and intending sabotage. Then the Council repeated the process in its statement against the Defense Committee, as a prelude to the security campaign launched against the Committee thereafter. Then came the stage of true and comprehensive confrontation with ad-da‘wah, the reformers, and the scholars of truth, where the Council, especially Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Bāz, lent its cover for the arrest of the two Shaykhs, Salmān and Safar, in a long speech, which the regime openly used to justify the arrest of the two Shaykhs and the launch of the massive campaign against reformers and du‘āt.

Ever since the elite scholars were arrested, the campaign of repression and arrests intensified, and an open war was declared on ad-da‘wah, the Council has remained in its absolute loyalty and complete obedience to the regime. Position after position has been repeated in its dedication to endorsing and defending the regime, and accusing anyone who seeks to denounce evil of inciting fitnah (strife) and confusion. It has gone even further, volunteering a set of fatawā describing other actions as 'corruption in the land' and stressing the necessity of applying ḥadd al-ḥirābah (punishment for highway robbery/waging war against society) to their perpetrators."

Indeed, understanding this issue and perceiving it correctly is crucial for the integrity of the Ṣaḥwah's path. There is a significant difference between considering these scholars as part of the Ṣaḥwah entity, advocates of reform, and scholars of Da‘wah, or considering them part of the regime—indeed, one of its pillars and more important to it than the secret police or the media apparatus.

The mission of a scholar in Islam is not merely personal piety and financial integrity. Rather, his mission is to speak authoritatively on behalf of Allāh, bear the trust of knowledge, and inherit from the Prophet. A scholar commits a grave crime merely by neglecting the duty of conveying the message and concealing knowledge. Allāh the Exalted said: *{Indeed, those who conceal what We sent down of clear proofs and guidance after We made it clear for the people in the Scripture—those are cursed by Allāh and cursed by those who curse.}* (Al-Baqarah 2:159).

A scholar is not safe from this curse—the curse of concealment—unless he fulfills what is mentioned in the verse that follows it: *{Except for those who repent, correct themselves, and make evident [what they concealed]. Those—I will accept their repentance; and I am the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful.}* (Al-Baqarah 2:160).

Concealing knowledge is not concealing the Book and the Sunnah, for no one can conceal the Book and the Sunnah. Rather, it is failing to apply them correctly to the

contemporary issues (Nawāzil) upon which a scholar is obliged to apply the texts. This is a grave crime if it is limited to mere concealment. So how much worse is it if he betrays the trust and lies about Allāh when conveying from Him something other than what He, the Glorified, intended in His Book and the Sunnah of His Messenger? These are the ones intended in the saying of Allāh the Exalted: *{And recite to them the news of him to whom We gave Our signs, but he cast them away; so Satan pursued him, and he became of those who go astray. And if We had willed, We could have raised him thereby, but he clung to the earth and followed his own desire. So his example is like that of the dog: if you chase him, he lolls his tongue out, or if you leave him alone, he (still) lolls his tongue out. That is the example of the people who denied Our signs. So relate the stories that perhaps they will give thought.}* (Al-A'rāf 7:175-176).

This is the manner in which the Qur'ān described scholars and distinguished between one who fulfills the duty of conveying the message, one who conceals it, and, even more severely, one who lies about Allāh and betrays the trust.

The discussion here is not for the purpose of advising or reminding those scholars—although advising and reminding them is a duty, no matter how great their crime. Rather, it is a message directed to the youth of the Da'wah and all who belong to the path of reform, that they should know their men [i.e., recognize true leaders].

The accumulated fame and good reputation of some scholars, established before the real test began, should not divert us from the Qur'ānic method of identifying the scholars who are to be followed and obeyed.

What is required here is not to criminalize so-and-so, or insult so-and-so, or curse so-and-so. Rather, what is required is that the Muslim youth not deceive themselves and continue to deal with those scholars as if they were reformist leaders and figureheads in denouncing evil.

Revering a specific person for his knowledge, age, or for an effort he made at some point, never means placing him in a position of leadership, to be followed, and to be resorted to in times of new critical issues (Nawāzil). Instead, it is paramount to return to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, learn how to deal with scholars according to what is stated in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, and identify the true scholars whom the Ummah should consult for fatāwā and whose choices they should abide by.

What was reported from Shaykh Ibn 'Uthaymīn in Al-Muslimūn newspaper and what was reported from Shaykh Ibn Bāz in the Saudi press, which my article 'Al-Iṣlāḥ' (Reform) addressed, represent an example of the exposure of this group.

This is an opportunity for those who wish to evaluate according to the Qur'ānic method and the Muḥammadan path. Those close to the two Shaykhs observe their personal commitment in terms of worship, uprightness, financial integrity, and asceticism. They also observe the breadth of their Sharī'ah knowledge and their abilities in teaching and instruction. However, they also observe what we meant in our previous discussion regarding a major problem in the most important issue, which is the issue of them fulfilling their duty of conveying the message.

We hope that Shaykh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh Ibn 'Uthaymīn will repent to Allāh, rectify themselves, and clarify—meaning that they acknowledge whatever in their statements contradicted the Sharī'ah and alert the Ummah to this error, as per the guidance of the Qur'ān. We hope that Shaykh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh Ibn 'Uthaymīn will transform into individuals who proclaim the truth, confront injustice, fight tyranny, and support every banner of Da'wah and reform.

However, what is more important is that the youth of the Ṣaḥwah and those belonging to the path of reform realize the reality of the scholar who acts upon his knowledge, calls to it, is patient with the harm he endures for it, and strives in His cause (mujāhid fī sabīlih). And [they should realize] the reality of the scholar who

concealed what Allāh taught him, or worse, lied about Allāh and His Messenger and betrayed the trust.

Sufficient time has passed for testing, and the days have proven that the Council of Senior Scholars (Hay'at Kibār al-'Ulamā') and all those affiliated with it have not taken a single stance in support of the Da'wah or against injustice. All their positions have been recorded as being with injustice and tyranny and against the Da'wah. It is indeed foolishness and poor judgment for a person to seek protection from his enemy.

The problem with the members of the religious establishment is not mere incompetence. An incompetent person can admit his incompetence, say, "I am incompetent," resign, and leave it with a clean slate. But none of them has done so; had one done it, he would have achieved much good. Their problem, however, is their weighty, serious, and active standing with falsehood, supporting it with words, stances, fatāwā, and defending it by all possible means.

This discussion is not intended to say that so-and-so is righteous, so-and-so is among the people of Paradise, and so-and-so is among the people of Hellfire. Allāh knows best the hearts of people, their intentions, their motives, their deeds, and their final outcomes. However, what is intended is the practical aspect of the issue: who is the scholar that should be followed.

And it is as if, through this review, we have come to know the reality of the scholar who should be followed, and whether the members of the Council of Senior Scholars (Hay'at Kibār al-'Ulamā') deserve this attribute or not). End quote.

And in Newsletter (155), dated 9 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1419 AH – April 5, 1999 CE, titled: 'An Open Letter to Shaykh 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn Bāz,' al-Faqīh said:

Allow us, Your Eminence the Shaykh, to review your record over the past years regarding the issue of conveying the message.

Many statements have been issued by you in which you praise the state and describe it with the best Sharī‘ah-based descriptions, despite your full and detailed knowledge of what is happening in the country and all the details of the Sharī‘ah violations committed by the regime at the state level and at the level of influential individuals.

Indeed, as those close to you know, you are far more knowledgeable about what is happening than even those who claim to be informed, because most people of reform convey their news, information, observations, and advice to you. We personally witnessed many sessions where the reality was laid out to you in detail, without ambiguity. Rather, we can say that the proof has been established against you, and responsibility has been cleared with you by a large number of Shaykhs, university professors, and reformers. The establishment of proof by detailing the reality to you has happened repeatedly by people whom you trust and whose words you accept. There is no greater evidence of this than the Memorandum of Advice (Mudhakkirat al-Naṣīḥah) that was presented to you and reviewed by the Quintipartite Committee and the Council of Senior Scholars (Hay’at Kibār al-‘Ulamā’), both of which you preside over. No one disputes that this memorandum is a proof against anyone who read it. We reckon that you cannot excuse yourselves by claiming that you only know what the regime informs you of. On the contrary, you have detailed knowledge of the situations, an 'obligatory awareness' forced upon you by a large number of Du‘āt, reformers, and students of knowledge. Therefore, you may be committing a grave error and a dangerous slip when you praise the state in this manner, while you currently know, and also know from your Sharī‘ah knowledge, the seriousness of such an act. Someone like you is not unfamiliar with the writings and sayings of the scholars of the Da‘wah, especially Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. If you know with certainty that the regime rules by other than what Allāh has revealed, despite repeated warnings and advice, then what is your position on the statement of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb about

those who praise those who rule by other than what Allāh has revealed? He (may Allāh have mercy on him) said:

"Indeed, these ṭawāghīt, in whom people believe obedience is obligatory besides Allāh, are all disbelievers, apostates from Islam. How could they not be, when they permit what Allāh has forbidden and forbid what Allāh has permitted, and strive to spread corruption on earth through their words, actions, and support? And whoever argues on their behalf, or denies [the kufr of] those who declare them kuffār, or claims that this action of theirs, even if it were false, does not take them into kufr—the least that can be said of such an arguer is that he is a fāsiq (transgressor). For the Dīn of Islam is not sound except by disassociating from these individuals and declaring them kuffār." (Al-Rasā'il al-Shakhṣiyyah, p. 188).

If merely not declaring them kuffār is a major crime according to Shaykh Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, then what about one who describes them with the best descriptions of Islam, praises their state and system, and criticizes those who denounce them?

And you, Your Eminence the Shaykh, know with certainty that the regime has imposed ribā (usury) upon the people, established mighty edifices for it, supported it with the state treasury, and made the state's economy dependent on it. You know with certainty that the regime allies with the kuffār, supports them, aids them, seeks their help, empowers them, implements their plans, and conspires with them against the Muslims. You know with certainty that the regime encourages moral corruption and contributes to its spread through media and education, by supporting cells of corruption protected by the princes, and by restricting and obstructing the Da'wah. You know with certainty the crimes committed by the regime against the Du'āt and the war it wages against them through imprisonment, displacement, siege, and intimidation. Indeed, you are among the most knowledgeable of this because you are often the first to be informed about an arrest,

a raid, a suspension, or similar incidents. You know with certainty the forms of injustice inflicted upon individuals, groups, and tribes by the regime as a system and by influential individuals within it, because many of the oppressed often seek refuge with you and write to you for help.

Your problem, Your Eminence the Shaykh, is not merely praising the regime. Rather, you have been forced into contradictions more than once due to accommodating the regime. Among the examples of this blatant contradiction is the fatwá prohibiting seeking assistance from non-Muslims, which was directed at Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir, in which you stated that such assistance is not permissible even in cases of necessity. Years passed, and the situation reversed; you not only permitted seeking assistance in necessity but considered it obligatory, and sinful for those who did not act upon it.

You repeatedly changed your fatwá to follow the ruler in the cases of Afghanistan and Yemen. This is in addition to the list of fatāwā issued by you according to the regime's desire, beginning with the fatwá to summon foreign troops, then the statement of the Council of Senior Scholars (Hay’at Kibār al-‘Ulamā’) against the 'Letter of Demands,' the Council's statement against the 'Memorandum of Advice,' the Council's statement against the 'Committee for the Defense [of Legitimate Rights],' the Council's statement ordering the arrest of the two Shaykhs, Salmān [al-‘Awdah] and Safar [al-Ḥawālī], in order to 'protect society from their errors,' and the recent fatāwā that deemed Americans as protected covenanters whose blood is inviolable, and considered killing them among the greatest forms of corruption on earth. Have you, I wonder, read the words of Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah concerning one who issues fatāwā contrary to the Book of Allāh and the Sunnah of His Messenger in agreement with the whim of the Sulṭān? He said in Al-Fatāwā: "And whenever a scholar abandons what he knows from the Book of Allāh and the Sunnah of His Messenger and follows the ruling of a ruler that contradicts the ruling

of Allāh and His Messenger, he becomes an apostate, a disbeliever, deserving of punishment in this world and the Hereafter." (Al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, pp. 372-373).

Concealing knowledge is not concealing the Book and the Sunnah, for no one can conceal the Book and the Sunnah. Rather, it is failing to apply them correctly to the contemporary issues (Nawāzil) upon which a scholar is obliged to apply the texts. This is a grave crime if it is limited to mere concealment. So how much worse is it if he betrays the trust and lies about Allāh when conveying from Him something other than what He, the Glorified, intended in His Book and the Sunnah of His Messenger? These are the ones intended in the saying of Allāh the Exalted: *{And recite to them the news of him to whom We gave Our signs, but he cast them away; so Satan pursued him, and he became of those who go astray. And if We had willed, We could have raised him thereby, but he clung to the earth and followed his own desire. So his example is like that of the dog: if you chase him, he lolls his tongue out, or if you leave him alone, he (still) lolls his tongue out. That is the example of the people who denied Our signs. So relate the stories that perhaps they will give thought.}* (Al-A'rāf 7:175-176).

Your problem, Your Eminence the Shaykh, is not mere incompetence. An incompetent person can admit his incompetence, say, "I am incompetent," resign, and leave it with a clean slate. Your problem, however, is your weighty, serious, and active standing with falsehood, supporting it with words, stances, and fatāwā.

The time has come, as long as there is life remaining, for you to strive for a good ending and a good remembrance [after your death], after you fulfill the duty of reform and clarification. Have we not conveyed the message? O Allāh, bear witness). End quote.

I believe that these two testimonies are sufficient to define the official religious establishment of Saudi Arabia, from the words of some of its sincere and honorable members—and Allāh is their reckoner. The matter has now worsened, and

discontented pens and tongues have multiplied within the Islamic Ṣaḥwah circles in Saudi Arabia. Whoever wants more on this can turn to internet sites where many of these scholars have found an outlet to proclaim the truth and express their opinions.

The Stance of the Sulṭān's Scholars in the Islamic World on the American Occupation of Iraq

When America invaded Iraq in March 2003, it had failed, despite a year of prior diplomatic efforts in international institutions and the United Nations, to obtain clear legitimacy for its invasion of Iraq. The inflammation of global public opinion in general, and Arab public opinion in particular, with feelings of rejection and resentment led to fear and panic among Arab rulers regarding the consequences of the occupation of Iraq. This was clearly evident in the media.

Furthermore, the American administration's declaration of its intention to target the political and geographical map of the Middle East confused Arab rulers due to fear for their thrones and their inability to confront America, having shackled themselves with what prevents them from doing so. Governments gave the green light to their media outlets, including mosque pulpits (manābir), to declare positions of rejection of the war in Iraq. This was the situation in the Arab and Islamic world generally, with the exception of Kuwait, which officially and practically declared its support for America and its war on Iraq. Nevertheless, America compelled seven Arab countries to open their lands, waters, and airspace for the aggression and to provide logistical services. Thus, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan provided their services, as did Pakistan. Turkey provided partial support as a result of refusal, reluctance, and coercion.

It appears that the Arab rulers were disgruntled by American recklessness, which disregarded their dignity and interests and failed to consider their capacity for relative collaboration or what the Arab street could tolerate of it. This was reflected

in a tendency to turn a blind eye to some popular expressions of frustration, such as demonstrations and conferences, many of which ended with police and riot control forces killing some demonstrators and breaking the bones of others. This atmosphere also led the official religious establishment and semi-governmental mosques to experience a kind of "awakening of conscience," in which the sincerity and emotion of some scholars mixed with the rulers' desire to exert some pressure on America. Thus, we were surprised when the Shaykh of Al-Azhar, Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī, who had spent most of his time combating "terrorism," issued a fatwā at the beginning of the war declaring Jihād in Iraq, permitting martyrdom operations against the invading forces, and paving the way for demonstrations at Al-Azhar Mosque. He was followed, to our surprise, by the Muftī of the Nuṣayrī state in Syria, Aḥmad Kaftārū, who called on Muslim youth to carry out martyrdom operations. In this way, many scholars and leaders of the official and semi-official Saḥwah (Awakening) made themselves comfortable on satellite channels and began calling for Jihād.

Indeed, contingents of Mujāhid youth moved to Iraq under the eyes and ears of some Arab regimes, crossing into Iraq from Syria.

Soon, the war proceeded in its well-known fashion, and matters returned to their usual course, with scholars combating "terrorism" in the media alongside their governments and their master, America.

However, what is strikingly peculiar is that this temporary "awakening of conscience" did not affect the Saudi religious establishment. On the contrary, the efforts of Saudi scholars were focused on declaring the illegitimacy of Jihād in Iraq against America, both during and after the invasion. They proclaimed the invalidity of its banner and harped on the theme of recklessness that led people to Guantanamo. This harping even extended to independent scholars, prominent pioneers of the great Saḥwah. For example, Shaykh Salmān al-ʿAwdah surprised us

with his "fiqh of the personal project" during an interview on an Arab satellite channel during the war. When asked about the legitimacy of going for Jihād in Iraq and whether it was an individual obligation (farīdah) because the enemy had occupied the heartland, he evaded the answer. Instead, he spoke to us of a strange matter: that if the enemy invades, it is not incumbent upon the entire Ummah to go and defend. Rather, everyone should be preoccupied with their "personal project," which might be da‘wah to Allāh, a university graduation project, publishing a magazine, a job, perhaps a marriage project, or even reading a book. He went so far as to say, even if the "personal project" was a session of contemplation!

I do not know contemplation of what?! Is it contemplation of honor being violated, or of lives being taken?! Or of Kufr (disbelief) flourishing all around him, even where he sits, prays, and contemplates?!

This was from one of the independent scholars, let alone the flood of fatāwā from the official imāms of the Two Holy Mosques and the "counter-terrorism jurists" on satellite channels – the scholars of the Sulṭān in Saudi Arabia.

And so it was. The evidence, as I said, could fill a large, independent "black book" on the role of the official religious establishment in Arab and Muslim lands in supporting the "Third Crusades" and combating those who resisted them. And to Allāh belongs the command, before and after!

Today, the official Saudi establishment is at the forefront of institutions lying in wait for Jihād and the Mujāhidīn, especially in Saudi Arabia. Matters have escalated to the opening of media centers to consolidate the efforts of thinkers and scholars in "combating terrorism," with the Saudi government and its client scholars believing that this will alter the plot America has hatched for the Saudi regime, which it has decreed for change, and for the map of the Arabian Peninsula, which it has decreed for division. The Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) spoke the

truth when he said:

“Whoever aids an oppressor in his oppression, Allāh will give that oppressor power over him!”

In conclusion, I say:

Understanding the power equations in the conflict between Islām and Muslims on one side, and the Crusader campaigns on the other, constitutes a fundamental element of the Jihādī ‘aqīdah. It is a necessary foundation for seeking correct methods of resistance by which the Jihādī elite can lead the Ummah to stand with them in confronting these invading campaigns, performing this obligation (farīḍah), and ultimately achieving victory, by Allāh’s permission.

After reviewing the Crusader campaigns, especially the Second and Third, we move to the next chapter, which is a review of the history of the Islamic Saḥwah and its schools.

This Saḥwah bore the responsibility of confronting colonialism since the classical religious authority of the Muslims dissolved and lost its role in confronting it, after we were faced with rulers from our own kin, and scholars and Islamists at the forefront of their armies and security apparatuses. So, on to Chapter Five, by Allāh’s permission.

A Brief Overview of the Contemporary Islamic Saḥwah

(1930 - 2003 CE)

Allāh the Exalted said:

{So why were there not among the generations before you those of enduring discrimination forbidding corruption on earth} (Hūd: 116)

Abū Dāwūd narrated from Thawbān that the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “The nations are about to call each other [to attack] you as diners call one another to a dish.” Someone asked: “Will that be because of our small number at that time?” He said: “Rather, you will be numerous at that time, but you will be like scum, like the scum of the torrent. And Allāh will remove the fear of you from the hearts of your enemies and cast weakness (al-wahn) into your hearts.” Someone asked: “O Messenger of Allāh, what is al-wahn?” He said: “Love of the world and hatred of death.”

And the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “Islām began as something strange and will return to being strange as it began, so glad tidings (ṭūbā) to the strangers.”

The Ottoman Khilāfah officially fell in 1924, after a phase of decline that began in the early nineteenth century, and it had effectively died by the early twentieth century. The Crusader states had chipped away at its peripheries and then divided its legacy when this fall was declared.

The stirrings of an Islamic Saḥwah had begun to emerge since the mid-eighteenth century. Some of its pioneers attempted to restore and reform the Ottoman state, cooperating with its righteous elements and with the earnest reform efforts of Sultān ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd. However, "the perfumer could not mend what time had corrupted." The state fell, the colonial era began, and the Khilāfah has been absent ever since – for 79 years now. This earthquake triggered a reaction in the Islamic world, which resulted in the birth of an Islamic Saḥwah of diverse leanings and

objectives, all ultimately seeking to restore the Khilāfah, reinstate Islamic rule, and achieve an Islamic renaissance (Nahḍah).

The most prominent emerging schools and centers of the Saḥwah were as follows:

- The Muslim Brotherhood School:

Founded by Shaykh Ḥasan al-Bannā (may Allāh have mercy on him) in 1928. It adopted the restoration of the Khilāfah as its slogan and goal. Ḥasan al-Bannā summarized his movement's program and method in his saying and slogan:

"Allāh is our objective. The Messenger is our role model. The Qur'ān is our constitution. Jihād is our path. Death in the way of Allāh is our highest aspiration."

The Muslim Brotherhood spread throughout Egypt, entering most of its cities and villages, and became the largest of the contemporary groups in Egypt and its surroundings. Within a short period, it spread to the Levant. A number of Islamic societies and movements joined it, and it attracted many cadres and personalities, growing until its base numbered in the tens of thousands. It then expanded to various Arab and Islamic countries, where groups emerged either under the same name or local names, but all originating from the same principles and based on the same foundations. The methodology of the Muslim Brotherhood's da'wah can be summarized as a movement that combined some Salafī ideas, some Ṣūfī principles, a Jihādī inclination, and an organizational activist structure, along with clear political orientations, in addition to features of nationalist spirit and patriotic sentiment. Depending on the circumstances of each country, the Brotherhood engaged in political activity and contested elections. They had Jihādī contributions in Palestine and against the English in Egypt. Over time, they developed their own shaykhs, writings, and extensive library. They also adopted a distinct

methodology (manhaj) that evolved over time, its features changing, and they practiced education (tarbiyah) and da‘wah accordingly.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement is rightly considered, as they call it, the "mother group" for most political fundamentalist movements, and even many Jihādī movements, in the Arab and Islamic world. The Muslim Brotherhood gave birth to movements with other names, and youth gatherings adopted its ideology, giving themselves local names, but they were all groups that emerged from the same "cloak."

Among those groups that emerged independently in their respective countries following this model were: - The Sudanese National Front - The Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia, which later changed its name to the Ennahda Movement - The Hamas Movement in Algeria, founded by Mahfoud Nahnah, which transformed into the Movement of Society for Peace - The Algerian Renaissance Movement - The Reform and Renewal Movement in Morocco - The Islamic Vanguard Movement, founded by Shaykh Issam al-Attar in Germany, which spread among immigrants and students in Europe, and so on.

- Movements ideologically close to the Muslim Brotherhood's methodology: In some countries of the Islamic world, such as the Salvation Party in Turkey (which changed its name to the Welfare Party, then the Virtue Party), the Jamā‘at-e-Islāmī in Pakistan, and similar groups in Muslim Southeast Asia.
- Ḥizb ut-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī (The Islamic Liberation Party):
Founded by the Palestinian Shaykh Muḥammad an-Nabhānī. It originated in Jordan and Palestine, and Ḥizb ut-Taḥrīr spread in the 1940s. It also raised the slogan of the Khilāfah but was distinguished by being more inclined towards political education and guidance. It proposed the theory of establishing the Islamic State after securing support (nuṣrah) and power

(shawkah) for the da‘wah, which should migrate to a place where this could be achieved. It made Jihād contingent upon achieving this, leaned towards clandestine work, and adopted the principle of coup d'état in some countries.

- Educational Reformist Schools:

These adopted the spread of religious awareness and scholarly grounding to rebuild the infrastructure in Muslim societies, such as the Association of Muslim ‘Ulamā’ in Algeria. These schools prepared the ground for a political vision based on the concept of civilizational and civil resistance to colonialism, leading to qualifying the people for Jihād.

- Tablighī Jamā‘at and Da‘wah Groups:

And similar groups in method and approach. These movements originated in the Indian subcontinent. Their idea is based on reforming the individual Muslim at the level of worship (‘ibādāt) and conduct, establishing a foundation of Sharī‘ah basics, and dedicating oneself to this, away from the arenas and clashes of politics, so that the movement can spread without hindrance from authorities. The movement expanded and gained millions of followers and devotees (murīdīn). Its core idea is that its affiliate dedicates a part of his time—daily, weekly, monthly, and annually—to go out fī sabīl Allāh (in the path of Allāh) on da‘wah journeys from mosque to mosque, where they meet people and call them to righteousness, religion, and commitment.

- Salafī Movements and Schools of Ahl al-Ḥadīth:

These movements found that many innovations (bida‘) had infiltrated the beliefs of Muslims, while many Sunnahs had been abandoned in their place. They perceived that the extent of polytheistic practices (shirkīyyāt) and deviations had nullified the original, correct creed for most Muslims, to the point where they were almost outside its principles. They believed the path to success (falāḥ) lay primarily in calling for the purification and correction of

Tawḥīd as the basis for reforming the individual and society, which would automatically lead to society becoming qualified for the establishment of Islamic rule. Most Salafī movements in the Arab and Islamic world resembled a scholarly, educational method. The adoption by the Third Saudi State, led by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and his allies thereafter, of the Wahhābī da‘wah to "trade with it" (exploit it for political gain) in the Arabian Peninsula—a story touched upon in previous chapters—led to an alliance between the governmental and private religious establishment and the government. This contributed to an active movement of teaching in universities and the establishment of official and private societies and institutions to spread the da‘wah and the ideas of its founder, his descendants, and subsequent scholars of the da‘wah. It also led to the revival of the heritage of Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah and other imāms of the Salafī da‘wah, such as Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Shāṭibī, and others. The publication of these works and those based on them further increased the spread of the Salafī da‘wah and the schools of Ahl al-Ḥadīth in the Arab and Islamic world. Indeed, Allāh may support this religion with a dissolute man and with people who have no share [of good].

Subsequently, new movements were born through the merging of ideas from different movements. Thus, the movement called "Surūrism" (Surūriyyah), named after one of its proponents, emerged, representing a blend of the Muslim Brotherhood's activist thought and Salafī orientation. Similarly, the current known as "al-Salafiyyah al-Jihādiyyah" (Jihādī Salafism) was born, a branch of Quṭbist thought and Salafī da‘wah – contemporary schools born from older ones. Likewise, some activist Ṣūfī groups emerged, blending spiritual education (tarbiyah), Sufism, and political orientations, as seen in North Africa and elsewhere.

During this period (1930 - 2000) that we are briefly analyzing, some Jihādī Ṣūfī movements also emerged, such as those that arose in the Indian subcontinent, Central Russia, and North Africa during this period.

Thus, many Islamic preachers (du‘āt), scholars (‘ulamā’), orators (khuṭabā’), writers, and thinkers influenced the paths of the Saḥwah according to their activities and contributions. Phenomena of religiosity and a return to commitment spread, such as the prevalence of the ḥijāb and beards, and other manifestations of observance. The printing, publishing, and trade of various Islamic books flourished, as did the publication of Islamic magazines and newspapers. Many mosques became active with da‘wah, circles of knowledge (‘ilm), remembrance (dhikr), and reform. Private institutions and societies engaged in various forms of righteousness (birr) and piety (taqwā). Various types of Islamists, both groups and individuals, entered the arena of political, intellectual, and literary life. Numerous violent clashes also occurred between Islamists and some governments. In short, the phenomenon of the Islamic Saḥwah imposed itself on Muslim societies and became a prominent landmark in their contemporary history.

The Main Phases of the Islamic Saḥwah:

The path of the Islamic Saḥwah, from its inception to the present day, can be distinguished into four main phases in terms of its activist and methodological structure, performance, and general characteristics in each stage:

The First Phase (1930 - 1965): The Emergence Phase

This can be called the (Pre-Crystallization) phase. The most important characteristic of this phase is that the general features of the Saḥwah were mixed in terms of methodological composition, especially in its mainstream current, such as the Muslim Brotherhood movement. In it and similar movements, Ṣūfī influences, stemming from the classical structure of the Ummah's religious authority during the

Ottoman era, were mixed with Salafī influences that arrived with the winds of renewal (tajdīd) and reform (iṣlāḥ), the most prominent of which was the birth and spread of the Wahhābī da‘wah in the Arabian Peninsula since the eighteenth century, and the contemporary proponents of this school in other regions. This was blended with nationalist sentiments that appeared in the late Ottoman Empire as a reaction to the policy of "Turkification" that characterized its final period, which spurred other peoples, especially Arabs and others, towards nationalist fervor (‘aṣabiyyah) and rallying around it. The schools and trends of the Ṣaḥwah were also characterized by inflamed national sentiment because the phase was one of confronting colonialism. It was also marked by the method of education (tarbiyah) and behavioral reform.

This period was relatively rich in foundational writings for these schools. Most symbols and groups of the Ṣaḥwah also practiced Jihād in one form or another against the colonizers, either through armed Jihād or through civil resistance and political action.

The Second Phase (1965 - 1990): Crystallization and Differentiation of the Ṣaḥwah movements:

This occurred during the post-independence phase under national governments characterized by secularism and subservience to colonialism after its departure, as we discussed in previous chapters. The winds of Westernization blew, and the frenzy of intellectual invasion was unleashed, spreading secular doctrines, nationalist and patriotic currents, and Western-originated political and intellectual schools such as democracy, socialism, capitalism, communism, and others. Due to the establishment of governments based on concepts contradicting Dīn and their natural clash with various schools of the Ṣaḥwah (Awakening) – which had played

the primary role in confronting colonialism – these secular currents were able to reap the fruits of the efforts of those Ṣaḥwah movements and the peoples who had waged Jihād against colonialism under the banner of Islām. Methodological problems arose for the Ṣaḥwah as a result of the new situation, along with Fiqhī (jurisprudential) issues requiring it to define a political, Sharīʿah-based, and practical stance. The rulers were outwardly Muslims, but in reality, they governed by other than what Allāh revealed. They and their aides killed those who enjoined justice among the people. They allied with the kuffār and assisted them against the Muslims! Parts of Muslim lands remained occupied, especially Palestine with its chronic problem and the treacherous stance of the governments towards it. There was the issue of clashing with the authorities versus appeasing them, separating from them versus making peace with them, or disassociating from them and confronting them. Or was it to engage with them through the gateway of "legitimate," "legal," and "constitutional" practices? These circumstances forced the Ṣaḥwah to differentiate its ranks and crystallize based on its position on these issues and its method of dealing with the apostate, ruling, tyrannical authorities. Among the intellectual and ʿaqīdah (creedal) issues raised... the Ṣaḥwah thus split into four main schools. The Ṣaḥwah continued to grow and contribute, but through differentiation in its structure and methodologies. These schools are:

1. Non-political Ṣaḥwah

These are the schools, currents, and groups that saw safety for the path of Daʿwah and its adherents in shunning politics and working through Daʿwah and reform, each according to its capacity. Despite the differing, and perhaps entirely contradictory, perspectives of each of these schools, they converged on the point of shunning politics and staying away from its arena in the face of the problems confronting the Ummah. Among these non-political schools were most Ṣūfī movements, their mosques, and their leaders, who returned to adopting the

principle of behavioral upbringing, 'ibādah (worship), and rectifying the individual's relationship with their Lord. This reached a point where one of their major figures in Bilād al-Shām – the Shaykh of the Qādiriyyah ṭarīqah in Syria and its surroundings at the time – would instruct his followers upon joining the ṭarīqah to pray two rak'ahs he had innovated for them, in which the worshipper would make the intention, saying: "I pray to Allāh the Exalted two rak'ahs, the sunnah of abandoning politics... Allāhu Akbar," and then begin the ṣalāh.

Among these non-political schools is Jamā'at al-Tablīgh wa al-Da'wah, with its branches, mosques, callers, and itinerant followers in the path of Da'wah. Their guides and officials ensure that politics and its issues do not seep into their mosques and conferences!!

Also participating in shunning politics were the schools termed "al-Salafiyyah al-'Ilmiyyah" (Scientific Salafism), which dedicated themselves to correcting 'aqā'id (creeds) and striving to spread Sharī'ah knowledge, particularly in Ḥadīth and its sciences, 'aqā'id and its branches, and other areas of Sharī'ah sciences based on that. From this emerged the school of Shaykh al-Albānī under the slogan "al-Taṣfiyah wa al-Tarbiyah" (Purification and Education).

Among the schools that turned to thought, research, and education was what came to be known as "al-Quṭbiyyah" (Qutbism) – specifically, "al-Quṭbiyyah al-'Ilmiyyah al-Salafiyyah" (Scientific Salafi Qutbism). This school adopted the intellectual methodology of Professor Muḥammad Quṭb and many intellectual aspects of his brother, the Shahīd (martyr) Sayyid Quṭb (may Allāh have mercy on him), while setting aside his political, activist methodology. Some of these schools were characterized by quasi-activist educational Ṣūfism, such as Jamā'at al-'Adl wa al-Iḥsān in Morocco, and similar groups. I draw attention here to what I mentioned in the introduction: I am not here to present a critical study from methodological and

structural aspects, nor to list positives and negatives, but rather to provide a general classification.

As I said, these schools, despite their differences and contradictions, converged on an idea summarized as follows:

Changing the conditions and reviving the Ummah depends on reforming the individual. If the individual is reformed, society will be reformed, and its rulers will be reformed – “As you are, so will you be ruled.” As for the Ummah's local and external problems, they have no concern with them, “and none but Allāh can avert it”!

As for the differences between these various schools in the method of reforming the individual: one sees it as behavioral, another as creedal, educational, or intellectual, and so on. These trends were unable to present a logical vision for a mechanism that would generate a solution to the existing problems through this upbringing, nor its duration or stages. The most that the esteemed Professor Muḥammad Quṭb expressed in one of his books in the early nineties, titled Ḥawla Taṭbīq al-Sharīʿah (Regarding the Application of Sharīʿah), after presenting the method of تربية (upbringing) for the "solid base," was, as I recall him stating: "And when the solid base extends and becomes a hard nut that resists breaking... one day... Allāh's relief will come to it, and its state will be established, and then people will enter Allāh's Dīn in droves...!!!"

As for Shaykh al-Albānī – "and I am still in the process of definition and example, not evaluation and commentary" – his last fatāwā condemned Jihād and the Mujāhidīn in confronting governments, with his famous fatwā: "Revolting against the rulers in this era is, in reality, revolting against Islām!!!!" Similarly, the propositions of Ṣūfī and reformist groups also revolve in the realms of the unseen regarding change and its mechanism. It seems to me that the brutality of governments and their way of dealing with the Ṣaḥwah in all countries in the late fifties and early sixties

contributed significantly to the formulation of the non-political schools of the Ṣaḥwah, although one cannot deny that sincerity and concern for the safety of the Da‘wah and its adherents were often the reason behind this methodology. And Allāh the Exalted knows best.

2. Political Ṣaḥwah

These schools of the Ṣaḥwah were, from their outset, in complete contrast to the previous ones. These groups described the situation more accurately. They said that the Ummah's problems, whether internal or external in origin, are political problems, and solutions must be sought through the practice of politics.

Furthermore, it is an injustice, and even a creedal error, to remove politics from Dīn under any pretext. The solution is not to shun politics to avoid clashing with authorities and their brutality, but rather to storm the political arena through the legitimate and legal channels provided by the authorities, each according to its context. This is done by forming Islamic political parties, political and semi-political associations, engaging in intellectual, literary, and political activity, entering the electoral and democratic arena if available, or infiltrating the apparatuses of authorities and oppositions as feasible and according to the conditions of each country. The banners of this political Ṣaḥwah were carried by al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood) parties and similar groups, and movements that emerged from them, whether under the same name or local designations. This phase (1965-1990), and perhaps a little earlier in countries that gained independence early like Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, and Turkey, witnessed many experiments in "Islamic" democracies! These experiments continued into the early nineties and persist, but after the establishment of the New World Order, they entered a new phase which we will discuss later, Inshā‘Allāh. Among these political experiments are:

- The experience of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn and Islamists in parliamentary elections in Syria shortly after independence in 1946 until the early fifties, leading to the era of military coups in the mid-fifties and early sixties.
- The experience of elections and parliamentary life in the last days of the monarchy in Egypt before ‘Abd al-Nāṣir's coup in 1952.

Political life in most of the Arab and Islamic world then witnessed a phase of military and party dictatorships during the sixties and seventies. This phase was a period of collision between the Ṣaḥwah and the authorities. Most du‘āt (callers), and even politicians among them, spent a portion of their lives in prisons, emerging with more developed democratic ideas.

Anwar al-Sādāt's era in Egypt saw an opening after he succeeded ‘Abd al-Nāṣir in the early seventies. He opened prison doors for Islamists to counter the growing leftist tide, so al-Ikhwān and other Ṣaḥwah figures entered party political life in Egypt.

- Then, King Ḥusayn in Jordan licensed al-Ikhwān and a number of Islamic groups to operate, and this developed in the late eighties into participation in parliamentary life. Some even entered the government and ministries.
- In the monarchies of the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and Morocco, Islamists and some Ṣaḥwah schools formed part of the royal authority's entourage, especially in Saudi Arabia.
- Kuwait then began its parliamentary experiment as the first Gulf state where Islamists entered political life as parties.
- The Islamic Tendency in Tunisia, led by al-Ghannūshī, also underwent a tragic experience.

- The National Islamic Front in Sudan, led by al-Turābī, allied with Ja‘far al-Numayrī and became part of the government, then led a coup and ruled Sudan, then returned to the opposition.
- Similarly, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn and their counterparts in the Ṣaḥwah current had their parliamentary party experience in Yemen.
- However, the most prominent Arab democratic experiment was what happened in Algeria after the opening initiated by President al-Shādhilī and the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), whose experience serves as a highly significant lesson.
- On the Islamic level, the most prominent experiment, and closest to the Arab world, was that of Jamā‘at-e-Islāmī in Pakistan. It entered the democratic party experiment early on and continues to this day.
- Likewise, the experience of the National Salvation Party (Millî Selamet Partisi) in Turkey since the sixties, which brought its leader Erbakan to power twice: first as Deputy Prime Minister in the mid-sixties, and the second, more importantly, in 1996 when it won a parliamentary majority and Erbakan became Prime Minister in 1995. In both instances, the military overthrew the experiment.

Overall, most Islamist contributions to political life remained in the opposition, forming a small part of its strength in legislative parliaments. In rare cases, they reached executive power, as in (Jordan, Algeria, Turkey), but in all cases, their claws were clipped, and they were distanced from the centers of influence and decision-making.

- With the beginning of the nineties, many non-political schools – Ṣūfī, Salafī, Tablīgh wa al-Da‘wah, and others – followed their predecessors from al-Ikhwān and their counterparts into parliamentary practice. Democracy

infiltrated most components of the Islamic Ṣaḥwah, as we shall see, and we will comment on this experience in the following section, Inshā'Allāh.

3. Jihādī Ṣaḥwah

Shortly after the establishment of post-independence governments on the basis of ruling by other than what Allāh revealed and allegiance to the Eastern and Western colonial powers that appointed them, various segments of the Ṣaḥwah clashed with them. Most governments practiced a policy of oppression, killing, imprisonment, and abuse. These conditions began to interact and reinforce their consequences on all levels of political, economic, and social life. The seeds of revolution against that reality and the motivations for Jihād began to form in the thought of the Islamic Ṣaḥwah.

In the early sixties, a number of early thinkers and du'āt concluded that the Ummah's problems were longstanding: foremost among them was the rule of kufr (disbelief) and allegiance to enemies, not to mention aggression, injustice, occupation, plunder of wealth, and so on and so forth. These are problems whose persistence the enemy guards through its deputies with the force of arms, iron, and fire, prison chains, and executioners' whips. They concluded that the requirement of Allāh's Dīn in such circumstances is for Jihād to be a farḍ 'ayn (individual obligation) – firstly, to establish the rule of Allāh in the land, and secondly, in defense of the Dīn, lives, wealth, and honor. Thus, the harbingers of Jihādī thought began to form, مطرحing concepts like Ḥākimiyyah (Allāh's sovereignty), al-Walā' wa al-Barā' (allegiance and disavowal), differentiation, and separation.

The undisputed pioneer of this Ṣaḥwah was the master and teacher Sayyid Quṭb (may Allāh have mercy on him). Professor Abū al-A'ālā al-Mawdūdī (may Allāh have mercy on him) in Pakistan also made a unique contribution. Contributions followed, and the primary foundation for activist Jihādī thought was formed, which soon

spread, and its nuclei began to form in Egypt, then al-Shām (the Levant), then North Africa, and elsewhere. Experiments followed, as will be detailed somewhat in the next two chapters, Inshā'Allāh.

4. Deviant and Aberrant Ṣaḥwah

As a result of the clashes between the various preceding schools of the Ṣaḥwah and the ṭawāghīt (tyrants) of the Arabs and non-Arabs among the rulers of Muslim lands, a deviant, aberrant current was born in those tragic circumstances, represented by what became known as the current of Takfīr (excommunication), or al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah (Excommunication and Migration), as the media named it. It initially emerged in Egypt, but its seeds were found in every environment whose conditions resembled the period in which it was born there.

Most rulers openly displayed various forms of kufr (disbelief) and riddah (apostasy), from ruling and legislating by other than what Allāh revealed to allegiance to the kuffār, and other consequences thereof. These rulers employed police, aides, intelligence agencies, security forces, and oppressive apparatuses. Governments established prisons and torture chambers without accountability or oversight. Each ruler also propped himself up with a crutch of "soothsayers and magicians" (compliant scholars) who would testify to his ranks of Islām, Īmān (faith), and Iḥsān (excellence), and to the legitimacy of his regime, bestowing upon him the rights due to a legitimate Sharʿī ruler. Meanwhile, many figures of the political and non-political Ṣaḥwah inclined towards sycophancy and faltered in speaking the truth. Some even dared to enter the structures and apparatuses of power. The Ṣaḥwah was characterized by an inability to confront that reality, while at the same time, most of the Ummah's populace was immersed in a consumerist, heedless, and frivolous life. Naturally, among the youth of the Ṣaḥwah were those who possessed fervent enthusiasm and intense jealousy for Allāh's Dīn, matched by

their share of ignorance of the sciences of Dīn, its principles, and its regulations, as well as a lack of experience in Fiqh al-Wāqī‘ (understanding of reality) and its data.

One of them would look at a kāfir ruler, and a jailer violating honor, shedding blood, and cursing Allāh, His Messenger, and His Dīn without shame or fear. The tormented youth saw that there was no doubt these were kuffār – and undoubtedly, this was a correct conclusion. Then the youth looked at hypocritical ‘ulamā’ (scholars) who knew all this yet testified to its legitimacy and justified it. They said, there is no doubt about the kufr of these who concealed what Allāh revealed and exchanged it for a paltry price. Then they looked at incapable, sycophantic, and retreating Ṣaḥwah leaders. They asked them about this kufr and its rulings, and the ruling on those who perpetrated it. The du‘āt and Ṣaḥwah leaders condemned this misguidance as fisq (transgression) and ḡulm (injustice), but they did not dare, or did not conclude, to declare it kufr. So they judged these regimes and their apparatuses as Islamic, merely unjust and transgressive. Here, an intellectual shock occurred in the minds of some youth, so they applied the known principle, "Whoever does not declare a kāfir to be a kāfir is himself a kāfir," at all levels, ignorant that this principle applies to the kufr of one whose disbelief is unanimously agreed upon without interpretation or deduction, such as Jews, Christians, and Magians. They misapplied it to anyone who did not declare those rulers kuffār, and the wretched chain (of Takfīr) continued. So, anyone who did not declare kāfir those whom they declared kāfir, has himself become a kāfir...

Due to a lack of knowledge, coupled with fervor, tension, and prison conditions, the ideology of Takfīr was born. And due to ignorance and for the same aforementioned reasons, they differed on the limits of Takfīr, so they declared each other kuffār. From here, various schools and groups emerged, differing in the principles of Takfīr and their expansion of it...

On the periphery of these ideas, these individuals looked at societies and the vices and corruption in which most people were immersed. Thus, the idea of the jāhiliyyah of these societies was born. Then, some of them declared these societies kuffār because they appeased their rulers, did not bother to learn their Dīn, and fell into nullifiers of faith due to their ignorance and lack of effort to understand their Dīn. The idea of separating from these societies to live in isolated communities, where the inhabitants would raise themselves and their children on Dīn and virtue, was proposed, giving birth to the idea of Hijrah... This was often compounded by isolation, ignorance, and the injustice they suffered from the authorities and their scholars, then from the Ṣaḥwah and its leadership, and then from the people and society... Thus, the phenomenon worsened... The angles of deviation within it varied... Some of these groups considered themselves "the Jamā'ah of Muslims" and declared all others kuffār... Others hesitated due to some knowledge they possessed or some fear of piously issuing a ruling of Takfīr, so they began to research the excuses of ignorance to mitigate these rulings for some. Opinions differed in interpreting the texts of early scholars regarding the excuse of ignorance, its limits, and its conditions. So, they issued rulings at times and paused for clarification at others, giving birth to what are called "At-Tawaqquf wa at-Tabayyun" (Suspension and Verification) groups... The seventies and eighties witnessed the availability of growth factors for these deviant currents, which harmed Islam, Muslims, the Ṣaḥwah, and themselves. They provided a golden opportunity for the enemy to undermine the popularity of the Jihādī current and the entire Islamic Ṣaḥwah, as the government accused anyone they wished to destroy of belonging to this despised current, which was isolated by the common Muslims, both righteous and corrupt.

This is a summary of the story of Takfīr within the Ṣaḥwah circles, where the equation for its generation can be summarized as follows:

A kāfir oppressive ruler + a murderous criminal executioner + a scholar hypocritically subservient to the Sultan + an incapable Ṣaḥwah + a populace largely overcome by corruption + enthusiastic, ignorant, oppressed youth = ... the birth of the Takfir current.

And as is always the way of Shayṭān... some leaders of this current sought some knowledge and returned to searching the books of the ancients for what would support their principles and ideas. Thus, this current came to have its deviant emirs and fuqahā' and its misguided publications... Violence became predominant among its followers in all situations. Intelligence agencies lured some of them, where they found an outlet for indulging in the blood of innocents, then the blood of each other, and the blood of those whom the intelligence agencies wanted to draw in to destroy them, and to destroy Jihād, the Ṣaḥwah, and the future of Islam as they wished, as will be detailed somewhat in the upcoming two chapters, inshā'Allāh.

Thus, these four schools of the Ṣaḥwah crystallized. With increased communication during this period through all means of contact, these schools spread in Arab countries according to their precedence in gaining independence and the spread of the Ṣaḥwah within them. They also spread in some countries neighboring the Arab world, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and parts of Africa... As a result of the massive wave of emigration that pushed millions of young Muslim students and workers to diaspora communities in Europe, America, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere... many cadres, leaders, and du'āt of the Islamic Ṣaḥwah from its various schools emigrated to Western countries and others, as a result of oppression and persecution. They established Islamic centers and mosques. Many community groups and institutions also went there without coercion, but rather with the intention of spreading da'wah and Islam. So these four Ṣaḥwah schools spread within the diaspora communities. As a result of the available freedom and the availability of means of communication and publication... Ṣaḥwah centers in the West contributed to re-exporting their

developed thought and experiences. They came to have their own newspapers, magazines, and means of communication, and the Islamic Şaḥwah in the diaspora became an important part that contributed to advancing its course, enriching it, and increasing its contributions on all levels. The West and diaspora communities also became a stage for the presence of all Şaḥwah schools found in the Islamic world.

The Third Phase (1990-2000): The Crisis Stage

The last decade of the twentieth century, following the launch of the New World Order, was a critically important juncture in the history of the Islamic Şaḥwah, with all its four schools and the various aspects within each school. It was also a period of our confrontation with the ṭawāghīt of Arab and Muslim lands. As we indicated in the previous chapter, the beginning of this decade witnessed the launch of the New World Order and its selection of Islam, and the Islamic Şaḥwah in particular, as a strategic, civilizational, doctrinal, and even military adversary to Western civilization, after its leadership had passed to America and its followers from NATO European countries.

The policy of the West in confronting the Şaḥwah, through the agency of rulers and their various apparatuses during this decade, can be summarized in the following brief points. We will list them and then follow with a summary of the trajectory of each of the four aforementioned schools: the Apolitical, the Political, the Jihādī, and the Takfirī. The confrontation by rulers and the West against the Şaḥwah was characterized by the following:

1. Striking the Jihādī trend of the Şaḥwah by promoting its "moderate" counterpart, as defined by their standards.
2. Expanding the base of "moderate" fundamentalism (according to their concept) by widening the door of democratic participation for Islamists to

enter state institutions, in order to achieve the aforementioned goal in the previous point.

3. Assisting the Takfīr current to emerge and cloning takfīrī seeds under intelligence sponsorship. And adopting a media policy to conflate Takfīr with Jihād in order to isolate the Jihādīs from the Ummah and cause discord between them. This was applied in Algeria (1993-1997) and succeeded...
4. Launching an "American-style Islamists" campaign through the media in an onslaught of Westernization and moral decay, in order to dismantle the fundamentalist roots of Islam that ensure the generation of seeds of resistance.
5. Launching a security "counter-terrorism" campaign against the Jihādī current.
6. Launching a political and media "counter-terrorism" campaign against the Jihādī current, using the official religious establishment as a primary front, supported by sectors of "moderate Islam."

Let us examine the impact of these confrontational policies on the trajectory of each of the four Ṣaḥwah schools during the last decade of the 20th century.

1. The Non-Political Ṣaḥwah (1990-2000)

Perhaps the most prominent features of what befell the schools of this Ṣaḥwah – such as some Sufi, Salafi, Da‘wah, and reformist schools – during this decade are two:

The first: The politicization of many of its figures and groups over time, and their entry into partisan and parliamentary work through the doors of democracy, which governments opened wide to achieve the ulterior goal of fragmenting the Ṣaḥwah and making its three other schools stand in a state of siege and confrontation against the Jihādī current. Many figures from Sufism, Tablīgh, and Salafism entered

the democratic and electoral field, either as independents or as parliamentary blocs and gatherings in various Arab and Islamic countries that opened this path.

The second: The revival of the doctrine of Irjā' with a contemporary political dimension and identity among the various schools of this Şaḥwah, despite their doctrinal contradictions, from the furthest extents of Sufism to the furthest extents of Salafism. This involved redirecting focus towards the ruler's declared Islam and Īmān, and separating this identity of his from his method of governance, policies, and public and private practices.

The aim, it seems, was to lift the Shar'ī impediment to participating in the government's legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, an impediment caused by declaring such participation as upholding kufr.

Thus, the base of these schools, in their apolitical capacity, began to shrink. They began to practically overlap in their political, and consequently Shar'ī, propositions with the other school (the Political Şaḥwah) that had preceded them in these practices by several decades. These blocs formed a real competitor within the ranks of the Islamic Şaḥwah to the political school of the Muslim Brotherhood and their likes in some countries, especially when some of them entered into electoral alliances with secular currents!!!!. In other cases, numerous alliances occurred between the two Islamic schools (the newly politicized and the originally political) to form large Islamic blocs and working fronts to confront the ruling political current or the secular opposition.

2. The Political Şaḥwah (1990-2000)

The period (1970-1990) witnessed an increase in the intensity of confrontations between various Şaḥwah schools and Arab and Islamic governments and their security agencies. This included military clashes of Jihādīs with governments, as happened in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and elsewhere, or the clashes of

political du‘āt and some prominent scholars and preachers with governments... These confrontations resulted in the expansion of the Islamic Ṣaḥwah's popularity in general, and the spread of Jihādī thought and its popular base in particular. As I mentioned, governments, their Western advisors, and those managing the present and future of those regimes saw that matters were heading towards a dangerous point. So, the cunning plan their minds concocted, after the phase of filling prisons and mass graves with Islamists, was political openness towards them. Rulers thus made way for Islamists to enter the game of democracy and participate in it, either as Islamists, or under the banners of licensed secular parties... or as independents. This decade (1990-2000) witnessed a significant shift in the practices and methodologies of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated schools in order to justify those political practices. Many books and research papers were authored. Articles were written and enthusiastic speeches were delivered encouraging this direction, advocating for taking advantage of "legitimate channels" and "available opportunities," and so on with such justifications... The Muslim Brotherhood, its branches, and some other Islamic blocs participated in municipal elections in most Arab and Islamic countries. They also participated in parliamentary elections, as happened in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Kuwait... They entered semi-governmental institutions in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in various capacities. The parliamentary experiment was launched in Tunisia and Morocco, as well as Mauritania and Algeria at the end of that past decade. Similar developments occurred in most countries of the Islamic world, notably the most famous of those experiments in Pakistan and Turkey...

The most important of these experiments, in terms of their scale and political significance, were what occurred in Tunisia, Pakistan, then Algeria, and finally Turkey... whereby the authorities, at the end of this decade and the end of the 20th century, became convinced of the necessity of closing this door and returning to confrontation with all schools of the Ṣaḥwah using an eradicationist approach, as we

will see, inshā'Allāh, in paragraph (Fourthly) concerning the stages of the Ṣaḥwah. However, it is worth mentioning here that the methodologies of the Muslim Brotherhood and its branches of Islamic movements witnessed an overturning of many fundamentals of the methodology built on the ideas of its early founders like Ḥasan al-Bannā, 'Abd al-Qādir 'Awdah, and especially Sayyid Quṭb (may Allāh the Exalted have mercy on them). The angle of methodological deviation widened due to loitering at the gates of Sultans and accepting positions in their secular institutions, which are based on the principles of apostasy, legislation without Allāh's permission, and allegiance to disbelievers and enemies of this Ummah...

We will address the issue of democracy in more detail and its impact in Chapter Eight, inshā'Allāh.

3. The Jihādī Ṣaḥwah (1990-2000)

The Jihādī Ṣaḥwah – as we will see in the next chapter in some detail, inshā'Allāh – had engaged in real and extensive confrontations with some governments during the seventies and eighties. In these, it suffered many casualties, its popular base expanded, and it became subject to security pursuits of an intelligence nature... The Afghan gateway, opened for Jihād since the year (1984) for the Islamic Ṣaḥwah in general and the Jihādī Ṣaḥwah in particular, had tempted most of its leaders to go to Afghanistan, where they underwent a unique experience during (1984-1992). The security storm orchestrated by America, executed by Pakistan, and followed up by Arab and European countries shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of America's need for Islamist support against the Russians, resulted in the dispersal of most Jihādī cadres and those wanted by security services in their home countries (due to their clashes with their governments). They sought political asylum in Western Europe and similar places like Canada, Australia, etc., or moved to other Arab countries where their governments' hands could not reach them due to the lack of security cooperation agreements between those countries at the time...

However, successive American administrations after the Second Gulf War ("Desert Storm") laid out a comprehensive plan to confront the Jihādī current, termed the "International Confrontation to Combat Terrorism," which George W. Bush escalated into a real global war after September 2001, as we will see, inshā'Allāh...

The global counter-terrorism program during this decade can be summarized in the following points:

- Broad Outlines of Global Counter-Terrorism Programs 1990-2000:

1. Drying up financial sources.
2. Targeting Jihādī leaders and cadres with killing and capture.
3. Extradition agreements and exchange of "terrorist criminals" (Jihādīs) between different countries.
4. Eliminating safe havens and shelters for Jihādīs.
5. Shifting security cooperation from regional to international levels.
6. Expanding counter-terrorism legislation.
7. Media warfare to defame and isolate the Mujāhidīn.

Thus, this global campaign to combat terrorism, led by America, resulted in turning the leaders, cadres, and elements of Jihādī movements into individuals living under the constant fear of pursuits, assassinations, kidnappings, capture, and the closure of safe havens... The plans to dry up resources took care of cutting off their livelihoods and the sustenance of their families and children, who had roamed with them to the east and west of the earth, scattered, being scorched by the fires of this contemporary "Trench" (Ukhdūd) for the believing strangers fleeing with their Dīn.

There is an important observation, which is the emergence of a new Jihādī school during this time that can be called:

- The Phenomenon of Individual Jihād

Due to the oppressive atmosphere weighing on the conscience of the conscientious youth of this Ummah, some of them, from time to time, carried out Jihādī actions here and there, as individuals not belonging to any organization. This phenomenon is old, dating back to the arrival of the "Second Crusades" at the beginning of the 18th century (as per author's dating). For example, the action of the martyr Sulaymān al-Ḥalabī, who emigrated from Aleppo in northern Shām to Cairo, passing through Bayt al-Maqdis, where he met some scholars and obtained a fatwá to kill General Klèber, commander of the French campaign in Egypt, whom Napoleon had left as his successor when he returned to France. Sulaymān (may Allāh have mercy on him) killed him, and the incident was one of the initial reasons for the evacuation of the French campaign from Egypt. Then he (may Allāh have mercy on him) was executed, along with the scholar who issued him the fatwá. This phenomenon recurred according to circumstances.

However, during the decade (1990-2000), after the launch of the "Third Crusades" (the author's term for contemporary conflicts) and the establishment of the New World Order, these practices began to multiply and form a phenomenon and a Jihādī school worthy of attention, study, and development, as will be discussed later, inshā'Allāh. Some military personnel, civilians, and various forms of the "Crusaders'" presence were subjected to brilliant and effective individual Jihādī operations that confused the enemy and heralded the growth of seeds of resistance. If these seeds are destined to mature, I believe they will form the most important foundations of the coming confrontation, by Allāh's permission.

4. The Deviant Ṣaḥwah and the Takfīr Current (1990-2000)

It is very important for understanding the phenomenon of Takfīr to understand the equation that constitutes it, which we summarized as:

An oppressive kāfir ruler + a criminal, blood-shedding executioner + a scholar hypocritically serving the authorities + a helpless Ṣaḥwah (Awakening) + a populace predominantly characterized by corruption + an ignorant, zealous youth... = The birth of the Takfīr current.

The summary of what has happened to this phenomenon since its birth in the early seventies until today is that it remained limited and isolated, failing to gain popularity or spread, neither within the circles of the Islamic Ṣaḥwah nor among the general Muslim populace. While communication and relationships continued between various members and groups of the Ṣaḥwah in its three political, non-political, and Jihādī aspects, despite their differences and disputes—where intellectual communication, personal relationships, and even cooperation at various levels of agreement occurred—the entire Islamic Ṣaḥwah unanimously agreed on rejecting the phenomenon of Takfīr and the ideology of its proponents. This helped in its decline and contraction.

Due to the extremely malevolent nature that characterized the thought and behavior of its individuals—marked by ignorance, extremism, violence, and irrationality, in addition to deviation from the foundations of Sharīʿah—this current could not gain ground within or outside the Ṣaḥwah, except in the form of shrinking, isolated pockets here and there, ruminating on their grudges and ignorance, and undertaking the liquidation of one another. However, it is worth noting some important observations under the heading of this phenomenon:

The first observation: Although the groups of the Takfīr current declared takfīr upon the Muslim masses, their ‘ulamā’, the leaders of their Ṣaḥwah, and their callers

because they did not declare takfīr upon the rulers and their henchmen, and did not declare takfīr upon those who did not declare takfīr upon the rulers, and did not declare takfīr upon those who did not declare takfīr upon these... and so on, which is their wretched chain and the foundational premise of their ideology. Yet, the strange thing is that they did not adopt the idea of waging Jihād against the kāfir ruler, over whose disbelief they broke ties with people! The Takfīr groups were not known to have fought rulers except in a few instances. This is not to mention that they did not call for Jihād against the original kuffār among the Jews and Christians who occupied the heartlands of Muslims. Meanwhile, their hands were stained with the killing of innocent Muslims. This is what the noble tradition (athar sharīf) highlighted as one of the characteristics of these vile factions: “They leave alone the idol-worshippers and kill the people of the Qur’ān.”

The second observation: The ṭaghūtī governments, and behind them the enemies of Islam, realized the importance of this deviant current in combating Jihād and halting its Ṣaḥwah. This is due to a simple paradox:

The Jihādīs want to mobilize the Ummah and recruit it to fight external enemies from among the kuffār, such as the invading Jews, Crusaders, and pagans, and to confront the ṭawāghīt rulers who undertook to achieve their enemies' goals and fight their own Ummah. In contrast, the Takfīrīs operate from the principle of declaring takfīr upon the generality of the Ummah! So how could they wage Jihād alongside them after having stripped them of their religion!

The second important matter that those malicious rulers, their aides, their intelligence agencies, and their research centers—dedicated to warring against Islam and Muslims—realized is that pinning the accusation of Takfīr on the Jihādīs, by claiming they are Khawārij who declare takfīr upon rulers, their aides, and their ‘ulamā’... and declare takfīr upon the common people (which is a false claim), is crucial. This is because the Jihādīs, as is well-known, do not haphazardly apply

chains of takfir. They have their disciplined jurisprudence based on the well-known creeds of Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā‘ah, and their writings and media platforms are the greatest proof of this. Therefore, for governments to pin this accusation on the Jihādīs is one of the most important ways to separate them from their popular base. Consequently, they worked to demolish the clear, dividing wall between these two trends, contradictory in methodology and objectives, namely (the Jihād current) and (the Takfir phenomenon).

The third and very important observation: The intelligence agencies hostile to this Ummah, working day and night to devise means to confront its Jihādī Ṣaḥwah, when they saw the benefit of the shameful actions of Takfir—especially after their heinous crime against Jihād and the Ummah in Algeria, which was an experimental field for intelligence agencies, as I will explain in Chapter Six in a brief on the Algerian experience, in shā’ Allāh—they realized that one of the most successful means to confront Jihād and the Jihādīs, and to separate them from the Ummah, is to accuse them of Takfir. This way, people would hate them, they would become isolated, and thus it would be easy to eliminate them. This is what they applied in Algeria. When intelligence agencies studied this (Takfirī) phenomenon, they discovered the equation I referred to regarding the birth of Takfir, which arises naturally in the aforementioned environments. So, they deliberately set out to generate Takfir currents through artificial cloning in circles where Jihād was naturally expected to emerge due to colonial presence or a ṭāghūtī regime. Examples of this include what happened in Saudi Arabia since the Kuwaiti Desert Storm war, and the birth of the seeds of Jihād and resistance. The Saudi intelligence, whose Interior Minister Nāyif bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz took the former, notoriously disreputable Egyptian Interior Minister (Zakī Badr)—famous for his eradicationist theories and the brutality of his methods—and a team from Egyptian intelligence as advisors to establish his repressive apparatus in Saudi Arabia since 1991. Among the results of

this was the little news that reached us about what happened there to clone Takfir and use it to accuse the anticipated Jihād in Saudi Arabia.

Several survivors from the infamous (al-Ruwais) prison in Jeddah, both Saudis and non-Saudis from among the Jihādīs, recounted that after the two bombing incidents in Riyadh and Khobar in 1994, and the subsequent activity of some Jihādī organizations in Saudi Arabia, thousands of young men were arrested for interrogation, whether they had prior Jihādī involvement or were suspected of it. The youth were subjected to various horrific forms of torture, which Saudi security imported from Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and other countries well-versed in the "sciences" of torture. However, what they benefited from the Algerian security experience was the utility of the Takfir current in destroying Jihād! This was one of the most important lessons: they proceeded to clone and generate it by creating the components of the right side of the equation:

One of those who witnessed the experiment in al-Ruwais prison in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, said:

"After rounds of physical torture involving beatings and electricity... a supervisor of psychological torture, a Shī'ī man from the Nakhāwilah, who introduced himself as (Abū Nāyif), in his sixties and lame, would come to us. He would make us hear such forms of blasphemy, cursing of the religion, the Lord, the sanctities of Islam, mockery of its rituals, and cursing of Jihād and the Mujāhidīn... that what we had suffered in the torture sessions seemed insignificant compared to the hideousness of what we heard. Then he would say to us: 'You want the rule of Sharī'ah?! And what is this that the walī al-amr (ruler) governs by? Is it not Sharī'ah? Don't you like the Sharī'ah of the (...!!...) [and he would mention a sexual act in vulgar colloquial language],' and he would laugh, and the executioners would laugh. He would continue: 'This Shaykh Ibn 'Uthaymīn and Ibn Bāz say it is Sharī'ah, and that it is the state of Tawḥīd...' and he would go on in this manner... Often, the detained Jihādī

brothers would be taken, gathered naked, covering their private parts with their hands. Then they would be called one by one. The detainee would be tied and hung, then an executioner would come and fondle his genitals with a stick in his hand. Then he would bring a plastic model of a male genital organ and begin to pass it over the detainee's anus! And threaten him with rape and sodomy if he did not comply with what was demanded of him. Then he would demand that he sign papers of a report confessing that he declares takfīr upon the walī al-amr, declares takfīr upon the 'ulamā', and declares takfīr upon Saudi society!! It was narrated from some brothers that some had the act of sodomy committed against them and were raped by Saudi executioners!!"

Employees receiving salaries from "the state of Tawhīd by which Allāh has benefited [people] and through which goodness has been achieved that none knows except Allāh!!" – according to the false testimony so often repeated by the Muftī of the land – their "esteemed father" – and the Council of Senior Agents (a play on 'ulamā', scholars), and it seems this is some of that "goodness"!!. We have previously presented the Saudi opposition's statement regarding these heinous matters, which I hesitated greatly to include out of modesty and to preserve the feelings of those who read this book.

But I found that "The right of the Truth (Allāh) is more binding than the right of creation," as Ibn al-Qayyim (may Allāh have mercy on him) said. And people must know at least a part of what goes on.

The witnesses from (al-Ruwais) prison added that foreign detainees from other Arab countries were severely tortured to sign confessions stating that they had transferred the ideology of Takfīr to Saudi Arabia, and that they had brought weapons and ammunition into the Kingdom. All this under duress of threats and torture methods similar to those known to be used in countries with a long history in such practices, like Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and others. Some of them

mentioned to me that there was a torture session with whips called (al-mawzah, "the banana") because the detainee's skin is peeled in it!! He is tied backwards, his hands to his feet, so his back arches and his shape becomes like a banana, and he is beaten on his stomach and... There is an iron cage called (Sandarīllā, "Cinderella") in which the detainee is hung, his four limbs tied to the bars, then it spins rapidly, and he is electrocuted periodically. The detainee comes out unconscious, water is poured on him, and he is demanded to confess... and so on... So, contemplate the equation anew...

An oppressive kāfir ruler + a criminal executioner repeating blasphemy then reminding them of the ‘ulamā’s ruling that the walī al-amr upholds Tawḥīd (and here the mechanism of Takfīr is triggered in the mind of the poor detainee). Then the detainees are left in group cells where intelligence officers or some afflicted with Takfīr are planted to stir up discussion in these atmospheres, so the "genes" of Takfīr are cloned. Then confessions are signed in exchange for release. Glorified be He Who said: *{Shall I inform you upon whom the devils descend?}* (Al-Shu‘arā’: 221). We heard these testimonies in 1995. No real confrontation had yet begun in Saudi Arabia. But now that its signs have started to appear, Saudi intelligence has a huge archive of these Takfīrī "treasures," for the ignorant among the Sultan's ‘ulamā’ to rely on and issue fatwās that the Mujāhidīn fighting the Americans and their tails from the House of Sa‘ūd are Takfīrī Khawārij!

Anyone following the media and its coverage of events orchestrated by the Jihādīs today sees the focus on accusing the brothers of being Khawārij, and on the ideology of the early Khawārij, through a theatrical production accusing them of having split the unity of the Muslims, declared takfīr upon the ruler and the ruled, stored explosives in Makkah and Madīnah, and placed bombs inside booby-trapped copies of the Qur’ān! And killed innocent Muslims and those under covenant of security... and so on. The trap has succeeded to a large extent. A number of trusted ‘ulamā’ in

Saudi Arabia came out to participate in this play, prepared and directed by Prince Nāyif and his advisors from Arab intelligence agencies.

This observation is one of the most important things to be aware of regarding the interplay between Takfīr and intelligence agencies. Some detail will follow when we touch upon a brief account of the Jihād catastrophe in Algeria in the next chapter, in shā' Allāh.

Fourthly: The Islamic Ṣaḥwah in the post-September (2001) world:

The West had raised a slogan expressed by the late French President – may he go to hell – (Mitterrand) when he said: "We will strike extremist Islam with moderate Islam." This led to the inauguration of the "flourishing democratic era," making political Islamic schools of thought practically part of (the elite) – Pharaoh's elite – alongside (the ruler, the priest/soothsayer, and the aides). The Ṣaḥwah achieved some gains, but the price was to stand against the Jihādī tide.

However, over the past decade, a logical development occurred that was not in the calculations of the West or its apostate agents, who, due to their grudges, could not comprehend the gushing spiritual momentum and nature of Islam. And look at some of Allāh's signs:

- The "moderate" Islamists, as they call them, ultimately have no commodity to offer but Islam.

So, if they are given space (mosques... schools... seminars... lectures... publications... newspapers... parliament halls... contact with the public), they have no commodity other than Islamic projects and talk about: (implementing Sharī'ah... Jihād for Palestine... issues of justice and oppression... combating corruption... social reform... commitment and Islamic ethics... etc.). Even with personal objectives and partisan interests, these messages—whether their proponents are sincere or merely use them to trade in slogans—have significantly contributed to expanding the popular

base for Islam and religious conceptions. This was a huge horizontal gain on the path of Islamizing societies, which, by their innate nature, realize—after the religious spirit has permeated them—the need to confront those situations and clash with them when peaceful reform is not possible.

Similarly, the Jihādīs or "extremists," as they call them, find in such respites and atmospheres of political and security relaxation an opportunity for clandestine expansion, reorganizing their ranks, and acquiring broader bases within the general margin of the Ṣaḥwah. The same can be said for non-political, Da‘wah-oriented Islamists.

The creeping Islamization of Arab and Islamic societies, which the West calls "the return to fundamentalism," deeply troubles them. Even though a large segment and the vast majority of societies are moving towards immorality, disobedience, and detachment from religion according to the program of secularization and those who implement it. Yet, they wish to extinguish Allāh's light with their mouths, with all its traces, and they do not want truth to exist, nor for those who carry it to have the right to movement and life. Over a decade, the Crusader West and the Sages of Zion—our rulers who are their lackeys—discovered the mistake of democratic openness, so they raised a new slogan: "We want (democracy without Islamists in Muslim lands)!!"

Although this statement is self-contradictory, because democracy means the people ruling themselves and signifies the principle of the Ummah's sovereignty. The natural and logical thing is to respect its choice, out of respect for the principle itself. But the hypocritical West and its followers—the rulers and secularists in our countries, who are even more audacious in their hypocrisy—were ready to lick up the principle itself, so they said what they said: "(Democracy... but... without Islamists!!)."

Soon, the slogan turned into practical application, and most countries closed the democratic margin. Other countries chose to deflate it from within, by tailoring electoral laws or constitutional amendments that leave Islamists with only the husks. Consequently, only opportunistic Islamists, or those prepared to tailor and re-stitch Islam according to the taste of the ruler—who is himself ruled by his master, the enemy of Islam and Muslims—continue in the game.

Thus, Islamic democracy in Algeria was brutally suppressed (1991) through a military coup, the price of which was a civil war that has so far claimed about one hundred and fifty thousand lives. Similarly, Islamic democrats and their leader Erbakan were removed from the head of government and parliamentary majority in Turkey via a soft political coup, only to be thrown into prisons or banned from political activity. Musharraf then launched a military coup against Pakistan's democracy, subsequently tailoring a system for them that was (democratic, dictatorial, military, civilian, intelligence-led, under American supervision!). Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, and others tailored electoral laws that cast Islamists as a minority in the corridors of parliament. Or, in the best-case scenarios, they were given ministries of water and electricity... or the Ministry of Mills and Fisheries... in countries that are not even on the sea! And so on...

The West discovered it was facing a tight, divinely ordained equation, driven by the vibrant spirit of this divine religion. The essence of this equation is:

If the enemies of Islām strike the Islamists and confront the Awakening with coups, prisons, and oppression... they provide justifications for taking up arms, and the Jihādīs expand, growing in depth and quality! And if they open space for political moderation to counter the Jihādīs with moderates, Islām spreads horizontally and at the grassroots level and proliferates! So they return to oppression, and Jihād returns to growth! Then they return to openness, and Islām returns to spread and expand! This occurs in a recurring cycle of Allāh's plan against them.

Thus, they found that awareness, development, the communications revolution, and the world of satellite channels and the Internet had opened the minds of the peoples. That the thrones of colonial governors and their deputies among our rulers were threatened. That Israel was besieged by fundamentalism. That oil sources and the weapon stockpiles of government armies were vulnerable to falling into the hands of popular revolutions led by hardliners. So, the West decided on direct invasion and occupation of the center of the conflict (the Middle East): the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. It sought to extend greater control over what remained by supporting apostate rulers to increase oppression, just as America increased the capabilities of its military bases. The American presence alone, in the Central Command area of operations (Central Asia, the Arab world, and the Horn of Africa), reached about 1.5 million American soldiers under a single central command. Its forces are distributed from Kabul, Tashkent, and Merv... in Central Asia, from the farthest east of Muslim lands, to Baghdad, Amman, and the Arabian Peninsula... to Egypt, Western Sahara, and Somalia in the Middle East... to Tangier and the Atlantic coasts in the farthest west of the lands of Islām. This is what they today call (the Greater Middle East), and they are laying plans to occupy it culturally in all aspects. The prelude to this, as we saw, was the destruction of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq, and the declaration of war on the Awakening in all its spectrums. Bush "corrected" Mitterrand's statement when he divided Islamists into moderates and "stray" hardliners... for the slogan, American style, to become:

"(There is no moderate Islām! All Islamists are extremists and must be eliminated)." This American war was to include everyone, starting from the Jihādīs, extending to the moderates, and passing through the smallest humanitarian charitable institution working in distributing copies of the Qur'ān or caring for orphans.

And this was by the grace of Allāh. For this policy resulted not only in cornering the entire Awakening and preparing it for resistance and taking up arms, but also in opening the door for the ordinary man in the street to take up arms under the banner of Islām.

This is what some of America's pharaonic masterminds had warned against, just as the president of Egypt exclaimed before parliament at the beginning of America's invasion of Iraq that America's policy would create for us a hundred Bin Ladens instead of one... But the foolish, bigoted Bush, captive to his Zionist advisors, did not comprehend this plan of Allāh against him. So he proceeded with the policy of eradication, to be followed by the rulers of Muslim countries. Part of this was what I heard yesterday from the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah... in a hysterical speech addressed to the people on the evening of August 1, 2003, saying:

"(Anyone who harbors a terrorist is a terrorist like him. Anyone who sympathizes with a terrorist is a terrorist like him. And when the state confronts terrorists, there is no place for neutrality or a middle ground)."

This is the gist of Bush's current slogan:

"(Whoever is not with us in our war on terror is against us, and there is no place for neutrality)."

Indeed, the equation proceeds with the grace of Allāh, for the most important causal conditions for victory to be realized through the entire Ummah entering the battle, forcibly or voluntarily. As for the divinely decreed causes of victory, that is Allāh's victory, which He sends down when He wills, upon whom He wills, where He wills... And we ask Allāh that we witness it and be among the fuel for its realization in the path of Allāh.

As for the effect of this blundering policy on the four schools of the Awakening in the few years after September 2001, it is, in brief, as follows:

First: The Non-Political Islamic Awakening after September 2001:

In Amman, the capital of Jordan... one of the leaders of (Jamā'at al-Tablīgh wa al-Da'wah) shouted in detention, at the interrogator, astonished and protesting, saying:

"(We did not practice Jihād or politics, nor did we confront you! We call to Allāh in our mosques, reform people, and save them from corruption and the world of taverns and crimes...)!" The expert interrogator, an intelligence officer who had learned his lesson, told him: "(This is the problem: you are the bus! You take people from the street to the mosque. Then the Ikhwān come and take them from the mosque to politics! Then the extremists come and take their pick of the youth for Jihād and extremism! We want to cut off this entire path from its roots. We want to stop the bus! ..)"

This explains the whole truth of the confrontation today. It is a true, realistic story, extremely expressive and significant...

Thus, governments today confront the non-political religious Awakening and suppress it. They close mosques, restrict schools, and ban sermons... Indeed, Saudi Arabia is now referring more than 1,800 preachers and callers to psychological rehabilitation courses! To distance them from extremism and make them understand the fundamentals of the world of American hegemony post-September and Iraq! Egypt has announced that it has dismissed thousands of teachers accused of fundamentalism from the teaching apparatus! This is within the framework of the war of ideas and curricula... Kuwait announced it has no choice but to confront hardliners, and most Islamic countries announced amendments to religious and general education programs. It even reached the point where the Minister of Culture in Pakistan (Zubaida Jalal) demanded, on television screens and before the media, the deletion of Sūrahs: (Āl 'Imrān, Al-Anfāl, and Al-Tawbah) because they call for terrorism!!

Second: The Political Awakening in the Post-September (2001) World:

As I mentioned earlier, avenues for effective political participation are closed to them today, and they are subjected to repression. If there is anything to add, it is the birth of prostrate political Islamists and callers, compressible without limits, and prone to dilution without restraint. They have transgressed the methodology, their methodology. Indeed, they have surpassed previous angles of deviation... A few days ago, I heard one of the Muslim Brotherhood candidates for the Press Syndicate elections in Egypt, responding to a newspaper's question: "You are an Islamist, so how can you represent 400 journalists from all spectrums?" He said: "(I have my orientation! But when I represent journalists, I represent the Muslim, the Christian, the Communist, those who have a religion, and those who have no religion!)" Contemplate if such words leave any room for contemplation!

The representative of the Islamic Movement in Iraq sits in the local governing council under (Bremer) to pass and justify the occupation! The Muslim Brotherhood and the Surūrīs in Saudi Arabia fight against Jihād and Jihādīs, hand over their members to the intelligence services, and call on them to surrender to the state through their homes! And you can say the same about the Islamists in the parliament in Morocco... Those democratic Islamists who remain in the political game have become an essential part of the battalions of the New World Order in confronting the bearers of the banners of Jihād and resistance in the Ummah...

It must be noted that their margin for positive contribution is shrinking day by day, as political Islamists try to fight colonialism under the dome of parliament! And limit the tyranny of the Pharaohs through marches! And there are still those among them who think this is possible!

Third: The Jihādī Awakening after September (2001):

America has targeted Jihādīs – groups and individuals, and even their supporters and sympathizers – in its war. This was after realizing that they are, in practice, the living heart of the Ummah and its remaining weapon to defend itself. The details of this confrontation involve many witnessed events, which I will leave for the next chapter, Inshā'Allāh.

Fourth: The Deviant Awakening of the Takfīrīs after September (2001):

This phenomenon has shrunk further. Were it not for what Arab and Islamic media in some regions, like Saudi Arabia, try to highlight and talk about its existence, no one would have heard of it. And praise be to Allāh.

After this brief review of the path of the Islamic Awakening and the summary of its harvest over more than seventy years since its birth, it remains for us to conclude this chapter with a summary and to draw attention to two important phenomena of the non-Jihādī Islamic Awakening, as we will leave the coverage of Jihādī observations for the sixth chapter.

- Conclusion on the Path of the Islamic Awakening and its Outcome (1930 - 2003):

This conclusion can be expressed very briefly by saying that the Islamic Awakening, in all its four schools, has reached bankruptcy, failed to achieve its goals, and entered the bottom of the crisis. There is no hope for the continuation of what is sound among them unless they reconsider their methodologies, objectives, and methods of operation according to the constants of Islamic Sharī'ah with the discipline of a committed Muslim, and according to the givens of the new Fiqh of reality in light of the contemporary American Crusader campaigns in the post-September world and the occupation of Iraq. The path of the Awakening during those seven decades can be expressed by the following diagram:

[To view the diagram, refer to the printed version of the book (Word or PDF)]

This diagram clearly shows:

1. That the Awakening, with most of its convergent trends, was born shortly after the Caliphate, around 1930.
2. The schools of the Awakening proceeded and grew convergently, intertwined in their nature, in a mixed manner regarding methodology, objectives, and methods, until around 1960.
3. Each of its four schools continued its contribution and path until 1990 in a distinct manner.
4. Between (1990 - 2000), the paths of the political and non-political Awakenings converged as the latter approached the former.
5. The path of the Jihādī Awakening declined from 1990, reaching the year 2000 in an exhausted state.
6. As the year 2000 approached, all schools of the Awakening began to collapse in their contribution and path.
7. With the year 2001 and the beginning of the post-September world... signs of collapse and disintegration emerged in all schools of the Awakening. This indicates the continued collapse of the political and deviant schools, along with signs of a renaissance for the Jihādī Awakening due to the conditions of direct colonialism. Additionally, the non-political Awakening is expected to flourish as a result of conditions of oppression, colonialism, and general helplessness. It also indicates that all have reached the bottom of the crisis.

Considering that I belong to the Jihādī current and write for it, and my discussion of the other schools of the Awakening is only brief and to the extent that they intertwined with the path of the Jihādī Awakening, the details of my conceptions of reform and contributing to shaping the future path will focus on writing about the

horizons of the Jihādī current and the program for reforming its path throughout the remaining chapters of this book.

As for reforming the path of the political and non-political Awakenings, that is the work of their proponents, writers, and theorists. If there is any advice for them for the sake of Allāh, His Messenger, His Book, the leaders of the Muslims, and their common folk, it is that Islamists should stay away from the doors of the rulers and the three institutions of apostasy: executive, legislative, and judicial. For entering them is ḥarām, not approved by Sharīʿah, and a disobedience to Allāh not justified by political sophistry – as we shall see with Sharīʿah evidence later, InshāʾAllāh. Although we seek excuses for some of them for actions and sayings that contradict the requirements of Īmān and Tawḥīd, on the grounds that they are interpreting based on maṣāliḥ mursalah (unrestricted public interest) and considering the state of istiḍāf (being deemed weak or oppressed).

Indeed, whoever follows the condition of most of them will find in it a confirmation of what is reported in the athar from the Messenger of Allāh (peace and blessings be upon him): “A servant does not draw nearer to the ruler except that he draws further from Allāh.” In their experience and the bitter harvest that has passed, there is the greatest proof of this saying.

As for reforming the deviant Awakening and the Takfīr it produced, if there is any advice that might benefit its adherents, it is that they repent to Allāh, engage in Jihād against the original kuffār and their apostate agents, and cease aggression against Muslims of all classes, from the common folk to the scholars of Islām. I ask Allāh to rectify them and take charge of the affairs of those who refuse.

As for the specific advice for the adherents of the non-political Awakening, it is that they focus on their very important role today in light of the cultural and methodological colonial onslaught. Focus on preserving the Dīn of the Ummah

through da‘wah and education, and pay attention to safeguarding the Dīn – and they know better than us and are more experienced in the ways to do so.

As for the additional specific advice for the adherents of the political Awakening, it is that they work in the fields of civil resistance, political and media work, according to the two principles of resisting colonialism and not entering the structures of the ruler and the malicious triangle of power consisting of (the ruler, the elite, the aides, and the soothsayers).

Because by doing so, they will stand, whether they realize it or not, in confrontation with the Ummah.

I draw attention to an important truth, as frank and perhaps harsh as it is: the leaders of the September world have declared and made it known that there is no place for neutrality in the confrontation.

So, it is either with the Crusader campaigns – of colonialism, colonial deputies, and colonial agents – and consequently a fate, by Allāh's justice, to Hellfire, Inshā’Allāh, and what an evil destination.

Or it is in confronting them, and thus Jihād and armed or civil resistance with the hand; if not, then with the tongue; and if not, then with the heart, and that is the weakest of Īmān, and beyond that there is not a mustard seed's worth of Īmān. Let everyone seek for himself the highest ranks as much as he can...

As Allāh the Exalted said: *{And whoever strives only strives for [the benefit of] himself. Indeed, Allāh is free from need of the worlds.}* (Al-‘Ankabūt: 6).

And as he (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “So whoever is absolved is safe, but (as for) he who is pleased and follows...”

On the Day of Resurrection, one will realize, and one will regret, when regret is of no avail, that there are two paths and no neutrality: a party in Paradise and a party in the Blaze. And they are not equal.

And we ask Allāh for the stations of those upon whom Allāh has bestowed favor – of

the prophets, the ṣiddīqīn, the shuhadā', and the ṣāliḥīn. And excellent are those as companions.

As for the two important pauses regarding the path of the political and non-political Awakenings, they are: a pause on the phenomenon of political Irjā' in the Awakening, and a pause on the phenomenon of democratic practices among Islamists. We will address the first here and leave the discussion of the second for the section on Thought and Methodology in Chapter One of the Eighth Part of the Second Volume, Inshā'Allāh.

A Pause on the Spread of the Creed of Political Irjā' in the Islamic Awakening

The emergence of the Murji'ah school of thought dates back to the appearance of the scholars of the ruler (palace scholars) with the rise of monarchy and the demise of the Rāshidūn Caliphate, when the separation of the Sultan and the Qur'ān began. The summary of that deviant creed is that al-Īmān is affirmation by the heart and declaration by the tongue, after the adherents of this school excluded action from the definition of al-Īmān. They said, "Al-Īmān is affirmation," and "Sin does not harm [one's] Īmān." And, "Whoever says Lā ilāha illā Allāh (There is no god but Allāh), we rule him to be a Muslim regardless of whatever sayings or actions he may subsequently commit." They invalidated all the detailed rules concerning the nullifiers of Īmān supported by evidence from the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, and the sayings of esteemed jurists.

Ibn 'Asākir narrated from al-Naḍr ibn Shumayl, who said: "I entered upon al-Ma'mūn, and he said: 'How are you this morning, O Naḍr?' I said, 'Well, O Amīr al-Mu'minīn.' He then asked: 'What is al-Irjā'?' I replied: 'A religion that suits kings; through it, they gain from their worldly life and diminish from their religion.' He said: 'You have spoken the truth.'"

The scholars of the sultans adopted this school of thought to the extent that the verifying scholars accurately labeled the school of al-Murji'ah as a religion that pleases kings. According to this school, they [the rulers] are Muslims and guardians to whom obedience is due, even if they take your wealth and flog your back. The Ummah said, "We are content." They are Muslims, and they have taken wealth and flogged backs. But the scholars of the sultans expanded it for them a little, so it became [permissible] even if your honor is violated! Even if your blood is shed! Even if he proclaims, by word and deed, as his predecessor proclaimed:

{And Fir'awn proclaimed among his people, saying, 'O my people, does not the kingdom of Egypt belong to me, and these rivers flowing beneath me? Then do you not see?'} (Al-Zukhruf: 51). Even if he declares the Shari'ah unfit for this age! Even if he allies with the enemies of Allāh! Even if he fights and dispatches armies to fight alongside Jews and Christians to shed the blood of Muslims! Even if... even if...

Does not the ruler pray the two 'īds? And celebrate the Prophet's birthday (Mawlid al-Nabawī)? Does he not commit zinā under the pretext of nikāḥ al-mut'ah (temporary marriage), which some have permitted? When he strips free Muslim men and women of their clothes in detention centers and tortures them, does he not find justification in the saying of 'Alī (raḍiya Allāhu 'anhu) to the messenger of Ḥāṭib (raḍiya Allāhu 'anhu), "You will either produce the letter, or we will remove the clothes!"? Is it not permissible for the ruler to kill one-third of his subjects for the remaining two-thirds to be safe for him? Indeed, evidence for all of this has been cited, according to the deceivers among today's charlatan scholars. This religion, due to its excessive ease, has even accommodated Musaylimah!

Thus, the late, esteemed Imām, the Imām of scholars, Ibn 'Uthaymīn, came up with a development of the Murji'ah school, saying—and marvel as you wish at what he said concerning a statement that could almost cause the earth to split asunder and the mountains to fall down in devastation—he said: "And if we assume, as a remote

possibility, that the ruler is a *kāfir* (disbeliever), does that mean we should incite people's hearts against him until rebellion, chaos, and fighting occur? There is no doubt that this is a mistake." Then he added a clarification, lest anyone should think he meant the rulers in his own country, for they, praise be to Allāh, rule by the *Sharīʿah*. He explained that his intention was that if a ruler in another country were to commit *kufr*, it would still not be permissible to revolt.

With this statement, he rejected the explicit *Qurʾān*, the authentic *Sunnah*, and the creed of the *Ummah*'s consensus! All for the sake of the *Āl Saʿūd* and their ilk! Then *al-Albānī* took charge of another contemporary school of *Irjāʾ* and said, "Revolting against the rulers in this era is a revolt against *Islām* itself!" And he testified that they [the rulers] are Muslims. Then the charlatan whom they call the Grand Muftī of Pakistan, *Rafīʿ ʿUthmānī*, stood up to say that those who are killed while defending themselves against the Pakistani army's raids are not martyrs! He thus rejected the ruling of the *Ḥadīth* of the Messenger of Allāh (*ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam*) that whoever is killed defending his wealth, his honor, his life, his rights against oppression, or his religion is a martyr. And [he said] that the Americans and their like are *mustaʿminūn* (granted security) and *dhimmiyyūn* (protected non-Muslims) against whom aggression is not permissible, not even in their own countries. He withdrew from the *Dār al-Fatwā* a previous permissibility for martyrdom operations. And he said, "We are not obligated to perform *Jihād* unless the ruler calls for it (*Musharraf*... just as was the case during the days of *Ḍiyāʾ al-Ḥaqq* when he called for *Jihād* against the Russians!!!). And he said that whoever fights with the Americans against Muslims is sinful but does not commit *kufr*, and that legislating without [reference to] Allāh is a sin and does not expel one from the religion, being minor *kufr* at the very most!!" etc.

And say the same about the *imāms* of *daʿwah* and religious sciences from the contemporary *Murjiʾah* of this era, those among them who have passed on—and

their affair is with Allāh—and those who are still a slithering snake... What draws attention in the school of contemporary political Irjā' is that it tolerated deferring judgment and making excuses when dealing with kings, sultans, and their actions, but it could not tolerate deferring judgment regarding the actions of the Mujāhidīn. Instead, it ruled that they are the dogs of Hellfire! That they will not even smell the fragrance of Paradise! And that they should be killed, crucified, their limbs cut off on opposite sides, and exiled from the land in this world!

How can they kill a Christian occupier who came with the permission of the ruler, thus becoming a dhimmi, a musta'min, and a mu'āhad? Then came the criminals who claim to be waging Jihād and shed the blood of this "pure" Crusader! And they violated the protection of the "apostate" who granted him security?!

And stranger still regarding the school of political Irjā' in the Islamic Awakening is a peculiar observation! It is that its leading figures, from the extremists of Taṣawwuf (Sufism) to the extremists who claim Salafiyyah, declared takfīr upon one another over the understanding of the Divine Names and Attributes and the schools of Ash'ariyyah, Māturīdiyyah, Salafiyyah, and the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth. They differed over the Essence of Allāh, the Blessed and Exalted, and His Names and Attributes! Yet they agreed—and glory be to the One Who unites hearts—on the Islamic status of the ruler and his names and attributes! This happened among them in Morocco, Pakistan, and wherever the two schools coexisted. Thus, they found more latitude concerning the kings of the earth than they did concerning the King of the heavens and the earth and all that is within them!

It seems that a researcher finds no justification for this school of thought except to justify to its adherents their entry into the components of the ruling establishment (al-mala') when they opted for politics and working within democracy. For they would enter parliament (an institution that legislates without [reference to] Allāh) and they would enter government (an institution that rules by other than what Allāh

has revealed). So how could this be permissible if they were to declare the ruler a *kāfir*, while they themselves are part of his faction, his partners, and his establishment?! What, then, is the way out? Either they do not enter! Or they rule him to be a Muslim! So they chose the easier and more enjoyable path! And they ruled in favor of the Islām of an apostate who openly wages war and enmity against Allāh, and vies with Him in the most exclusive attributes of Divinity.

Here is a story I experienced myself, and it is quite significant! I relate it merely as an example; otherwise, the evidence these days is too numerous to count.

When I emigrated from Syria during the collapse of the Jihādī movement—and I had been affiliated with the Jihādī organization (*al-Ṭalī‘ah al-Muqātilah*)—my situation led me to become a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, then a member of the leadership of the Brotherhood's military apparatus in 1980. We were in Baghdad, and as military cadres, we were unaware of what our political leaders were planning. But we were surprised when they halted military operations, practically dissolved their structures, and announced the beginning of a phase of political Jihād. In March 1982 (after causing the destruction of Ḥamāh and the liquidation of Mujāhidīn throughout Syria), they announced the formation of a national alliance. This alliance included the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Front, a group of independent Sufi scholars, the right-wing Ba‘ath Party affiliated with Iraq under Ṣaddām's patronage at the time, and subsidiary secular parties to confront the leftist Nuṣayrī Ba‘ath Party in Syria. For this, they wrote an "Islamic-secular" charter, reflecting the identity of those who formed the alliance. Then, the "National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria" was expanded to include Rif‘at al-Asad, the Nuṣayrī brother of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad! Rif‘at! Who was responsible for the massacres and mass graves of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Muslims? Because he had become an opponent of the regime led by his brother in his power struggle with him. This orientation was followed by a new intellectual curriculum and a new fiqh that the

Brotherhood's educational apparatus had to inculcate in the Mujāhidīn. Shaykh Munīr al-Ghaḍbān of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (and he later retracted what he wrote in subsequent writings—may Allāh forgive him) wrote the book "Political Alliance in Islām." Along with Shaykh Saʿīd Ḥawwā, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah, and Syrian Brotherhood scholars, he undertook the task of presenting a new fiqh suitable for the stage, in which deductions from the treaties of the Messenger (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam) were distorted. This continued until one of the senior educators in the Brotherhood at the time confided in me, saying, "I have a crisis! How can I teach the youth these books that reconcile us with the secularists and explain to them the National Alliance charter, and then teach them Sayyid Quṭb's book 'Milestones'?"

For those who want more information and details on this issue, they can refer to my book "The Jihādī Revolution in Syria - Pains and Hopes," published in 1990.

During the same period, in 1989 in Amman, one of the mentors in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood told me that when the Jordanian Brotherhood decided to enter the Jordanian Parliament and ministries—that is, the legislative and executive authorities—under "His Majesty" King Ḥusayn "the Great," as Radio Amman would repeat! Our brother told me: "Listen to this marvel:

I joined the Brotherhood organization in the early seventies. I was asked to believe in the kufr of King Ḥusayn because he ruled by other than what Allāh revealed. Our primary book was 'Milestones.' I had read some books of tafsīr and came across the saying of some of the Tābiʿīn regarding this: 'kufr dūna kufr' (a lesser form of disbelief). I thought that Ḥusayn was a Muslim and not a kāfir, even if he was an unjust transgressor. After I voiced my 'knowledge' about the Islamic status of the unjust ruler, I was subjected to a Brotherhood tribunal where the organization gave me a period to adopt the belief in King Ḥusayn's kufr or be expelled from the organization! My membership was frozen during that time. I considered the matter,

and Allāh guided me to what He guided them to, so I declared King Ḥusayn's kufr and returned as a member of the organization. After some years, I became a mentor in it, teaching the youth the evidence for King Ḥusayn's kufr from 'Milestones' and other sources. In this year (1989-1990), nearly twenty years after that incident, the Jordanian Brotherhood entered Parliament, and some of them joined the ministry. The Brotherhood wrote fiqh treatises testifying to Ḥusayn's Islām and the permissibility of entering Parliament. Some permitted taking ministerial positions but not parliamentary seats, based on the example of Prophet Yūsuf working for Pharaoh as a treasurer! Others held the opposite view, and a third group permitted both. However, they once again agreed on Ḥusayn's Islām to solve the problem of entering the government.'

My companion continued: 'But over twenty years in the Muslim Brotherhood, I had become fully convinced of King Ḥusayn's kufr; I studied it and taught it. So how could I now accept his Islām merely based on a statement from the organization?! I stood firm on my position. I was subjected to a new organizational trial during which I was given a deadline to be convinced of King Ḥusayn's Islām, or else I would be expelled from the organization!! And my membership was frozen during this period!' So I asked, 'What did you do?' He replied: 'I decided to "expel" the organization from my membership!! And I decided to "freeze" them from being Muslim Brothers. These people cannot be my brothers, and I don't know what is left of them as Muslims?!'

Thus, the principles of Irjā' entered the Islamic Awakening, so they followed the sunnah of the people of Nasī', making it lawful one year and unlawful another, to correspond with the period that Allāh had forbidden!!

This is the sole explanation for the phenomenon of political Irjā': the whims of politics and the art of the possible; the price of loitering at the gates of sultans and the confirmation of the Ḥadīth of the Messenger of Allāh (ṣallā Allāhu 'alayhi wa

sallam): "Whoever frequents the gates of rulers is put to trial (uftutina)" and "A servant does not draw nearer to the Sultan except that he draws further from Allāh." This is the truth, quite simply: the political Murji'ah have been put to trial at the gates of sultans and have strayed far from the fundamentals of Allāh's Sharī'ah. And the Arabic language is clear: uftutina (he was put to trial/tempted) is from fatana (to tempt/test), yaftinu (he tempts/tests), so he is fattān (a tempter) and maftūn (one who is tempted/tested)...

As for the second reason, or the second explanation for the phenomenon of political Irjā', it is the whips of the torturer in prisons and the policy of the aforementioned "banana" sessions and "Cinderella" electricity. And preferring to belong to the current of Irjā' over entering a current of 220 volts!!

As for the third explanation, it is Satan and his deceptions. And so, between the deceptions of Iblīs, the whips of a despicable torturer, and the gains of a seat in the wretched parliament, this malicious fiqh was born. And the scholars of the sultans and the deviant du'āt (callers) sat inside the institutions of power.

Innā lillāhi wa innā ilayhi rāji'ūn (Indeed, to Allāh we belong, and indeed, to Him we shall return).

It goes without saying that there is another type of Irjā': the Irjā' of hypocritical scholars who knowingly concealed what Allāh revealed. They sold Allāh's Sharī'ah and altered it with understanding, due to the glitter of the Sultan's gold and greed for His saying: {*Yes, and indeed, you will then be among those brought near [to me].*} (Al-Shu'arā': 42). This is an Irjā' whose nature and causes are clear and require no discussion. Our Lord's Book has identified its adherents for us when He, the Exalted, said:

{*The example of those who were entrusted with the Torah and then did not uphold it is like that of a donkey carrying volumes [of books]...*} (Al-Jumu'ah: 5), and when He

further elaborated on their conditions by saying: *{And recite to them, [O Muḥammad], the news of him to whom We gave Our signs, but he detached himself from them; so Satan pursued him, and he became of the deviators. And if We had willed, we could have elevated him thereby, but he adhered [instead] to the earth and followed his own desire. So his example is like that of the dog: if you chase him, he pants, or if you leave him, he [still] pants. That is the example of the people who denied Our signs. So relate the stories that perhaps they will give thought.}* [Al-A'raf: 175-176].